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Abstract
The information leakage of electronic devices, especially those used in cryptographic or other vital applications, represents a serious practical threat to secure
systems. While physical implementation attacks have evolved rapidly over the last
decade, relatively little work has been done to allow system designers to effectively
counter the identified threats. This work addresses the technology gap between
identified problems and potential solutions, and significantly advances the study of
information leakage in two primary areas of investigation:
1. Radio-Frequency “Distinct Native Attribute” (RF-DNA) fingerprinting of integrated circuits (ICs) for device authentication, and
2. Leakage mapping to assess the information leakage of arbitrary cryptographic
implementations.
First, the RF-DNA fingerprinting technique is used to recognize unique ICs
based on fabrication process-induced variations in unintentional electromagnetic
(EM) emissions in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. The effectiveness of the technique is demonstrated through an extensive empirical study,
indicating the technique scales well for both identification and verification tasks.
Empirical results are presented for 40 near-identical devices, with correct device
identification success rates of greater than 99.5%, and average verification equal error rates (EERs) of less than 0.05%. Correct identification success rates exceeding
90% were maintained under analysis conditions of SNR ≥ 15 dB.
Whereas all previously known techniques require device hardware or software
modifications, RF-DNA fingerprinting permits opportunistic passive authentication
using unintentional RF emissions during pre-existing processes and protocols. This
characteristic makes the approach suitable for security applications involving com-

xii

modity commercial ICs, with substantial cost and scalability advantages over previous approaches.
Second, a systematic leakage mapping methodology is developed and demonstrated to comprehensively assess the information leakage of arbitrary block cipher
implementations. The proposed framework provides a comprehensive approach to
assess the information leakage of all algorithmically specified key-dependent intermediate computations for implementations of symmetric block ciphers. The resulting
leakage assessment quantitatively bounds the resistance of an implementation to the
general class of differential side channel analysis techniques, and provides system
designers and evaluators with a tool to objectively assess whether countermeasures
implemented are justified given the added cost in time, space, and energy compared
to the obtained reduction in exploitable information leakage. Furthermore, the systematic approach enables evaluators to quickly and efficiently repeat the assessment
process for different variations of implementations, which helps to ensure the addition of countermeasures does not inadvertently introduce new unexpected sources of
information leakage.
The leakage mapping framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, with recommendations to extend the technique using more accurate models. The approach effectiveness is demonstrated through empirical assessment of two typical unprotected implementations
of the Advanced Encryption Standard, and the assessment results are empirically
validated against correlation-based differential power and electromagnetic analysis
attacks.

xiii

EXPLOITATION OF UNINTENTIONAL
INFORMATION LEAKAGE FROM INTEGRATED CIRCUITS

1. Introduction
It is common knowledge that electronic equipment radiates electromagnetic
(EM) energy that can interfere with other nearby devices. It is for this reason
that airline passengers are required to “turn off all portable electronic devices”, and
consumer electronics sold in the U.S. are required to undergo certification testing for
compliance with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations [FCC09].
Digital devices that incorporate clocks, oscillators, or other high frequency pulses are
specifically regulated as known unintentional emitters because they produce radio
frequency (RF) radiation.
Over the past decade there has been a growing realization that the content of
unintentional emissions, in addition to being a source of interference, can also be
a source of information about the emission producing device’s internal state. This
realization has profound implications for the physical security of sensitive electronic
systems since in many instances the “leaked” state information is sufficient to infer
precise details about the operations the device is performing and the data it is
processing. Such details can include extremely sensitive private information such as
cryptographic key material. This research studies the limits of how much information
can be gained by exploiting the unintentional information leaked from secure systems.
1.1

Problem Addressed
When viewed externally, all physical systems produce both intended and un-

intended outputs. The unintended outputs are quantifiable, physically observable
phenomena produced as a side-effect of normal operation. When an unintended
1

Figure 1.1

Side-Channel Leakage from Physical Systems.

observable outcome is correlated to some aspect of the internal state or system operation, a side-channel is said to leak information. The term side-channel was first
introduced by Kelsey et al. [KSWH00]. However, military and government agencies
have been aware of information leakage due to unintentional emissions for decades
prior [Boa73, vL85]—as early as 1914 by some reports [And01].
Definition 1 (Side-Channel) Any unintended physically observable time-varying
phenomenon that is correlated to the internal state, operations, or data being processed by a device of interest.
EM radiation, including RF radiation and other regions of the EM spectrum,
is just one of many different side-channels through which electronic devices may leak
information. Other channels include variations in power consumption, variations in
computation time, and even acoustic and thermal emissions. The various known
sources of side-channel emissions are depicted in the block diagram of a notional
two-party communications system shown in Figure 1.1. The underlying phenomena
that cause these emissions are described in further detail in Section 2.2.
2

1.2

Security Implications of Information Leakage
The side-channel information leakage from electronic devices is of intense in-

terest to security researchers since it presents attack vectors through which unauthorized parties may gain access to information that is intended to be kept private.
Information leakage may inadvertently reveal the contents of protected data such as
passwords, cryptographic keys, or PIN numbers. Further, it may allow an adversary
to reverse engineer critical aspects of intellectual property or critical technologies
such as proprietary algorithms, circuit designs, or protocols. Therefore, unintended
leakage of information poses a serious practical security threat to electronic systems—
particularly cryptographic systems—when naive designers assume a closed, secure
environment where only the intended outputs are visible [ZF05].
Over the past decade, a significant body of research has been dedicated to
applying side-channel analysis (SCA) as an attack mechanism to defeat the security
of cryptographic devices. Typically, the earlier research has focused on the vulnerability of systems to key recovery attacks—i.e., the extraction of private or secret key
material from a cryptographic system. The existence of SCA techniques means the
security of sensitive information that relies on the secrecy of a cryptographic key as
a primary mode of protection can be greatly reduced in practice if access to sidechannel emissions is realistically possible. The type of information that is typically
protected varies widely, but includes things such as the content of secure communications, software or firmware code which reveals critical technology or intellectual
property details, and tokens permitting access to secure networks or systems.
The protection of sensitive proprietary algorithms or techniques (i.e., critical
technology or intellectual property) is of particular importance in both military and
commercial applications. Reverse engineering poses a serious threat since it can enable competitors or adversaries to bypass years of research and development through
counterfeiting or theft of intellectual property. Commercially, the total global loss in
revenue due to counterfeiting and pirated products is predicted to reach $1.7 trillion
3

by 2015 [Fro11]. This estimate does not account for intangible losses such as brand
deterioration. Likewise, in military applications, compromise of critical technology
degrades weapon system combat effectiveness and useful life expectancy.
Whereas ‘traditional’ techniques for reverse engineering of integrated circuits
(ICs) still require very expensive, specialized equipment (e.g., scanning electron microscopes) [TJ09], side-channel attacks can be performed using widely available (and
relatively inexpensive) commercial tools. Commercial SCA systems are available
for sale on the open market, to include the Riscure Inspector system used in this
research [Ris09], and source code for carrying out a variety of attacks is readily
available on the Internet [Par10, OT11]. Since it is increasingly common for critical
technologies or intellectual property to be in software or firmware protected by a
cryptographic system, the existence of SCA key extraction techniques must be a
consideration when assessing the security level of any such systems.

1.3

Research Objective
The overall research objective is to investigate various aspects of the infor-

mation leakage of ICs. The study of information leakage from electronic devices,
particularly ICs, is a relatively new area of investigation and researchers are only
beginning to formalize the problem and develop rigorous methods for assessing the
vulnerability of physical devices to SCA techniques. Most research to date has focused on the exploitation of cryptographic systems, with a particular emphasis on
key recovery attacks. Thus far, very little work has been done that enables system
designers to effectively counter the threat of side-channel attacks or to investigate
alternative, constructive uses of the phenomena. Investigating alternative aspects of
information leakage is the focus of this work, and includes two main thrusts.
First, unintentional emissions are investigated as a source of information to
recognize or verify the identity of a unique IC. The problem of IC authentication has
numerous practical applications, including providing enhanced security for secure

4

access mechanisms (e.g., anti-cloning), detection of unauthorized modifications to
circuit designs (e.g., hardware Trojan detection), or forensic attribution of electronic
evidence in criminal or other cases. Whereas all previously known authentication
techniques require either device hardware or operational software modifications, unintentional emissions can be passively analyzed. Thus, an effective authentication
approach based on the unintentional emissions of a device would result in a more
cost-effective and scalable approach to the problem than existing solutions.
The second thrust is to investigate techniques that enable system designers to
effectively and systematically assess the vulnerability of a particular cryptographic
implementation to known side-channel attack techniques. From a cryptographic system designer or engineer’s perspective, designing a system that is secure against the
plethora of rapidly evolving physical implementation attacks is daunting. While new
or enhanced attack techniques continue to be published at a rapid pace, very little
work has been done to aid system designers in practically addressing the resulting
security risks. This research investigates the development of a systematic leakage
mapping framework to guide system designers in making sound decisions during
the development process to obtain, with some degree of certainty, a desired level of
resistance to side-channel attacks.

1.4

Dissertation Organization
This document is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an historical

overview of the relevant work done to date, and introduces fundamental concepts
necessary for the study of side-channel emissions and information leakage. Additional
relevant, but not critical, background information is included as appendices.
The main document body is composed of two chapters containing scholarly articles prepared during this research: Intrinsic Physical Layer Authentication of Integrated Circuits (Chapter 3) [CLB+ 11] and Leakage Mapping: A Systematic Methodology for Assessing the Side-Channel Information Leakage of Cryptographic Imple-

5

mentations (Chapter 4). Each chapter contains the aricle text, including relevant
background and methodology, as submitted for publication with some editing as required for incorporation into the format of this document. Because the submitted
versions of each article were constrained by mandatory page limitations, some additional supplementary explanation is provided at the end of each chapter to expand
on the methodology and results in more detail where appropriate.
Chapter 5 concludes the main document and summarizes the key findings of
this work, and provides several recommendations for future research.
Finally, selected source code developed during this research is included in the
appendices. A full archive of the source code and data sets used to produce the
results are available separately on electronic media.

6

2. Background
2.1

Overview
This chapter introduces the key concepts and techniques investigated in this re-

search. Side channel information leakage by electronic systems is a multi-disciplinary
field that synthesizes a variety of sub-domains of knowledge to include:
• Cryptography,
• Computer architecture and engineering,
• Microelectronic devices,
• Digital and VLSI systems design,
• Electromagnetic theory,
• Probability theory,
• Signal processing and pattern recognition,
• Communications and information theory, and
• Software design.
Where required, the relevant aspects of each field are covered to describe needed
concepts as they are introduced. The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows.
Section 2.2 describes the principle sources of side channel information leakage and
their underlying causes. Section 2.3 describes the main applications of side channel
analysis to date, with an emphasis on cryptanalytic key recovery attacks. This
section also describes the basic aspects of cryptographic systems which make SCA
analysis techniques feasible in practice. Section 2.5 reviews the primary classes of
cryptanalytic SCA techniques, including so-called simple, differential, and profiling
techniques. Section 2.6 describes a variety of proposed countermeasures to improve
the resistance of physical systems to SCA techniques. Finally, Section 2.7 discusses
important practical aspects of SCA attacks.
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2.2

Emission Sources
Electronic devices create a variety of side channels during the normal course of

operation. Each channel can leak information when the characteristics of the physically observable behavior are correlated to the electronic circuit’s internal operation
or state. This section reviews the common side channels of electronic devices—
including timing, power, electromagnetic and acoustic (cf. Fig. 1.1).
2.2.1

Variations in Computation Time.

The time for a microprocessor or

other electronic device to complete tasks is, in general, variable and depends on the
data processed [Koc96]. The reasons for variations in processing time are unique to
a particular implementation, but may include dependencies on conditional branches
or other conditional execution mechanisms, cache misses, pipeline stalls, waiting on
queries to external devices such as RAM, and so on [Koc96]. For combinational logic
devices, the time required for an output to reach a steady, glitch-free state may vary
depending on the inputs, circuit layout, or other factors [WH05].
A notional example of a simple algorithm with data-dependent computation
time in most implementations is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Data-Dependence Example
Require: Integers x and y, Control bit b.
1:
2:
3:

if b = 1 then return xy
elsereturn x + y
end if
The value, b, is some control bit and x and y are operands. If the control bit

is a ‘1’ an exponentiation is performed; if not, the operands are added. Assuming
an exponentiation operation is much more costly in terms of execution time than an
addition (which it would be in any typical implementation) the algorithm will take
longer when b is ‘1’ vs. ‘0’. Thus, an outside observer can infer the value of bit
b from the amount of time the operation takes to complete. The implementation,
therefore, is said to leak the value of the data bit b through a timing side channel.
8

Kocher discovered that such unintentional variations in execution time can be
significantly correlated to the data processed by a device [Koc96]. In many cases
the correlation of the unintentional variations leak sufficient information to recover
an entire key from a cryptographic device. The cryptanalytic applications of timing
and other SCA techniques are discussed in Section 2.3.1.
2.2.2

Variations in Power Consumption.

Most modern integrated circuits,

including general purpose microprocessors, are based on complementary metal oxide
semiconductor (CMOS) transistor technology.1
The power consumed by CMOS devices has both static and dynamic components. Since the static component is nearly constant, it can be neglected for the
purposes of SCA since it is not data or operation dependent and therefore does not
leak information about the internal system state. Dynamic power consumption, on
the other hand, is a function of internal switching activity of individual transistors.
Since the switching activity depends on the operations performed and data manipulated, the resulting variations in dynamic power consumption are a source of side
channel information leakage [MOP07].

Figure 2.1

Dynamic power dissipation of the CMOS inverter [Bak07]

The total current drawn from a constant voltage power supply at any point in
time is the sum of the current drawn by all the individual logic cells. There are two
1

Strictly speaking, modern transistor technology is no longer necessarily metal- or oxide-based
since those material layers can be replaced by alternative materials. However, the term CMOS is
overwhelmingly used in the literature and general practice to refer to both true CMOS and other
technologies with similar behavior [WH05]. The differences are irrelevant to this work, and the
term is used to generically refer to all CMOS-like devices.
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primary sources of dynamic power consumption in a CMOS circuit. The first is the
current drawn and dissipated when individual transistors are switched on and off
respectively. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the concept using a simple CMOS inverter. When
the input transitions from 1 to 0, M 1 is switched off and M 2 is switched on. The
cell draws a charging current from a constant voltage power supply to charge the
intrinsic and extrinsic capacitances (Ctot ). When the input transitions from 0 to
1, M 1 is switched on and M 2 is switched off, and the stored energy is discharged
through the ground line. When the input remains the same, the transistors’ states
do not change and there is no dynamic current flow.
The second primary source of dynamic power consumption in CMOS logic is
the short circuit path between the power rail and ground created during the short
period of time during each transition when both the pMOS and nMOS networks
are partially on. This short-circuit current contributes significantly to the dynamic
power consumption of a circuit.
Combinational CMOS circuits also experience transient signal behavior, known
as glitches or dynamic hazards, as inputs propagate and arrive at different times
through the circuit. In large or complex combinational circuits, dynamic power
consumption is influenced to a large degree by the glitches encountered before the
circuit settles into its intended steady-state output—to the point that glitches may
actually become the dominant source of dynamic power consumption [MOP07].
For microprocessor devices, power consumption is affected by the instruction
being executed, the content of data being manipulated, and the address or location
of memory or data registers being accessed [QS02]. For pipelined architectures, there
may be two or more instructions in the pipeline during a clock cycle, all of which
contribute to power consumption during that cycle [QS02].
The statistical relationship between the activity of a circuit and its total power
consumption can be used to infer information about the data being processed—
including sensitive information such as cryptographic keys used in a ciphering opera10

tions [KJJ99]. Kocher introduced two key recovery attacks based on this observation—
simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). Both passively
extract the entire secret key from implementations of the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) cryptographic algorithm. Kocher’s SPA and DPA techniques are described
in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
2.2.3

Electromagnetic Emissions.

The electromagnetic emissions (both ra-

diated and conducted) produced by electronic devices during normal operations are
physically caused by the time-varying current drawn by the circuit as the transistors
switch on and off. As current flow varies, it induces many tiny time-varying electromagnetic fields. These fields combine through complex interactions and propagate
as time-varying EM waves via both radiation and conduction through the power
supply and ground lines and other conductive materials [Boa73,AARR02,AARR07].
The fundamental nature of these effects is well understood as described by Maxwell’s
equations [AARR02, AARR07]. The idea that EM emanations leak information has
been known for several decades, although it has only recently become the focus of
significant academic research [Boa73, And01].
Most early EM emissions research was related to the eavesdropping risks of
peripheral devices such as video display units (see Section 2.3.1.1). Van Eck and
Laborato’s (1985) eavesdropping attack, described in Section 2.3.1.1, was the first
known research on the topic [vL85]. The first published cryptanalytic applications
were [QS02, GMO01], both of which were extensions of Kocher’s timing and power
attacks.2
Quisquater and Samyde were the first to extend Kocher’s power and timing
attacks to the EM side channel [QS00, QS01]. By observing the EM side channel
data they achieved more precise measurements of circuit activity than would be
possible with power analysis short of physically modifying the circuit. Achieving
2

The authors of [QS00] refer to their EM variations of Kocher’s attacks as Simple EM Analysis
(SEMA) and Differential EM Analysis (DEMA).
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the same precision of measurements with power analysis would require an invasive
attack to bypass the filtering effects of the power distribution network and peripheral
components.
In 2001, Gandolfi et al. published the first concrete examples of EM cryptanalysis by successfully extracting keys from CMOS hardware implementations of
DES, COMP128, and RSA [GMO01]. Gandolfi’s results reinforced Quisquater and
Samyde’s claim that EM emanations allow more efficient DSCA attacks, resulting
in successful key recovery with fewer observations.
Agrawal et al. more recently published and updated an extensive study of
EM information leakage [AARR02, AARR07]. One of their key findings was that
single wide-band EM sensors capture many unique information leakage signals, each
of which carry distinct information. They also noted that a substantial source of information leakage is the very weak amplitude-modulated EM information conducted
by surfaces or lines attached to the device. The conducted EM leakage propagates
through attached or nearby conductive surfaces to include the power and ground
lines, implying that side channel data collected for power analysis attacks is likely to
contain weaker and higher frequency EM leakage signals due to unintentional power
line modulation.
EM emanations caused by a circuit’s operation fall into two primary categories—
direct and indirect emanations [AARR07]. Direct emanations are created by current
flow through a circuit’s intended current path and the resulting switching activity in
the circuit’s transistors or other devices. Indirect emanations are created when small
couplings between densely packed electronic components modulate existing carrier
signals emitted by the device, and can modulate both unintentional and intentional
EM signals transmitted by a device. Both types of emanations can lead to side
channel information leakage.
Through the analysis of leaked EM information, Agrawal et al. claimed successful attacks against various cryptographic implementations. Additionally, they
12

posit the possibility of more powerful attacks using multiple complementary electromagnetic sensors with different characteristics to simultaneously collect side channel
information leakage from multiple signals.
Agrawal’s most interesting experimental result is that strong information bearing signals (particularly carriers at multiples of the system’s clock frequency) propagate well beyond the near-field—beyond 50 feet for an unprotected commercial
secure socket layer (SSL) accelerator card operating inside an unmodified, closed
computer server [AARR02, AARR07, Roh06]. Practical template attacks on such
a device with no countermeasures were possible at a distance of approximately 15
feet [AARR02, AARR07]. Mangard reported similar results and demonstrated extraction of a cryptographic key from a smart card at a distance of more than 5 m in
an unshielded environment with an unoptimized measurement setup [Man03]. The
threat from these types of attacks may actually be greater because an adversary
could potentially place an inconspicuous receiver close to the target device (within
5 ft.), which could relay the side channel data of interest to a remote processing
station [Roh06]. The signal strength at that distance may be sufficient to enable
single-observation template attacks and advanced signal processing techniques capable of defeating some SCA countermeasures.
A potentially even more powerful technique was published by Burnside, et al.
on the illumination of an integrated circuit by an external carrier [BEA08]. The
targeted integrated circuit is illuminated with a low-power external RF source, and
the data-dependent behavior is modulated on the reflected external signal which is
then captured. The authors speculate that this technique may result in effective
side channel attacks at greater distances than those based on the native emissions
produced by the target device, but no experimental results were provided to support
that hypothesis.
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2.2.4

Acoustic Emissions.

The acoustic emissions of devices are also a

source of side-channel information leakage. Recently declassified lectures on the
History of Communications Security reveals that intelligence agencies were concerned
with acoustic information leakage from mechanical cryptographic devices as early as
the 1940’s—even over noisy telephone lines when a phone receiver was operated in
the same vicinity as the sensitive equipment [Boa73].
Various peripheral electronic devices also reportedly leak information. For
example, the sound of keyboard (or other keypad) presses is correlated with what a
user is typing [AA04, ZZT05]. However, few other peer-reviewed publications exist
on the subject. Recently, a similar attack was demonstrated using the sound of a
dot matrix printer to identify the characters printed [Gib09]. Dot matrix printers
are still used widely in financial and medical applications which makes the existence
of such a vulnerability a relevant practical concern.
Most surprising, however, is that electronic devices such as general purpose
microprocessors actually leak information through their acoustic emanations. Shamir
and Tromer have performed some initial, unpublished, experiments indicating that
the acoustic emissions of commercial microprocessors are sufficient to determine with
good precision when specific operations begin and end. Further analysis could lead
to effective timing attacks on cryptographic devices [ST04].

2.3

Applications
The vast majority of side channel research to date deals with the security vul-

nerabilities introduced by unintentional information leakage. Side channel vulnerabilities range from simple eavesdropping risks of peripherals, such as video displays
or keyboards, to the inadvertent disclosure of the cryptographic keys critical to the
security of entire systems.
Beyond the various cryptanalytic attack modes, side channel analysis has also
been investigated for several other applications including reverse engineering, hard14

ware covert channel circuitry, and the detection of unauthorized modifications or
additions to circuits (Trojans) during outsourced chip fabrication.
This section provides an overview of the different applications of side channel
analysis investigated over the past three decades of research in this area.
2.3.1

SCA Attacks.

The term SCA attack (often just SCA in the litera-

ture3 ) is commonly used to describe any use of side channel information to either:
1. Bypass or compromise the security mechanisms of a system, or
2. Infer information about the internal state, data or operations of a device that
is not intended to be accessible.
SCA attacks are a subset of the more general class of implementation attacks which exploit vulnerabilities in a device’s physical implementation rather than
attacking, for instance, the mathematical strength of a cryptographic algorithm.
Other common implementation attacks are fault attacks and physical tampering
techniques [ZF05]. SCA attacks differ from many other implementation attacks in
that they are generally passive—meaning they can be implemented without revealing
the attacker’s presence and without damaging or otherwise physically affecting the
system of interest [And01]. This is in contrast to many other known implementation
attacks that are either active—risking disclosure of the attacker’s presence or intent,
or invasive—risking damage or triggering of a circuit’s tamper-resistant features.
The two most prevalent SCA attacks—eavesdropping and key recovery attacks—
are described below.
2.3.1.1

Eavesdropping.

Eavesdropping attacks on electronic devices

are analogous to eavesdropping on human conversations. Both involve an adversary,
3
The acronym SCA is used interchangeably throughout the literature to refer to both side
channel analysis and side channel attacks. For clarity, the term SCA is used to describe the more
general side channel analysis. Side channel attacks are referred to as SCA attacks.
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Eve, secretly listening to what is intended to be a private conversation between an
originator (Alice) and a recipient (Bob). A typical traditional eavesdropping attack
might involve Eve tapping into video display cabling for a computer monitor or
television display to see the same picture Bob is seeing.
SCA eavesdropping attacks differ from classical eavesdropping in that they do
not target the primary or intended communications channel. For example, returning
to the scenario of a video display signal, in the SCA eavesdropping attack Eve
would not directly tap into the primary video display signal. Rather, she would
attempt to reconstruct the video signal from an alternate, unintended side channel
of information such as EM emanations produced by the system’s cabling. Eve may
prefer a side channel attack to the direct eavesdropping approach for a number of
reasons such as restricted access to the system or tamper-resistant cabling.
The first published eavesdropping attack to exploit unintentional emissions
was by Wim van Eck [vL85]. Cathode ray tube (CRT) video terminals produce
electromagnetic emissions that can be remotely intercepted and reconstructed by an
eavesdropper at a substantial distance—even through walls. The attack is carried
out using inexpensive commercially available receiver technology to passively view
a real-time reproduction of what is being displayed on a remote target computer.
More recently, van Eck’s attack has been extended to show it is still relevant to
modern-day flat panel technology [Kuh04].
Eavesdropping SCA attacks typically target peripherals or human interface
devices. Attacks have been published that target the electromagnetic emanations of
computer displays and keyboards [VP09], the flashing of light-emitting diode (LED)
activity indicators on computer peripherals such as modems [LU02], and the acoustic
activity of keyboards and printers [AA04, ZZT05], among others.
Eavesdropping attacks are not the principal focus of this research, and the
details of these attacks are not covered further here. Additional details can be found
in [vL85, Kuh04, VP09].
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2.3.1.2

Cryptanalysis and Key Recovery Attacks.

The term side

channel cryptanalysis refers to the practical application of SCA to break or bypass
cryptographic implementations—with a typical objective being the recovery of a secret key from a device [MOP07, ZF05, LR09]. Whereas SCA eavesdropping attacks
target side channel information leakage that reveals the same information as an
intended input or output, side channel cryptanalysis attacks attempt to gain knowledge of the internal state of a device or the data it is processing by analyzing the
information leakage from the implementation.
SCA cryptanalysis relies on the fact that cryptographic systems are not manifested in physical form as a pure mathematical function. Mathematically, a encryption operation is a function EK [P ] 7→ C where K is the key, P is the plain-text or
data being encrypted, and C is the intended output or cipher-text [Sch96]. However, in reality, a physical system implements the encryption algorithm as EK [P ] 7→
(C, S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn ) where Si is any additional information unintentionally leaked by
the system through one of n side channels.
For electronic systems, a fundamental reason that information leakage occurs
is that circuits must perform a variety of intermediate steps to produce a desired
final output value from a particular input. When viewed at the transistor level, even
fundamental logic cells such as an XOR gate produce intermediate signals in the
propagation path to the output.
In general, systems and components are designed in such a manner that only
the final output is intended to be externally visible. However, although the results of
each intermediate computation are not normally observable, some information about
their activity and content is leaked through the side channels they produce.
Definition 2 (Intermediate value) Any non-final result produced during the intermediate steps of a computation.
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Consider a system based on Algorithm 2, below. This algorithm can be viewed
as a simple, albeit very weak cipher that encrypts data by adding it to the Hamming
weight of the key, K. The system’s security depends on keeping the contents of the
key, K, a secret from outside observers or malicious agents. Assume K is stored in
some internal memory location inaccessible to outside observers.
Algorithm 2 Example of Intermediate Value Leakage
Require: Input X
1: T ← X
2: for i = 0 to 31 do
3:
if Ki = 1 then
4:
T ←T +1
5:
end if
6: end forreturn T
There are at least three potential sources of information leakage in this algorithm:
1. The comparison operation at line 3 directly accesses a key bit during each loop
iteration.
2. The algorithm’s execution path during each loop iteration is conditional on a
key bit.
3. The intermediate value T is manipulated at line 4 whenever the key bit is a
‘1’.
Due to a variety of phenomena described in Sections 2.2 and 2.5, each of these
actions may cause variations in the physically observable characteristics of the device
that are statistically related to the operation or data being manipulated. Analysis
of this side channel data may reveal Ki directly, or more subtly the value or change
in state of T which indirectly reveals one bit of K. As a result, the secret key K
may be revealed—compromising the security of the system on which it depends.
For cryptographic or other secure systems, the implications are far-reaching.
Since almost all security mechanisms in electronic and computer systems rely on
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preserving the secrecy of some sensitive information, any attack that can bypass those
mechanisms is of great concern. Whereas many traditional cryptanalytic attacks are
of theoretic interest but are not practical threats, recent research has shown side
channel leakage to be of great practical concern.
In 1996, Kocher proposed the first known attack capable of using side channel leakage (timing information) to extract an entire key from implementations of
several cryptographic algorithms [Koc96]. Since the publication of Kocher’s original paper, numerous new cryptanalytic side channel attacks and improvements
have been published targeting a wide range of cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Successful practical attacks have been mounted against hardware and software implementations of block, stream, and public-private type algorithms including DES, AES, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), and various elliptic curve schemes
[Koc96,KJJ99,Roh06,And01]. Mangard, et al. published an entire text dedicated to
SCA attacks of AES implementations [MOP07]. Brumley and Boneh demonstrated
a practical remote attack against an OpenSSL-based webserver across a local area
network [BB05].
Recently, a complete practical attack on the KeeLoq encryption scheme has
been published capable of extracting the master key from a device in a single observation [KKMP09]. KeeLoq is a ubiquitous remote keyless entry protection algorithm
used in a wide variety of commercial keyless entry systems for vehicles and garage
door openers. The publication of a simple and efficient attack against such a widely
used system amplifies the practical threat of SCA.
Section 2.5 reviews the major classes of SCA cryptanalytic techniques developed to date. In response to these discoveries, a variety of countermeasures have
been introduced to reduce the vulnerability of electronic systems to each new type
of attack. Section 2.6 reviews known countermeasures.
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2.3.2

Reverse Engineering.

The idea of using SCA for reverse engineer-

ing applications dates to Kocher et al.’s original (1998) DPA paper, in which the
authors claim to have used side channel analysis techniques to reverse unknown algorithms and protocols. The authors posited that automation of reverse engineering
of unknown systems might be possible, although no details of such an approach were
given. More recently, some success has been realized using side channel leakage to
manually facilitate reverse engineering and extraction of keys from unknown algorithms. This application of SCA has been termed side channel analysis for reverse
engineering (SCARE) [Nov03].
The first explicit use of SCA for reverse engineering in the academic literature
was by Quisquater et al. [QS02]. The authors show that it is possible to sufficiently
characterize the electromagnetic side channel emissions of a microprocessor to create
an instruction template dictionary. Future observations of the EM emissions from an
identical microprocessor can be automatically classified to determine what operation
was being performed.
Novak (2003) proposed an attack, with later improvements by Clavier (2004,
2007) to reverse engineer non-trivial portions of an unknown A3/A8 cryptographic
algorithm [Nov03]. The targeted algorithm is the COMP128-2 cipher used in cellular phone SIM cards to authenticate and generate keys in GSM networks [Roh06].
Clavier improved on Novak’s original technique and demonstrated a more practical reverse engineering approach capable of retrieving lookup tables of an unknown cryptographic algorithm without requiring any prior knowledge of the secret
key [Cla04, Cla07]. Daudigny, et al. (2005) used SCARE to recover unknown details
of a DES implementation [DLMV05].
Early reverse engineering attempts were applied specifically to software-based
microprocessor implementations. The first extension of the technique to an unknown
hardware implementation was in 2008 [RDG+ 08].
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In all of these cases domain knowledge is used extensively, but the passive
reverse engineering capability is nevertheless interesting. In many scenarios, the
non-invasive nature of side channel analysis provides clear advantages over more
invasive reverse engineering techniques. Reverse engineering applications of SCA
are still a relatively undeveloped area of investigation, and it is currently unknown
whether it is possible to generalize and automate the process as envisioned by Kocher,
et al. [KJJ99, Roh06]. However, the technique’s existence is another reason system
designers should not rely on security by obscurity.
2.3.3

Covert Channel Engineering.

Researchers in high-assurance comput-

ing realized early on—at least by 1973—that timing variations can be used to intentionally pass information across a controlled perimeter [Lam73,van90,Wra91,And01].
For example, a malicious Trojan program can be placed inside the controlled perimeter of a secure computing environment where it captures data and re-transmits it via
an encoded communications channel [Lam73, van90, Wra91, And01]. Such a communications channel can be created by intentionally varying some system characteristic
visible to an observer outside the controlled perimeter. For example, the Trojan
process can cause page faults or variations in CPU demand or disk cache loading. A
receiving process outside the perimeter can monitor the timing variations and decode
the message. This type of scheme is known as a covert timing channel [And01].
Circuit design or embedded software codes can be modified to surreptitiously
broadcast secret information over a covert wireless channel (such as the EM sidechannel) to a nearby receiver [DS06,Dyr07]. There are no concrete examples of such
a hardware-based malware attack having actually occurred in the literature to date,
but there are numerous examples of commercial hardware shipping with softwarebased malware. Several recent papers have been published with proof of concept
designs that illustrate the feasibility of such an attack [KTC+ 08, LKG+ 09].
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2.3.4

Trojan Detection.

The economic realities of semiconductor and mi-

crochip manufacturing have resulted in a large-scale migration of most integrated
circuit (IC) fabrication to facilities outside the United States. In 2005, a special
U.S. Defense Science Board Task Force examined the effects and risks of outsourcing
high performance microchip production to foreign countries [Off05] and concluded
this practice introduces risks that are unacceptable for domestic defense and intelligence applications. The Defense Science Board determined that existing diagnostic
capabilities are insufficient to assure that chips produced by foreign foundries are
unmodified. One particular risk cited is the opportunity for malicious foreign agents
to introduce unauthorized design changes such as Trojan horses into the chips, as
described above, to establish covert channels of communication.
Agrawal, et al. proposed extending side-channel analysis techniques to detect
the presence of hidden or modified circuitry in integrated circuits [ABK+ 07]. The
approach constructs SCA fingerprints by profiling the power, temperature and electromagnetic side channel characteristics of an integrated circuit. After fingerprinting,
destructive techniques are used to verify the authenticity of the characterized chips;
i.e., they have not been modified from their original intended design. Remaining
ICs are statistically tested against the fingerprints of the known good chips. The
approach clearly requires that the destructive verification techniques be extremely
reliable in detecting modifications to assure that the baseline is truly an unmodified
chip. This may not be practical in light of the Defense Science Board findings.

2.4

Adversary Models
When discussing SCA attacks, various assumptions must be made about the

capabilities of an adversary. It is common to refer to how powerful a hypothetical
adversary must be to carry out a particular attack in practice. In real world situations, an adversary’s capabilities can range from having very restricted access to
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the device at one extreme, to having complete control of the device or system being
attacked at the other.
A powerful adversary is one that has complete control of the device or system
being attacked. In this scenario, the adversary can arbitrarily choose the number
and content of inputs the device will process, can capture both the inputs and
outputs of the device, and is assumed to be in an environment (such as a wellequipped laboratory) where the quality of the side channel data being collected may
be optimized. In the most extreme case, the adversary may even have the capability
to load new keys into the device. The only significant limitation is that stored keys
cannot simply be retrieved as that is prohibited by most cryptographic devices.
A weak adversary has very limited capabilities to control and observe the device
being analyzed. In the context of SCA attacks, Eve still has the capability to collect
side channel data in some form (possibly noisy and otherwise suboptimal). Most
attacks also require that she be able to capture the contents of either the input
or output from the device (typically the plain-text or ciphertext in the case of a
cryptographic device).
Many SCA attacks assume a powerful adversary, which implies some reduction
in practicality under certain conditions. However, this does not negate the real-world
threat since there are many scenarios where such a powerful adversary truly exists,
and the attacks are easily within the reach of a moderately equipped malicious agent.
The publication of actual SPA and DPA attacks on the KeeLoq remote keyless entry
system [KKMP09] and the Xilinx FPGA bitstream protection [MBKP11, MKP11]
amplify this point. Furthermore, many attacks such as profiling techniques (see Sec.
2.5) have very weak assumptions about the adversary from the perspective of access
to the device being attacked.
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2.5

Techniques
Over the past decade, dozens of distinct SCA attacks and countermeasures

have been developed. Most, if not all, are derived from Paul Kocher’s original
timing and power analysis attacks [Koc96, KJJ99]. Because of the large number of
distinct attacks that have been developed, it is impractical to describe each in detail.
However, most of the techniques are similar and can be generally described according
to their basic principles of operation. Two of the most important distinguishing
characteristics used to categorize SCA techniques are the analysis approach and the
number of stages involved in the analysis.
The following definitions are used:
Simple SCA (SSCA). Any technique that directly interprets side channel measurements, typically through visual analysis of a captured signal in the time or
frequency domain [KJJ99]. Generally applied to one or only a small number
of observations. SSCA is a generalization of Kocher’s SPA technique to any
source of information leakage.
Differential SCA (DSCA). Any technique that uses statistical or other mathematical techniques to look for small differences in side channel data that may
be correlated to the data or operations of interest. DSCA is a generalization of Kocher’s DPA technique to other sources of information leakage and
statistical analysis techniques [KJJ99]. DSCA is usually applied to a relatively large number of observations—varying from a few dozen to a million or
more [MOP07, Roh06].
Profiling SCA. Any SCA technique that requires multiple data-collection or analysis steps, such as a profiling stage using a training device followed by an attack
stage on a separate target device.
This section reviews the fundamental SCA techniques developed to date: timing attacks, simple SCA attacks, differential SCA attacks, and profiling attacks.
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Each published SCA attack is unique in its approach, and most are specific to a particular algorithm or implementation platform. Timing attacks are presented first and
separately because they provide the initial foundation for the application of SCA to
cryptanalysis, and Kocher’s original attack does not fit neatly into the definition of
the other fundamental techniques that are the subject of widespread research today.
A brief overview of more advanced variations is also provided to include profiling,
higher-order DSCA, and advanced signal processing techniques that can be applied
to aid in pre- or post-processing of captured side channel emissions data.
2.5.1

Timing Analysis.

Timing analysis attacks exploit the small varia-

tions in the computation time of a cryptographic implementation described in Section 2.2.1. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in particular are known to have
non-constant execution times due to their conditional execution of time-consuming
operations such as multiplications [Koc96]. These non-constant times, together with
knowledge of the underlying algorithm or implementation, allow an adversary to
infer information about the sensitive data being processed. Although the idea of
timing attacks is generally applicable to any cryptographic implementation that operates in non-constant time, the details of any particular attack are implementation
specific and there is no generalized process for constructing such an attack.
Kocher’s timing attack [Koc96] on RSA and other asymmetric public-key algorithms is widely considered to be the first side-channel cryptanalysis in the scientific literature. Kocher’s attack targets the non-constant execution time of a
microprocessor-based RSA algorithm implementation. The attack extracts the private key from a cryptographic device by analyzing the small variations in computation time of a large number of decryption operations. Kocher validated the attack
against RSA Laboratories’ reference implementation [Koc96, Lab94]. Kocher’s timing attack on asymmetric ciphers is described in detail in Appendix B.
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Several practical attacks have also been published to demonstrate the feasibility
of extracting a cryptographic key remotely across a computer network based on the
observed differences in computation or response times, including those variations
introduced by cache misses (cf. [BB05, PH98, Ber05, KSWH98, KSWH00, Pag02]). It
is noteworthy that even lookup-table-based approaches to cryptography, which, on
the surface would appear to take constant time, can be vulnerable to timing attacks
due to variations related to cache misses.
2.5.1.1

Final Notes.

Kocher’s original analysis targeted crypto-

graphic algorithms based on modular exponentiation. However, he asserts that any
cryptographic implementation that runs in non-constant time is likely to be vulnerable to timing attacks. The plethora of attacks that have been published over the last
decade reinforces this claim, and investigators continue to identify new examples.
2.5.2

Simple Analysis.

In the SSCA class of techniques, an analyst ex-

amines (typically visually) measured side channel data looking for distinct features
that reveal information about the operations being performed or data being processed. The analyst is, in effect, performing a high-level reverse engineering based
on knowledge of the algorithm that produced the side channel leakage. The concept
is not limited to the power side channel (e.g., Kocher’s DES attack [KJJ99]), and can
potentially be applied to the data obtained from any of the side channels described
in Section 2.2.
When side channel data is visually analyzed in the time domain, features like
shape and magnitude can look very different for different operations, or for the same
operation performed with different data or outcomes. A well-known example is the
power consumption for conditional branch instructions in micro-controllers, which
often depends on whether the branch is taken or not [KJJ99]. The power trace of
a device that takes a branch may look significantly different than the trace of the
same device when it does not take the branch. By analyzing these differences and
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applying knowledge of the underlying algorithm, it is possible to deduce the content
of the data being processed—generally some sensitive private data of interest such
as a portion of a cryptographic key.
2.5.2.1

Simple Attack on a DES Parity Check.

The level of difficulty

involved in applying SSCA to extract data from a system varies greatly. An extreme
example of a trivial attack on a cryptographic key focuses on the key loading mechanism rather than the cryptographic algorithm itself [Roh06]. When a key is loaded
into memory from a storage location, it is desirable to verify the key’s integrity before it is used. One way to do this is to store a parity bit with each 7 data bits. The
data parity is verified when the key is initially loaded.
Algorithm 3 DES parity-check algorithm [Roh06]
Require: Key K (8 bytes — ea. 7 data bits, 1 parity bit).
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

for i = 8 downto 1 do
parity ← 0
for j = 8 downto 1 do
if bit j of Key[i] = 1 then
parity ← parity + 1
end if
end for
if Even(parity) then
ParityError();
end if
end forreturn ()
Algorithm 3 illustrates an implementation of such a parity checking algorithm.

The algorithm examines the value of each data bit and adds one to the parity if the
bit is a ‘1’. Line four of the algorithm executes a conditional branch decision based
on each data bit.
Figure 2.2 shows how trivial an attack on this type of implementation can be.
The inner and outer loop structure is immediately apparent from the peaks. The data
shown here includes the execution of three outer loops, each of which is composed of
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Figure 2.2

Rohatgi’s SPA Attack Against DES Key Parity Check [Roh06].

eight inner loops. The differences between the inner loop iterations where the data
bit is a ‘1’ and those where it is a ‘0’ are also clearly apparent. When the data bit
is a ‘0’, the addition step on Line 5 is skipped, and the current drawn by the circuit
peaks and drops off rapidly. When the data bit is a ‘1’, however, the current drawn
first drops off and then increases again for a short time. Thus, it is trivial to “read”
the entire secret key by directly examining the current trace and assigning each peak
a value of ‘0’ or ‘1’. It is noteworthy that a timing attack is also possible since
the inner loop appears to take slightly longer when the data bit is a ‘1’ than when
it is a ‘0’.
Despite the simple label, most SSCA attacks are significantly more subtle
and complex than the parity example. Kocher’s DES attack, for instance, requires
substantial insight into the operation of the underlying cryptographic algorithm to
extract the key from a device.
Information may leak from a wide variety of operations and can vary based on
the data being manipulated as well. For example, on some microprocessor-based devices a load register instruction reveals the Hamming weight or Hamming distance
of the data register [MDS99]. For such devices, the power consumed is proportional
to the number of ‘1’ bits being processed, or transferred across a bus.

28

Figure 2.3

Hamming distance power leakage from an 8-bit smart-card microcontroller performing a load register operation [MDS99]

Definition 3 (Hamming weight) is the number of non-zero bits in a binary vector of finite length [MOP07].
Definition 4 (Hamming distance) between two binary vectors of the same length
is the number of coordinates in which the two vectors differ [Mac03].
Figure 2.3 is the result of an SCA experiment on a vulnerable 8-bit smart-card
that clearly leaks the Hamming distance of the data being loaded into a register. Such
leakage is significant because for some cryptographic implementations, knowledge of
the Hamming weight or distance of a portion of the cryptographic key is sufficient
to make a brute-force key search or mathematical cryptanalysis of the remaining
possibilities computationally practical [MDS99].
2.5.2.2

Practicality of SSCA Attacks.

A significant practical consid-

eration for SSCA techniques is they require substantial knowledge of how a particular
cryptographic implementation is implemented. Although the need for implementation details appears to be a severe limitation, numerous researchers assert that SSCA
techniques are still quite effective in practice unless the system implements specific
countermeasures to prevent them [KJJ99, Roh06, MOP07]. Careful inspection of
the side channel leakage may actually reveal sufficient information about the imple-
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mentation to allow further refinement of an attack, or sufficient information for the
attacker to infer important details about how the system is implemented.
SSCA attacks are most effective against sequential implementations of algorithms. Use of SSCA to attack a fully pipelined hardware implementation of DES,
for instance, would be difficult because the parallel circuit activity would significantly
hinder direct visual interpretation [MOP07]. However, even if SSCA techniques are
insufficient to extract information from a side channel signal directly, they are frequently useful to help guide more advanced techniques and to infer information about
the underlying implementation or algorithm being executed.
2.5.3

Differential Analysis.

The second power analysis technique intro-

duced in [Koc96] is known as differential power analysis (DPA). DPA is a statistical
technique that correlates the effects of the data being manipulated to the power consumption trace rather than inferring the data being manipulated from knowledge of
what operations were performed as in SPA. Whereas SPA can be performed using
only a single power trace for an encryption device, DPA requires multiple power
traces to make statistical inferences. DPA is capable of extracting information due
to variations that are too subtle to be identified through direct examination of the
data by SSCA. The technique is not unique to the power side channel, and can
be generalized to the physical leakage due to other phenomena as differential SCA
(DSCA) [KJJ99, ZF05, MOP07, Roh06]. A key assumption of most DPA attacks is
that the attacker has essentially unfettered access to the physical device under attack
and can cause it to perform encryption or decryption operations at will.
DSCA techniques use statistical properties of multiple samples, which reduces
noise from measurement error or non-relevant circuit activity (either intentional or
unintentional) while amplifying the effects of the circuit performing the operation or
manipulating the data of interest. With a sufficiently large number of observations,
it is possible to identify very small correlations between the internal device state and
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the leaked side channel information. Various mathematical techniques are used to
identify these correlations, as described in Section 2.5.3.1.
The common characteristic of all DSCA techniques is they use statistical methods to find small differences in the leaked side channel information due to variations
in processed data or operations over a relatively large number of operations. The
number of observations required to successfully apply DSCA techniques range from
dozens to millions depending on the implementation, technique, and environmental
factors, and any countermeasures present [MOP07].
A key advantage of DSCA techniques over SSCA techniques, besides their more
robust information recovery capability, is they do not require detailed implementation knowledge. Rather, basic knowledge of the underlying algorithm is sufficient
to carry out the statistical analysis. In fact, DSCA techniques have the interesting
property (as pointed out in [KJJ99]) that they “automatically” identify the points
in time where the side channel leakage is correlated to the value of some piece of
data that is used by the cryptographic algorithm since the chosen metric indicating
the presence of correlation will be maximized at the relative times in the trace when
the relationship is strongest. The leakage mapping approach developed in Chapter 4
provides a methodology for systematically identifying all such potential points of
key-dependent leakage throughout an entire encryption operation.
Mangard, et al. and other researchers have noted that even if the details of
a particular implementation are unknown, the combination of DSCA and SSCA
techniques can be used together to learn sufficient details about an implementation
to allow a successful SCA attack [MOP07].
The more accurately the leakage model employed characterizes the true relationship of a particular intermediate value to the side channel leakage from the
device, the better the results will be in the final step of the DSCA attack. Various
techniques for modeling the leakage associated with an intermediate computation
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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2.5.3.1

Statistical Techniques.

There is no consensus on an optimal

mathematical technique for the DSCA procedure, although various proposals have
been put forward with claims of optimality. Kocher’s original DPA attack was based
on a difference of means technique [KJJ99, MOP07]. Later works introduced other
approaches including the Pearson correlation coefficient, Distance of Means (a variation of Kocher’s difference of means), and Bayesian estimation procedures. The
correlation coefficient and Bayesian techniques have received the most attention in
recent research. Mangard, et al. claim the correlation coefficient is the most general because it can more easily handle multiple-bit leakage models than some other
techniques [MOP07]. Recent experimental data supports the claim that all of the
commonly used statistical techniques produce, roughly, equivalent results [MOS09].
The basic strategy behind all of these techniques is to identify linear relationships between the predicted leakage under some leakage model and one or more
columns of the actual observed data matrix—where each column corresponds to a
particular sampled instant in time relative to the start of the encryption operation.
When the key hypothesis is correct, there should be a linear relationship between the
hypothesized leakage value and the observed leakage value at the times when that
value was actually manipulated by the circuit. If Pearson’s correlation coefficient
is used, the highest observed correlation indicates the corresponding key hypothesis
most likely to be correct. Furthermore, the relative position of the samples with
the highest correlation coefficients indicate at what relative time(s) the targeted
intermediate value is manipulated. The DSCA procedure is described in detail in
Chapter 4.
The largest correlation coefficients indicate the sub-key most likely to have
produced the observed results. Plotting the rows of the correlation matrix will result
in noticeable peaks in the plot that corresponds to the true key, while incorrect keys
have the appearance of noise within a solid band. A typical DPA result for three key
hypotheses (and reference current trace) is plotted in Fig. 2.4. The trace showing
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a large peak indicates the correct (sub)key hypothesis has likely been found. In
practice, keys similar to the true key may also produce high correlations, leaving
some ambiguity as to what the correct key is—or even resulting in an incorrect key
having the highest correlation coefficient at some point in time. This can sometimes
be overcome directly through additional post-processing or by collecting additional
observations. Furthermore, even if a DSCA attack leaves many possible candidate
sub-keys, the reduction in guessing entropy may be sufficient to allow brute force
computation of the full key.

Figure 2.4

Typical DPA traces, one correct and two incorrect, with power reference
[KJJ99].

2.5.3.2

Practical Limitations of DSCA.

Because DSCA techniques

require less implementation knowledge and are typically better than SSCA at extracting information, they are generally considered to be a more powerful class of
attacks. However, if significant noise is present the statistical techniques used can
require a very large number of observations to be successful. Collecting a large number of observations in practice may require an attacker to have dedicated access and
control of the device being analyzed. Thus, in practice, the security vulnerabilities
of a system to DSCA techniques may be less of a concern to the system designer
than SSCA vulnerabilities.
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Another practical limitation of standard DSCA techniques is an adversary
must generally have access to obtain either known inputs or outputs from the device,
although some advanced differential techniques (see Section 2.5.5.3) can be applied
in situations when this is not possible. AES, when operating in counter-mode, is
also susceptible to DPA techniques with knowledge of side channel data only (no
knowledge of inputs or outputs is necessary) [Jaf07].
2.5.4

Profiling Techniques.

Profiling, or multi-stage attacks were first

introduced by Chari et al. in 2002 [CRR02] in the context of side channel cryptanalysis. In general, profiling techniques are specific applications of the general problem
of pattern recognition, in which a classifier is presented with a pattern or signal
(e.g., the EM leakage from a target device), and must then classify it as belonging
to one of several possible classes [TK09].
These attacks postulate a powerful adversary that possesses a separate identical
(or nearly identical) device over which they have full control. In the variation known
as a template attack, this training device is used for a profiling step, in which an
attacker creates a precise multivariate probability distribution of the device’s side
channel leakage while it operates on known sub-keys [GLRP06]. This phase of the
attack is sometimes referred to as the offline phase.
The results of the profiling stage are used to classify future observations from
a target device over which the adversary does not have full control, but can observe
the side channel leakage. By classifying the new observed trace according to the distribution they are likely to come from, the most likely sub-key is revealed. Profiling
techniques are considered very powerful because they require only a few (sometimes
just one) observations to extract a key. Additionally, the attack phase does not require that the adversary control or have knowledge of the device inputs or outputs.
The attack phase is sometimes referred to as the online phase.
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Two specific variations of multi-stage attacks that have been proposed are the
template attack [CRR02] and the stochastic model attack [SLP05]. Template attacks
characterize the side channel leakage from the device by creating a template for each
possible sub-key. The noise distribution is therefore assumed to be key-dependent.
Thus, the profiling stage of a template attack creates covariance matrices for each
possible (sub)key. Schindler et al.’s stochastic model, on the other hand, presumes
the side-channel noise is independent of the (sub)key.
Gierlichs, et al. showed that while stochastic models have a lower up-front
computational cost during profiling, they are less effective at classifying future signals
[GLRP06]. Template attacks are the more effective tool if there are no limitations on
the number of observations that can be collected during profiling and if the workload
for template building is computationally feasible. Schindler’s stochastic model may
be more effective in cases where there is a bound on the number of observations that
can be collected during profiling, or if other considerations mean constructing a full
set of templates is not practical.
In 2005, Agrawal et al. extended template attacks to combine traditional DPA
techniques with template attacks—termed a template-enhanced DPA attack. This
technique is effective at defeating standard masking countermeasures against power
analysis attacks on smart-card implementations of AES and DES produced by two
separate manufacturers [ARRS05]. Recent work has shown in detail how template
attacks can be used in practice to extract a cryptographic key without knowledge
of the system inputs or outputs (plain- or cipher-texts) [HTM09] with only a few
(< 200) observed operations.
A practical limitation of template attacks is the computational cost due to their
reliance on multivariate statistics to characterize the dependencies among the various
temporal locations in the leakage traces. For traces containing a large number of
sample points, this step is very computationally intensive, and it may not be practical
to consider all the sampled data. In practice, most of the published techniques
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overcome this limitation by selecting a subset of the data points for use in the
profiling / template building stage. Typically, some heuristic is used to select a subset
of points of interest that correspond to the same relative times in each observation
[MOP07, APSQ06].
Several rules of thumb have been used including selecting the subset of samples that correspond to the relative time where the observations show the maximal
variance [MOP07] or maximal difference between mean traces when observations are
partitioned according to a classical Kocher-style DSCA attack [CRR02]. Additional
criteria are sometimes applied such as limiting the number of selected points to one
per clock cycle to eliminate redundancy of the selected data points [APSQ06]. A
primary objective is to compress the data set that must be manipulated while maintaining the most important information—which then takes on the role of characterizing the features of different signal classes. Recent research to find more optimal
techniques for identifying leakage points is discussed below.
2.5.5

Advanced Techniques.
2.5.5.1

Principal Component Analysis.

Principal component analy-

sis (PCA) is a linear transformation that reduces the dimensionality of a data set
while retaining the majority of the important information from the original data.4 A
well-known application of PCA is automatic facial recognition. The PCA transformation is such that each coordinate (component) is orthogonal to the others and is
a linear combination of many individual samples. By using PCA to select the points
of interest in profiling attacks, the n dimensions (components) that account for a
largest percentage of the overall variance between the sample classes are identified.
In template attacks, PCA maximizes the inter-class variance between possible operations (typically the same operation performed using each possible sub-key). The
4

PCA and its variations are also known as the empirical/discrete Karhunen-Loève transform,
the Hotelling transform, and proper orthogonal decomposition (POD) in various academic circles.
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magnitude of the resulting eigenvalues associated with each component indicates
the relative importance of the component, and normally a small number of principal components are sufficient to capture the majority (80-90%) of the inter-class
variance.
Archambeault et al. introduced a systematic technique using PCA for selection
of leakage points of interest that can subsequently be used to build templates as an
improvement on previous heuristic techniques [APSQ06]. Archambeault experimentally demonstrated a case where 7 components chosen by PCA produce better classification results (93.3% vs. 91.8% correct) than a template built from 42 points using
a difference of means heuristic. The paper does not, however, assess the computational efficiency of performing the combined PCA and template-building procedure to
previous techniques using larger numbers of sample points for the template-building
phase.
Archambeault’s PCA technique has two notable advantages over heuristic techniques for selecting points of interest. First, it provides superior classification results
with a smaller computational effort during the template-building phase although
the computational load of the PCA transformation itself may negate this benefit.
Secondly, PCA provides a quantitative measure of the number of components (transformed data points) to adequately capture the majority of the data’s variability. A
key assumption that has thus far resulted in effective attacks in practice is that the
side-channel variability is a good indicator of the temporal location of information
leakage.
A weakness of the PCA technique is that although the resulting subspace maximizes the inter -class variance between possible classes (sub-keys in most template
attacks), the technique neglects the effect of intra-class variance on classifier performance. This is because the principal components are computed from the mean
traces for each possible signal class (generally an operation performed for a given
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sub-key in most SCA template attacks).5 As a result, if there is a large degree of
variance in the side-channel leakage for a single class (sub-key or intermediate value),
it could result in degraded classifier performance.
2.5.5.2

Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA).

Standaert

and Archambeau proposed applying an alternate technique known as Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to address the possible effects of intra-class variance on
classifier performance [SA08]. LDA seeks a linear transformation of sample points
into a subspace that maximizes the ratio between the inter-class distance and the
intra-class variance after projection. Experimental data shows that LDA, as intuitively expected, provides a more optimal characterization of the target signal classes
than does PCA. However, computation of the LDA solution is substantially more
expensive than PCA, and thus limits the number of samples per observation that
can be handled. Although more expensive, the authors demonstrated that LDA
is an effective tool for dimensionality reduction for use in device profiling. In this
work, an n−class variant of LDA known as Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
is employed for dimensionality reduction in Chapter 3.
2.5.5.3

Higher-Order DSCA.

The DSCA techniques described to this

point are first-order DSCA attacks. The attack order refers to the number of samples
from the trace that are simultaneously considered [MOP07]. If more than one sample
is considered, then the attack is known as a higher-order DSCA attack (HO-DSCA).
A dth -order DSCA attack is one which simultaneously considers d samples of the
side-channel trace. HO-DSCA attacks were first proposed by Kocher in his original
DPA paper, and have been investigated extensively since [KJJ99, Roh06, MOP07].
5

PCA could be performed directly on the raw data, but instead of capturing the components of
maximal variance between classes, it would result in components that capture the components of
maximal variance across all data (irrespective of the classes).
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The motivation for HO-DSCA attacks is to overcome masking countermeasure
described in Section A.4. To be effective against masking, HO-DSCA considers d
separate points that correspond to d different sensitive intermediate values, each of
which is protected by the same mask. Theoretically, a dth -order DSCA attack is
capable of bypassing (d − 1)th -order masking scheme [CJRR99].
The precise time when the d sensitive intermediates are manipulated is generally unknown a priori by the adversary, although most of the available literature on
HO-DSCA attacks assumes these locations are known [PRB09]. However, for practical implementation reasons, masking implementations usually generate two sensitive
intermediates using the same mask in the first and last rounds. Therefore, in practice, attacking intermediates in the first and last round has been shown to be effective
against many masking implementations [OMPR05, MOP07]. Frequency-domain signal processing techniques have also been proposed as a technique to identify the
manipulation times [WW04]. In the context of profiling techniques, an adversary
has control of a training device and can identify relative times by carefully profiling
the device’s behavior.
Once the times of the sensitive data manipulations are identified, the data is
pre-processed to combine the multiple sensitive variables through some combining
function (typically additive or multiplicative), which maps the multi-variate problem
to a uni-variate problem [MOP07]. After pre-processing, the DSCA attack proceeds
as normal.
Because of the practical issues involved in locating the sensitive manipulations and the complexity of carrying out such an attack is believed to increase exponentially with the attack order, HO-DSCA attacks are sometimes dismissed as
impractical [MOP07,PRB09]. Oswald et al. published a practical attack on an 8-bit
smart-card micro-controller protected by a 2nd -order masking scheme with under 400
observations, without any a priori knowledge of the times when sensitive data would
be manipulated [OMPR05]. Other recent work indicates sub-exponential complex-
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ity growth attacks are possible [GBPV10]. Additionally, Mangard et al. found that
hardware masking implementations are frequently easier to attack than software implementations because of the unintentional effects of parallel implementations that
simultaneously process both random masks and masked values [MOP07].
2.5.5.4

Multi-channel Attacks.

Agrawal et al. proposed combining

information leakage from multiple simultaneous side channels [ARR03]. Their approach is a generalization of standard DSCA techniques and requires leakages from
the combined channels be very “similar” at the times when the side channel signal is
correlated to the underlying data or operations of interest. For the particular DES
implementation studied, a multi-channel EM and power attack is significantly more
efficient than either single-channel attack alone. The number of traces required to
successfully extract the DES key using a maximum-likelihood based DPA attack is
substantially reduced—in some extreme cases by more than 80%. The initial approach does not allow for combination of leakages that occur at different relative
times in the side channel trace.
Standaert and Archambeau later extended the concept of a multi-channel attack to the creation of multi-channel templates [SA08]. In their technique, the power
and EM side channel measurements (taken simultaneously during a single operation)
are simply concatenated together to create a combined power / EM feature vector.
Templates are then built normally, as described in Section 2.5.4. The authors found
that the combined power and EM template attack performed significantly better
than either technique alone (and that EM alone performed significantly better than
power alone) for the 8-bit micro-controller evaluated.
2.5.5.5

Combination of SCA with Other Techniques.

Although gener-

ally outside the scope of this research (with the exception of the algebraic cryptanalysis technique described below), a related research area combines SCA techniques
with other attacks, including invasive or semi-invasive attacks [SA03, Roh06, Sko06]
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and mathematical cryptanalysis techniques to augment SCA attacks (or vice versa)
[Roh06]. For example, side channel information can be used to precisely time the
injection of faults [Roh06].
For secure cryptographic algorithms, mathematical cryptanalysis is not a credible threat in itself since the required computational effort makes it impractical
assuming the mathematical basis has no flaws. Implementation attacks such as sidechannel attacks, on the other hand, exploit the vulnerabilities introduced by the
physical realization of the cryptographic algorithm—which is not a pure black-box
representation of the cipher. Even if an SCA attack is unsuccessful at extracting
a full cryptographic key from a physical system, it may be successful at identifying
a portion of the key or eliminating some class of possibilities. In such a case, the
problem complexity may be reduced enough to make a brute force or other direct
cryptanalytic attack practical [Roh06].
One of the most interesting and effective techniques published to date is the
recent work by Renauld and Standaert to combine profiling SCA attacks with algebraic cryptanalysis [RSVC09]. Rather than focusing on a single intermediate value,
algebraic SCA techniques use extensive profiling of a device to exploit the information leakage of as much information about the various intermediate values as
possible. Standard SCA template-based techniques are used for the profiling and
intermediate value extraction from the target device. The extracted intermediates
become known values in an over-defined system of boolean equations that can be
solved for the unknown key using an automated boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver.
The results achieved using this technique are compelling, in that this appears to be
the first technique to claim the ability to extract an AES key with a single target
trace and no knowledge of plain- or cipher-text. The technique currently depends
on very accurate extraction of the intermediate values used in the solution, although
the authors suggest several ways this dependency can be reduced in practice.
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2.6

Countermeasures
All SCA countermeasures have a common objective—the elimination of dis-

cernible linkages between sensitive internal circuit behavior (data manipulation and
operations) and one or more external, physically observable phenomena. In practice,
completely eliminating information leakage from a single side channel is an extremely
difficult problem. The problem becomes more difficult when all possible side channels
are considered. Various researchers have asserted that it is fundamentally impossible to make the side channel emissions of a device completely independent of the
underlying computations [MOP07, Roh06].
As is the case when security measures are implemented for any type of system, all of the countermeasures discussed in this section carry with them associated
implementation costs. Typical costs are slower performance, increased circuit size,
increased power consumption, and/or increased design time and expense. For this
reason, in the complex trade-space of real systems, designers may focus on the most
sensitive or critical circuit areas, and attempt to prevent information leakage only
from those subcomponents. In practice, system designers and architects balance
side-channel leakage resistance and other security measures with required system
cost and performance. Rather than attempting to build an impenetrable system, a
suitable goal is a design secure enough to deter would-be adversaries from applying
the necessary resources to defeat it. For a rational adversary, this is achieved in
practice if the costs of carrying out an attack outweigh the perceived benefits of
defeating the system’s protections.
At the highest level, countermeasures are classified as either procedural or physical design countermeasures. Procedural countermeasures include security practices
put in place to improve the security of a system. For example, a system architect
may understand that a device is vulnerable to various SCA attacks. Knowing this,
the architect may impose a restriction on the number of times a unique key can be
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used before it must be changed so that if a particular key is compromised, it will not
negatively effect the security of future transactions [And01, CJRR99].
Physical design countermeasures can be sub-divided into two primary approaches: reduce the signal and increase the noise. Both approaches degrade the
signal-to-noise ratio of information leakage during intermediate computations to the
point where it becomes impractical (in terms of number of required observations or
pre- and post-processing time) to extract information of concern from the physically
observable phenomenon. The actual implementation of either of these approaches
can take place at various levels of system design such as the protocol, system architecture, operating system, software (algorithm) or hardware levels [RO04a].
For each of the two general approaches, a large number of specific techniques
have been proposed. Most counter a specific side-channel threat, e.g., power or
timing information leakage since they have been the subject of the majority of the
SCA research to date. Notably, no perfect countermeasure exists to date, and most
of the proposed countermeasures still have significant SCA vulnerabilities. Some of
the most popular and promising countermeasures in theory have been shown to be
inadequate in practice soon after their introduction. Likewise, some widely used
countermeasures such as masking can be broken almost completely in the context
of profiling scenarios where the adversary has access and full control of a separate
training device [OM07]. However, in a well-designed system the countermeasures
may be sufficient as part of an integrated defense-in-depth strategy to deter less
determined adversaries—or at least be sufficient to protect a cryptographic key or
secure device for its useful life [CJRR99].
The principle SCA countermeasures that have been proposed to date are described in Appendix A.
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2.7

Practical Considerations
Numerous publications have documented the nuances of implementing side

channel attacks in practice, with the book by Mangard et al. being the most thorough treatment [MOP07]. This section briefly reviews techniques for experimentally
collecting side channel data and pre- and post-processing of the data to align traces.
Each side channel attack is unique and dependent on the specific device implementation being targeted. However, the approach outlined below is mostly generic and
should apply to most situations.
There are several ways side channel data can be experimentally collected. The
experimental setup used in this research to collect EM data is described in Section
3.11.1. The most common technique for capturing power consumption data is for
an attacker or security evaluator to insert a small resistor (1-100 Ohms) in series
with either the primary power supply line or the ground line, and sample the voltage
difference across the resistor using a digital oscilloscope [MOP07]. If the resistor size
is too small, it makes measuring the voltage drop difficult, and if it is too large it
may cause the circuit to malfunction. The time-varying voltage is proportional to
the current drawn from the power supply, and to the power consumed by the circuit
(thus the name power analysis). The procedure is semi-invasive since it requires
circuit or power supply modifications. A typical power analysis setup is shown in
Fig. 2.5.
An alternate technique preferred by some is to use a contact-less current probe
to collect the power consumption data. This technique is less invasive, and only
requires passing the power supply line through the measurement device. However,
Mangard et al. state that such a setup will have lower sensitivity than the former
direct measurement technique.
A block diagram of a typical experimental setup, representative of the setups
used for this research, is shown in Fig. 2.6. The steps involved in this experimental
setup are [MOP07]:
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Figure 2.5

A typical power analysis experimental setup [MOP07]

1. Supply the cryptographic device with power and a clock signal.
2. Configure and arm the oscilloscope from the controlling PC.
3. Command the target cryptographic device to begin execution and trigger data
collection by the oscilloscope.
4. Digitally sample the voltage variations across the resistor.
5. Collect the output of the cryptographic operation.
6. Retrieve the recorded side-channel data.

Power Supply

1

Measurement
circuit or EM probe
1

4

Digital sampling
oscilloscope
2

4

6

3
Clock generator

Figure 2.6

1

Cryptographic
device

Personal computer

5

Block diagram of typical experimental setup for side-channel analysis
(adapted from [MOP07]).
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Even if the target system has its own source, it may be more effective to
substitute more precise components to provide the power and clock signal. The data
collection technique may be adapted by the attacker to meet the unique objectives of
a particular SCA attack against the system of interest—which may be driven by, for
example, what countermeasures the system has implemented and the accessibility
of any internal circuitry. Modern chips often have several power and ground pins
as well as complex power distribution networks with filtering capacitors that reduce
the effectiveness of power analysis attacks. To achieve better results, it may be
necessary to target a specific pin rather than attempting to perform power analysis
on the noisy global power source.
Quisquater and Samyde were the first to report application of DPA-like experiments on EM emissions [QS01]. Their initial collection were taken from a circuit
using a small (less than 2 cm) diameter flat coil of copper wire attached to a digital oscilloscope as the measuring device. The original experiments were conducted
inside a Faraday cage to minimize received noise from external sources of electromagnetic energy. However, most recent EM attacks have reported minimal noise as
a result of conducting EM measurements even without such a device. The work of
Quisquater is also the first to report using a motorized table to precisely position the
EM probe over the device under test. Using this technique, they demonstrated the
ability to create a three-dimensional map of the EM leakage (magnitude) produced
by the device. Similar capabilities, including the Riscure Inspector system used for
this work [Ris09], are now commercially available.
2.7.0.6

Signal Processing Techniques.

In practical SCA attacks, sig-

nal alignment and countermeasures can make straightforward application of the
DSCA techniques impossible or at least very time consuming. In some cases, the
collected signals must be pre- or post-processed to make an attack possible. Signal (mis-)alignment can severely impact the results of a DSCA attack, and several
proposed countermeasures intentionally induce temporal misalignment. If all of the
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collected side channel traces do not begin at precisely the same relative time, noise
is introduced into the process, which requires many more measurements to mount a
successful attack. In experimental setups, initial alignment is achieved by asserting
a signal that tells the digital oscilloscope to begin collecting data at the instant the
ciphering operation begins. In real-world applications of SCA techniques, there is
obviously no trigger signal present. Certain commercial systems (e.g., the icWaves
subsystem of the Riscure Inspector side channel analysis system) can recognize, in
real-time, the signal features that indicate an encryption operation of interest is beginning [Ris09]. These systems obtain traces that are nominally aligned at the start
of the encryption operation. Mangard et al. discuss a number of techniques that
can be used to statically align trace data when the digital sampling does not begin
at the precise same time [MOP07].
Several techniques can overcome temporal desynchronization countermeasures.
Mangard et al. discuss a number of techniques to align trace data [MOP07]. Akkar et
al. suggested pre-processing signals where temporal desynchronization is present and
normalizing the individual traces by stretching or compressing the samples within
each clock period [ABDM00]. After pre-processing, DSCA techniques are applied
as normal. One technique for accomplishing this was introduced by Woudenberg
under the name elastic alignment [vWWB11]. Some investigators have also indicated
that simply pre-processing the captured traces to convert time-domain signals to
the frequency domain (via Fast Fourier Transform) and performing all subsequent
analysis in the frequency domain will significantly reduce any impact of misalignment
[RO04b, GHT05, PHF09].
Clavier introduced an attack variation that overcomes the randomization of
operation duration, which he termed sliding window DPA [CCD00]. The attack
works by conducting a DPA attack as normal, and post-processing the resulting statistical measure (e.g., correlation coefficients) over a fixed window of time, effectively
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restoring the amplitude of the characteristic peak values which indicate a correct key
hypothesis.
Numerous other applications of signal processing have been investigated. Since
SCA is, in essence, a signal detection/estimation/classification problem, it is likely
that well-known signal processing techniques from other fields (communications systems, biomedical signal processing, etc.) can be adapted for SCA.

2.8

Summary
This chapter summarized the relevant work and technical background necessary

to the study of side channel analysis and information leakage from integrated circuits.
This information supports the subsequent material presented in the remainder of this
document.

48

3. Intrinsic Physical Layer Authentication of Integrated Circuits
This chapter contains the text of an article that was submitted and accepted for publication to the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security [CLB+ 11]. This article was co-authored by
Mr. Eric Laspe, Dr. Rusty Baldwin, Dr. Michael Temple, and Dr. Yong Kim.

3.1

Abstract
RF distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting is adapted as a physical

layer technique to improve the security of integrated circuit (IC)-based multi-factor
authentication systems. Device recognition tasks (both identification and verification) are accomplished by passively monitoring and exploiting the intrinsic features
of an IC’s unintentional RF emissions without requiring any modification to the
device being analyzed. Device discrimination is achieved using RF-DNA fingerprints comprised of higher-order statistical features based on instantaneous amplitude, phase and frequency responses as a device executes a sequence of operations.
The recognition system is trained using Multiple Discriminant Analysis to reduce
data dimensionality while retaining class separability, and the resultant fingerprints
are classified using a linear Bayesian classifier. Demonstrated identification and verification performance includes average identification accuracy of greater than 99.5%
and equal error rates of less than 0.05% for 40 near-identical devices. Depending on
the level of required classification accuracy, RF-DNA fingerprint based authentication is well-suited for implementation as a countermeasure to device cloning, and is
promising for use in a wide variety of related security problems.

3.2

Introduction
Physical implementation attacks on secure electronic systems have evolved

rapidly in the past few years making it increasingly difficult for new countermea-
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sures and security practices to keep pace [BMV05, TJ09]. In contrast to mathematical cryptanalytic attacks which are typically hypothetical in nature, implementation attacks present a serious and immediate threat since the strength of
the underlying algorithms and protocols is rendered largely irrelevant. Examples
of implementation attacks range from complex techniques requiring expensive and
highly specialized equipment (e.g., laser fault injection or focused ion beam manipulation) to surprisingly simple, low-cost attacks targeting the unintentional information leakage produced by devices during normal operation (e.g., simple power
analysis) [BMV05, TJ09].
An extensive body of academic and commercial research has been dedicated to
examining the physical security of cryptographic and other secure devices. This work
has emerged in the last decade under the titles side channel analysis and fault analysis (cf. [BMV05, AARR02, KJJ99, ZF05]). Given that many implementation attacks
are well within the reach of even modestly funded and minimally equipped individuals, they should be given serious practical consideration when designing modern
systems. A prudent design approach is to 1) assume that secure tokens or other
essential system components are subject to counterfeiting, cloning, or sensitive data
extraction, and 2) take appropriate steps to mitigate the associated risks as part of
an integrated, multi-tiered system security architecture.
RF “distinct native attribute” (RF-DNA) fingerprinting (cf. [SITMM08,KTM09,
RTM10,RPT11,HBK06,WMTM10,WTR10,CGB+ 10]) is adopted herein as a way to
augment existing multi-factor authentication schemes via physical layer authentication at the device level to counter cloning and related threats. The term RF-DNA is
used to embody the coloration of RF emissions (both intentional and unintentional)
induced by the intrinsic physical attributes of a unique device. Only RF emissions
produced by unintentional emitters such as integrated circuits (ICs) are considered
in this study.

50

Using the RF-DNA approach, semiconductor-based IC devices are passively
recognized based on discriminating features (RF-DNA fingerprints) extracted from
their intrinsic physical properties in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. Because this technique exploits emissions caused by intrinsic inter-device
variability, it is suitable for a variety of security applications involving commodity
commercial ICs, and does not require any physical device modifications. Moreover,
our initial results indicate the technique can be adapted to work with existing processes and protocols, and is likely suitable for use with a wide variety of IC devices,
e.g., general purpose microcontrollers, programmable logic devices such as FPGAs,
and custom ASICs. To our knowledge, the work presented here and in [CGB+ 10]
is the first to propose using the intrinsic DNA of unintentional emissions for IC
recognition.
This work makes a number of distinct contributions while expanding on the
initial proof-of-concept results in [CGB+ 10] with an extensive empirical evaluation.
In particular, previous RF-DNA work has predominantly considered device identification tasks. However, the primary use case envisioned for IC fingerprinting is to
counter cloning and related threats, which requires identity verification. Herein, a
systematic approach is developed and introduced to evaluate RF-DNA fingerprinting
effectiveness in the context of both identification and verification tasks for arbitrary
n-class problems. Performance of the proposed technique is evaluated under a wide
range of simulated noise conditions, and empirical results are presented indicating
the RF-DNA technique performance scales well for identification and verification
tasks involving 40 near-identical devices.

3.3

Problem Definition
This work assesses the suitability of RF-DNA fingerprinting for two distinct,

but closely related device recognition tasks: identification and verification. These
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tasks are analogous to human recognition tasks for which biometric-based pattern
recognition systems are frequently used [JRP04]:
1. Device identification. The recognition system determines a device’s identity by
comparing a captured device fingerprint with reference fingerprint templates
for all known devices. Identification requires a one-to-many comparison and is
considered more difficult than verification.
2. Device verification. The recognition system checks the authenticity of a device’s claimed identity (by virtue digital credentials presented) using a one-toone comparison. As with biometric verification, the objective of physical layer
device verification is to prevent two devices from using the same identity.
Previous RF-DNA fingerprinting work predominantly focused on the one-tomany identification task in the context of wireless network security, where a device
entering a network needs to be verified as belonging to a pool of authorized devices.
However, detection of cloned security tokens such as smart-card based identification
cards or payment devices, requires one-to-one verification that the claimed identity
of the device matches its physical fingerprint. Herein, the suitability of RF-DNA
fingerprints for use by physical layer device recognition systems is assessed for both
identification and verification tasks.

3.4

Notional Physical Layer Device Authentication System Design
This section describes a system design for applying RF-DNA fingerprinting to

the device identification and verification problems described above. The basic design
is modeled after a typical biometric system [JRP04], and includes five modules:
• Sensor module. The sensor module captures unintentional RF emissions, and
is composed of an RF receiver and a near-field probe. Details of the particular
sensor module used to obtain the experimental data are described in Sec. 3.8.2.
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• Feature extraction module. Features are generated based on the statistical
behavior of one or more instantaneous response(s) within pre-defined fixed
signal regions. Both the device enrollment and the feature matching processes
use the feature extraction module to generate a statistical fingerprint for each
captured signal as described in Sec. 3.7.
• Classifier training module. Extracted features are post-processed using dimensionality reduction and probability density estimation techniques to generate
a reference template for each enrolled device.
• System database module. As each device is enrolled, the set of training fingerprints and associated reference template are stored in a verification database.
As each device is issued or associated with a particular digital identity, the
database is updated to reflect the pairing (e.g., device A1 belongs to John
Smith).
• Classification / feature matching module. For recognition tasks, one or more
fingerprints are extracted from the presented device. The extracted fingerprint(s) are compared to the stored reference templates in the system database
to either identify the device or verify its presented identity.
The basic steps involved in fingerprinting each device at enrollment are:
1. Command the device to execute a short pre-defined sequence of operations (the
challenge).
2. Capture the unintentional near-field RF emissions produced by the device as
it executes the operation sequence (the response).
3. Extract discriminating features from the captured emissions to produce an
RF-DNA fingerprint.
4. Repeat the above steps NFP times to obtain a set of training fingerprints.
5. Process the set of extracted training fingerprints to generate a reference template for each enrolled device.
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6. Repeat the above steps for each of NCR challenge-response sequences.
7. Store each set of training fingerprints and generated reference template in a
database.
8. When the physical device is issued to an individual or paired with a set of digital
credentials, update the database to associate the stored reference template with
those digital credentials.
In the context of a cryptographic challenge-response system, the command to
execute a particular operation sequence is the challenge and the unintentional RF
emissions produced by the device while executing the sequence is the response.
The operation sequence used can be composed of any fixed, repeatable process.
For general purpose microcontrollers, the operation sequence would be a series of
microcode instructions (e.g., some combination of loop, branch, control, or arithmetic
commands) on known (fixed) data. For programmable logic devices or ASICs, the
sequence could be composed of several clock cycles where different combinational
logic paths are activated, starting from a known fixed configuration. When possible,
device configuration (clock rate, on-chip peripheral status, etc.) should be held or
reset to a known state prior to beginning the operation sequence.
After enrollment, subsequent device recognition tasks are performed by repeating the challenge-response protocol to obtain an authentication fingerprint. The
authentication fingerprint is processed by the classification / feature matching module for identification or verification. Although the experiments conducted herein are
limited to a single challenge-response sequence (NCR = 1), extension of the approach
to an arbitrary number of challenge-response pairs is straightforward.
An explicit RF-DNA challenge-response procedure is unnecessary for many envisioned applications because the RF-DNA fingerprinting procedure can be be piggybacked on existing protocols. For example, it is typical to initiate communications
with smart-cards by issuing a reset command to the card and parsing the resulting
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answer to reset (ATR) response. A straightforward RF-DNA implementation might
generate a fingerprint from a small portion of the ATR response. Other opportunistic responses for fingerprinting of smart-card authentication include PIN verification
or credential retrieval. Similar opportunistic approaches can be envisoned for identification and verification tasks based on microcontrollers, programmable logic devices
such as FPGAs, and ASIC-based devices.

3.5

Unintentional RF Emissions of ICs
It is common knowledge that electronic equipment radiates electromagnetic

(EM) energy that can interfere with nearby devices. It is for this reason that airline
passengers are required to “turn off all portable electronic devices,” and consumer
electronics undergo certification testing for compliance with Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) [FCC09] or other regulating standards. Digital devices that
incorporate high frequency clocks, oscillators, etc. are specifically regulated as known
unintentional emitters and require strict testing to ensure emissions do not exceed
tolerable levels.
Variations in current flow through a device due to clock distribution, transistor
switching, and other IC component activity produce EM fields that combine through
complex interactions and propagate via both radiation and conduction in the form of
time-varying EM waves. The fundamental nature of these effects is well understood
and is described by Maxwell’s equations [AARR02].
In the past decade there has been a growing realization that unintentional
emissions are not only a source of interference, but also a useful source of information
about the internal state of the emission producing device [KJJ99, AARR02,BMV05,
ZF05, PEK+ 09]. This has had profound implications for the physical security of
sensitive electronic systems since in many instances the leaked state information is
sufficient to infer precise details about the operations the device is performing and/or
the data it is processing. More recently, it was shown in [CGB+ 10] that in addition
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to data and operation-dependent characteristics, the unintentional near-field RF
emissions of individual ICs also exhibit significant device-dependent characteristics.
The most likely source of inter-device emission variability is the random process
variations introduced during die fabrication and packaging [Ver10]. Although IC
fabrication processes are necessarily precise, structural variations are still introduced
in the final device structure on a very small scale (deep sub-micron in modern IC
technology). As a result, no two chips are exactly alike. As long as process-induced
variations are within acceptable tolerances, the device will operate correctly from a
black-box functional perspective.
For this study, the hypothesis is that the fabrication process-induced variations
in each individual chip’s electrical properties color the unintentional RF emissions
from the circuit, and that the resultant coloration is sufficient to uniquely identify
the emissions’ source. Although only unintentional RF emissions are studied herein,
the approach used is believed to be applicable to other side channel emissions such
as variations in the power consumption of the device.

3.6

Related Work
Various methods have been proposed to use the uniqueness of inter-device pro-

cess variations to enhance security. Previously proposed physical layer device recognition techniques include physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [Ver10, PRTG02],
RF certificates of authenticity (RF-COAs) [DK07], and the exploitation (i.e, RF
fingerprinting) of unique signal coloration within intentional emissions produced by
wireless networking [SITMM08, KTM09, RTM10, HBK06, RPT11, DC09] and RFIDbased devices [DHBČ09].
3.6.1

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF).

PUF techniques refer to two

distinct approaches for device authentication. The first augments an IC with specialized internal measurement circuitry that computes a one-way function from glitch
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counts, propagation delays, or other electrical properties that vary randomly with
intrinsic process variations of the IC [Ver10, MKP09]. A second approach combines
a grid of capacitive sensors integrated into the top metal layer of the IC with a conformal coating doped with randomly distributed dielectric particles applied on top of
the IC’s passivation layer. The conformal coating requires active interrogation (i.e.,
application of a specified voltage with known amplitude and frequency) and internal
measurement of the response by the circuit [Ver10].
3.6.2

RF Certificates of Authenticity (RF-COA).

The RF-COA technique

attaches a three dimensional constellation of small randomly shaped conductive or
dielectric objects to an RFID device. This is similar to a PUF coating except that
both the interrogation and response measurement are carried out by an external
RFID reader. The RFID reader is modified to include a dense matrix of patch
antennae to transmit and receive high-frequency RF signals. The reader interrogates
a modified RFID object and extracts a fingerprint to compute a COA [DK07].
3.6.3

RF-DNA Fingerprinting.

RF fingerprinting has been proposed as a

physical layer technique to enhance the security of various wireless communications
devices (e.g., RFID [DHBČ09], 802.11 WiFi [RPT11], 802.15 WPAN [HBK06,DC09],
802.16 WiMAX [WMTM10], GSM [WTR10]. The device fingerprinting methodology developed herein is specifically based on previous RF-DNA work in [SITMM08,
KTM09, RTM10]. The preliminary results in [CGB+ 10] confirmed that the general
approach was promising for recognition of ICs based on their unintentional emissions.
A significant advantage of RF-DNA fingerprinting compared to PUF and RFCOA techniques is its applicability to the authentication of any commodity IC without modifications to the internal circuitry or application of an external coating.
Additionally, measurement of the device response is passive and does not require a
transmitter.
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Figure 3.1

RF-DNA statistical fingerprint generation process.

To implement RF-DNA fingerprinting, the sensor module described in Sec. 3.4
would be integrated into the terminal or device reader. This approach is believed to
be reasonable given that space and power constraints are generally less restrictive
in a reader (e.g., smart-card reader or ATM machine) than in the secure token or
device itself.

3.7

RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation and Classification
3.7.1

RF-DNA Feature Extraction and Statistical Fingerprint Generation.

The statistical fingerprint generation methodology used herein is based on [SITMM08]
with modifications made to 1) extend the process from the limited 3-class to general
N -class problems, and 2) to enable both identification and verification device recognition tasks. RF-DNA statistical fingerprint feature vectors, F, are extracted from
real-valued time-domain samples based on the statistical behavior of instantaneous
signal response(s) within pre-selected response regions. The complete fingerprint
extraction and generation process is shown in Fig. 3.1.
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Three instantaneous signal responses are generated from the real-valued time
domain samples: instantaneous amplitude (IA) given by a (n), instantaneous phase
(IP) given by φ (n), and instantaneous frequency (IF) given by f (n). To calculate
φ (n) and f (n), the real-valued signal samples are first converted to I–Q samples,
sC(n) = sI(n) +sQ(n) , using a Hilbert transform [Lyo04]. The IP samples are calculated
using



sQ(n)
,
sI(n)

(3.1)



1 dφ (n)
f (n) =
.
2π
dt

(3.2)

−1

φ (n) = tan
with the corresponding IF (Hz) given by

The resultant IA and IF responses are “centered” using the amplitude (µa )
and frequency (µf ) means to remove potential collection biases

ac (n) = a (n) − µa ,

(3.3)

fc (n) = f (n) − µf .

(3.4)

Finally, the centered responses in (3.3) and (3.4) are normalized by their respective maximum magnitudes to compensate for power variation.
3.7.1.1

Statistical Fingerprint Generation.

After centering and nor-

malization, Nf = 4 statistical features are generated within each selected region of
each instantaneous response: standard deviation (σ), variance (σ 2 ), skewness (γ)
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and kurtosis (κ) [SITMM08]. For an arbitrary centered and normalized sequence
{x̄c (n)} having Nx samples, these features are
Nx
1 X
σ =
(x̄c (n) − µ)2 ,
Nx n=1
2

(3.5)

Nx
1 X
(x̄c (n) − µ)3 , and
3
Nx σ n=1

(3.6)

γ=

Nx
1 X
κ=
(x̄c (n) − µ)4 ,
Nx σ 4 n=1

where standard deviation (σ) is

√

(3.7)

σ2.

For all results presented in Sec. 4.6, each statistic was calculated over NR = 32
equal length, contiguous sub-regions spanning a total region of interest (ROI). The
ROI was empirically selected from the collected signal and contains NCL = 32 clock
cycles of device operations. Extensive pilot studies confirmed that for the parameter
combinations studied, partitioning samples into sub-regions corresponding to integer
multiples of the number of clock cycles in the ROI yielded statistically superior results
relative to partitioning based on fractional clock cycles. The full ROI encompassing
all NCL = 32 clock cycles was used as an additional “total” region giving (NR + 1) =
33 total regional contributions for each device. Fig. 3.2 illustrates the sub-region
allocation process used herein.
For each subregion and the “total” region, the four statistics are concatenated
to form a regional RF-DNA marker vector



FRi = σRi σR2 i γRi κRi 1×4 ,
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(3.8)
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Figure 3.2

Mean amplitude response of signals collected for all devices from part
numbers A and B (see Tab. 3.2). The x-axis shows sub-region allocation using NR = (NCLK + 1) = 33 sub-regions for calculation of
RF-DNA statistical fingerprints as described in Sec. 3.7.1.1.

where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (NR + 1)}. The RF-DNA marker vectors (3.8) are concatenated
to form a composite characteristic vector for each selected characteristic

C



F = FR1

..
.
. FR2 .. FR3 . . . FRNR +1


,

(3.9)

1×[4(NR +1)]

where the superscripted C denotes a specific characteristic response, i.e., a, φ, or f .
Considering IA, IP, and IF the final statistical fingerprint for each signal is a vector
of Nf · (NR + 1) · Ni = 4 · 33 · 3 = 396 total elements, or


a ..
φ ..
f
F= F .F .F

.
1×396
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Figure 3.3

Average of 500 RF-DNA fingerprints for each of the 40 tested devices.
Fingerprints are composed of statistical features extracted from NCL =
32 clock cycles (at collected SNR). The x-axis is the alpha-numeric
designator for each chip (see Table 3.2).

Finally, the training matrix composed of NFP separately collected statistical
fingerprints is


F1







 F2 

FT =  . 

 .. 


FNFP

,

(3.11)

NF P ×396

which is input to the classification training process described in Sec. 3.7.2.
The RF-DNA fingerprints shown in Fig. 3.3 illustrate intra- and inter -part
number variability in the statistical features generated for 40 unique devices. For
visual clarity, the RF-DNA markers in F are scaled, compressed and/or expanded,
and quantized such that the plotted data spans the interval [0, 1] within each statistic.
The quantized markers are stacked vertically to create an electrophoresis-like plot.
The RF-DNA plot is helpful in developing an intuitive understanding of which
statistical features exhibit the most variance both within and across part numbers. It
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is expected that the classifier will have the greatest difficulty distinguishing between
parts that have visually similar RF-DNA fingerprints. For example, the RF-DNA
plots for devices A4, A6, and A8 appear to be very similar across all features. These
devices are expected to be confused more frequently than devices that look substantially different across one or more statistical features. Device A9, on the other hand,
appears quite unique and would generally be expected to be less confused with other
devices. Likewise, the large apparent differences between the Class A chips and the
chips in all other classes implies that a classifier should be able to distinguish Class
A chips from the other classes more easily.
3.7.2

Classifier Training.

Consistent with previous RF-DNA fingerprinting

work, training of the classification system is accomplished using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to reduce feature dimensionality and improve class separability.
MDA is an extension of Fisher’s (two-class) linear discriminant analysis (LDA) to
N -classes that linearly transforms the sample points into an (N − 1)-dimensional
subspace without reducing the class separability power [TK09]. The MDA projection maximizes the ratio between inter-class distance and intra-class variance. For
all results presented herein, input fingerprint data is projected from the original
396-dimensional data into a compressed (ND − 1) = 39-dimensional space.
Given input data matrix X, the MDA transformation first finds the within
(intra-) (Sw ) and between (inter-) (Sb ) class scatter matrices [TK09]

Sw =

ND
X

Pi Σi ,

(3.12)

Pi (µi − µ0 ) (µi − µ0 )T .

(3.13)

i=1

Sb =

ND
X
i=1

where Σi is the covariance matrix for class Ci , and Pi is the prior probability of class
Ci (assumed to be equal for all classes).
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Projection matrix W is formed from the (N − 1) eigenvectors of S−1
w Sb . The
formation of W optimally maximizes the ratio of inter-class distance to intra-class
variance [TK09]. Individual fingerprints are projected onto the (N − 1)-dimensional
MDA space by

T
FW
i = W F.

(3.14)

For all results presented herein, the full MDA-projected fingerprint training
matrix, FW
T is a combination of NFP MDA-projected training fingerprints, each with
(ND − 1) = 39 elements


FW
1





 W 
 F2 


FW
T =  . 
.
 . 


W
FNFP

.

(3.15)

NF P ×39

Classifier training is completed by fitting a multivariate normal distribution to
the MDA-projected data and saving the estimated distribution parameters (mean
bW
bW
vector, µ
i , and covariance matrix, Σi ) for each class. For the linear Bayesian
classifier used herein, a pooled estimate of the covariance matrix is used in lieu of
individual covariance matrices for each class [TK09]. Note these parameters are for
the distribution fit to the training data after MDA projection, as indicated by the
superscripted W.
The complete training process produces the following:
• MDA projection matrix (W)
• ND sets of MDA-projected training fingerprints (FW
ci ) (one set for each device)
bW
• ND estimated mean vectors (µ
ci )
b W)
• A pooled estimate of the covariance matrix (Σ
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The pair of parameters composed of the mean vector and covariance matrix
for each device is the reference template for that device.
3.7.3

Fingerprint Classification.

As described in Sec. 3.3, RF-DNA statis-

tical fingerprints can be used for both identification and verification tasks. For both
applications, the unintentional RF emissions of a target device are collected and the
relevant statistical features are extracted and projected into the MDA space using
(3.14) to generate a projected device fingerprint (FW ). The classification technique
and performance measures used to evaluate system performance are different for
each application and are described below.
3.7.3.1

Device Identification.

For device identification, a captured

fingerprint is compared to the reference templates of all devices in a verification
database (one-to-many comparison) using some similarity criterion. The identity
of the target device is determined by computing the similarity score for each comparison and selecting the best match. The similarity measure used herein is the
Bayesian posterior probability under assumptions of equal prior probabilities and
equal costs. This approach is optimal for the minimization of classification error
probability [TK09].
Stated formally, for the case with ND devices, a device fingerprint FW is assigned to class ωi , where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ND } if



P ωi | FW > P ωj | FW

∀j 6= i,

(3.16)


where P ωi | FW is the conditional posterior probability that FW belongs to class
ωi . According to Bayes’ rule, the conditional probability is [Mac03]

P ωi | F

W




P FW | ωi P (ωi )
=
.
P (FW )
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(3.17)

For a given fingerprint FW the denominator is constant across all ωi and can be
neglected when evaluating the relative probabilities in (3.16). Assuming equal prior
probabilities for all classes, P (ωi ) = 1/ND is likewise constant, and the decision

criteria in (3.16) reduces to maximizing the likelihood P FW | ωi for all ωi . The
likelihood is estimated from the multi-variate Gaussian distribution defined by each
device reference template [TK09]
1


P FW | ωi =

b
(2π)(ND −1)/2 Σ

1/2

· exp (Fe ),

(3.18)

where

Fe = −

T −1 W

1 W
b
bi Σ
bi .
F −µ
F −µ
2

(3.19)

System identification performance is evaluated based on the overall correct
identification percentage, calculated as the percentage of time the classifier correctly
identifies the true class of an observed fingerprint over all trials. Confusion matrices
are generated to facilitate analysis of identification errors, but are not presented in
the interest of space.
3.7.3.2

Device Verification.

For device verification, the captured

fingerprint need only be compared with the specific template corresponding to the
device’s claimed identity to determine authenticity. Again, the similarity measure
used is the Bayesian posterior probability assuming equal priors and equal costs. The
decision for device verification is a binary result, where the device is deemed authentic
when the posterior probability exceeds a pre-determined threshold; otherwise, it is
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classified as an impostor. Stated formally, a newly observed device fingerprint FW
is considered authentic when


P ωc | FW ≥ t,

(3.20)

where ωc is the class to which the device claims to belong, and t is the decision
threshold.
For each verification decision the system can make two types of errors (see
Table 3.1) [JRP04]:
1. incorrectly accepting an impostor as authentic (false accept)
2. incorrectly rejecting an authentic device as an impostor (false reject)
The threshold, t, used for accept/reject decisions can be adjusted to tune
system performance to increase security (reduce false accept errors) or increase accessibility (reduce false reject errors).
Verification performance is assessed herein by plotting the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve and corresponding equal error rate (EER) for each curve.
The ROC curve is generated by plotting the true accept rate (TAR) vs. false accept
rate (FAR) as t is varied across the interval [0, 1] [JRP04]. EER corresponds to the
point on the ROC curve where the false reject rate (FRR = 1 − TAR) and FAR are
equal, and is frequently used as a summary statistic to compare the performance of
various classification systems. In general, lower EERs indicate better system classification performance. The EER achieved for each plotted ROC curve is provided
herein to facilitate future comparisons.
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Table 3.1

Verification Error Types.
System Decision

Reality

Authentic

Imposter

Authentic True Accept False Reject
Imposter False Accept True Reject
3.8

Experimental Methodology
All results were obtained by analyzing features of empirically collected unin-

tentional RF emissions from a given number of tested devices. A description of the
experimental setup and analysis methodology used herein is provided below.
3.8.1

Experimental Setup.

The unintentional RF emissions of a total of

ND = 40 individual 16-bit PIC24F micro-controllers are evaluated [Inc10]. These
devices include ten unique chips from each of four different part numbers as shown in
Table 3.2. The part numbers were intentionally selected to provide varying degrees
of similarity in device architecture. All ten chips within each part number are from
the same manufacturing lot.
One of the PIC parts (Part A) shares the same basic architecture as the others
but has several on-chip peripherals not present on the other three parts. The other
three PIC parts (B, C, and D) have minimal architectural differences and are identical except for the amount of on-board flash RAM (64, 48, and 32 kbit respectively).
Hereafter, individual chips are referenced by an alphanumeric designator corresponding to their respective part number and unique chip number, i.e., A1, A2, ..., D9, D10
as in Table 3.2.
The PIC devices are representative of the low cost micro-controllers used in
a variety of real-world commercial embedded systems, including various security
applications [PEK+ 09] and are easy to obtain through normal commercial channels.
All of the chips were fabricated using an unspecified 180 nm process. Since all chips
within a part number are from the same manufacturing lot, layout and architectural
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Table 3.2 Tested PIC micro-controller device classes.
Part
Class Device Numbers
PIC Part Number
A
B
C
D

A1-A10
B1-B10
C1-C10
D1-D10

PIC24FJ64GA102
PIC24FJ64GA002
PIC24FJ48GA002
PIC24FJ32GA002

I/SP
I/SP
I/SP
I/SP

features are identical; the only anticipated physical differences between chips with
the same part number are those resulting from random (uncontrolled) variations in
the die fabrication and packaging processes.
For device control and measurement, the micro-controllers were mounted on
a single evaluation board and programmed to respond to commands sent over an
RS-232 serial interface. The circuit board was fixed in place on a measurement table
using a custom jig to minimize any lateral movement during or between collections,
and was powered from a standard lab DC power supply (Agilent E3631A) to reduce
effects due to uncontrolled supply voltage fluctuations. A detailed description of the
experimental setup used can be found in [CGB+ 10].
The average amplitude response of the RF signals captured from all chips
in part classes A and B are shown in Fig. 3.2. As might be intuitively expected
given the architectural differences, the average signal response produced by the Class
A chips is noticably different from the response produced by Class B. The mean
amplitude responses produced by classes C and D are omitted from the plot because
they were visually indistinguishable from the average response of class B at the scale
shown.
3.8.2

Signal Collection.

The emissions from each micro-controller were

collected using a near-field probe connected to a Lecroy 104-Xi-A oscilloscope as
shown in Fig. 3.4. The probe acts as an antenna to receive the unintentional
emissions from the device under test and does not directly contact the chip. All
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Figure 3.4

Signal collection and pre-classification processing process.

data was collected at a sample rate of fs = 2.5 GSa/sec with a WLP = 1 GHz low
pass anti-aliasing filter inserted between the probe and the oscilloscope.
The high sampling rate used is excessive for the devices under test, which operate at FCLK = 29.48 MHz, but allows post-collection simulation of various receiver
configurations. All results are based on post-processed signals with an effective sample rate of 208 MSa/sec, which was achieved by passing all collected signals through
a low-pass Butterworth filter having a -3dB bandwidth of WBB = 100 MHz, and decimating them by a factor of 12 using proper decimation (i.e., every twelfth sample
is retained, all others are discarded).
To simulate the enrollment process in Section 3.4, each micro-controller is
repeatedly commanded to perform an identical sequence of operations on known
(constant) data. At the start of the operation sequence, the micro-controller asserts
a trigger signal to begin the data acquisition process. In practice, devices intended
for authentication could easily be configured to generate the required trigger. Use
of this technique for non-cooperative recognition tasks would require either precise
70

detection of the event to be fingerprinted or post-processing to extract the relevant
portion of the captured signal.
For this study, environmental effects (e.g., temperature and supply voltage)
were controlled by warming-up each device for approximately 20 minutes to stabilize
the operating temperature and using a bench power supply to provide a stable supply
voltage. After warm-up, NF P = 500 signals were collected from each chip as the
challenge-response sequence was repeatedly executed. For practical implementations,
training over the range of expected operating temperatures and supply voltages has
been shown to be an effective technique to deal with environmental fluctuations
[TSU04].
For all collections, acquisition order for the chips was randomly generated
to prevent any collection-order dependent variance. No measures were taken to isolate the data collection system from background environmental noise—all collections
were performed in an office building environment with numerous co-located PCs and
wireless devices.
3.8.3

K-Fold Cross Validation.

Classification performance is evaluated

using K-fold cross validation. Consistent with common practice [TK09], K = 10
is used such that each collection of NFP = 500 statistical fingerprints (one for each
sequence of operations) per device is divided into ten blocks each having NK =
50 fingerprints per block. Nine blocks from each device are used for training and
one block is “held out” for classification. The training and classification process is
repeated ten times until each of the ten blocks has been “held out” and classified.
Thus, each block of statistical fingerprints is used once for classification and nine
times for training. Final cross-validation performance statistics are calculated by
averaging the results of all K = 10 folds and calculating 95% confidence intervals to
determine statistical significance.
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3.8.4

Noise Simulation.

Signal collection occurred in a controlled office

environment while limiting outside influences where possible. To assess performance
under less ideal conditions (noisier integrated systems, poor probe positioning, increased separation between sensor and system under test, etc.), captured signals
are power-scaled for analysis. To evaluate performance under lower SNR conditions
the collected signals were combined with like-filtered additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) to achieve desired analysis SNRs of −50 ≤ SNR ≤ 50 dB in 1 dB increments as shown in Fig. 3.4. During pre-classification processing, the baseband signal
and AWGN were digitally filtered using the same filter, i.e., a low-pass Butterworth
filter with a -3 dB bandwidth of WBB = 100 MHz.
For each Monte Carlo iteration, a total of NZ independent AWGN realizations are generated, filtered, scaled and added to the collected signals prior to fingerprint generation. After NZ Monte Carlo iterations at each SNR, K = 10 fold
cross-validation results are averaged to calculate summary classification performance
statistics. All results are based on NF P = 500 empirically collected signals per device and NZ = 100 simulated AWGN realizations at each analysis SNR for a total
of (ND × NZ × NF P = 2 000 000) classification decisions.
3.9

Results
Extensive pilot studies were performed using all ND = 40 devices to assess

1) the influence of various system parameters on overall performance, 2) the ability of the classification approach to deal with the large number of devices, and 3)
the sensitivity of fingerprint performance to various arbitrarily selected response sequences. Performance was evaluated by varying the system parameters over NCL =
{2, 3, ..., 64}, NR = {NCL /2, NCL , NCL ·2}, and WBB = {25, 50, 100, 250, 500} (MHz).
All pilot studies analyzed signals at the collected SNR (no noise scaling). The effect
of including each of the instantaneous responses (IA, IP, and IF) was also assessed
during the pilot studies. The results used NR = NCL = 32 and WBB = 100 MHz
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for statistical fingerprints composed of all three instantaneous responses (IA, IP,
and IF). This combination of parameters and signal responses provides a reasonable
trade-off between system performance and computation time.
Fig. 3.5 shows overall average, best, and worst-case observed identification
performance for the ND = 40 tested devices in Table 3.2. The 95% CIs were calculated for the average performance data. However, they are omitted from the plot
for visual clarity since they are approximately the width of the data markers. As
indicated in Fig. 3.5, the classifier achieved an overall average identification success
rate of of 99.7% (σ = 0.892) at the collected SNR (no added noise), and maintained
average identification success rates of 90% or better for simulated SNRs ≥ 15 dB.
Perfect identification (100% classification success rate) was achieved for 27 of the 40
tested devices when analyzed at the collected SNR. The worst observed identification
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performance was exhibited by device A6, which was successfully identified 95.7% of
the time at the collected SNR. The confusion matrices (not presented) show that the
majority of identification errors for device A6 are associated with misclassifying device A6 as either A8 or A4. As discussed in Sec. 3.7.1.1, this is due to the similarity
evident from visual inspection of the device statistical fingerprints depicted in Fig.
3.3. Likewise, the most unique looking fingerprint in Fig. 3.3 (device A9) yields the
best identification performance of all tested devices across the range of simulated
SNRs. As expected, identification performance degrades as the input signals are
corrupted with noise, and approaches the accuracy of a random guess (1/40 = 2.5%)
at the lowest analysis SNRs.
While it is anticipated that the achievable SNR for the envisioned applications
will be very high in practice since emissions are captured using a near-field probe,
it is important to note that the identification accuracies are representative of what
is achievable by extracting a single fingerprint from the device being identified. Extension of the Bayesian classification approach for multiple extracted fingerprints is
straightforward, and should provide considerable improvement in identification accuracy. Such improvement may be required for specific applications not considered
here.
To evaluate system verification performance, a total of 40 ROC curves were
generated at each analysis SNR, again using K-fold cross-validation. The ROC curves
were generated by sequentially treating each tested device as the claimed identity and
testing the verification performance against the known true identity associated with
each fingerprint. Each individual curve shows the achievable trade-space between
system security and accessibility as a function of the selected decision threshold for
a particular device. Figs. 3.6 and 3.7 show the ROC curves for the worst-performing
device identity (A6) at selected analysis SNRs.
At the collected SNR, the system achieved an average EER across all tested
identities of 0.044% (σ = 0.12); 32 of the 40 tested identities exhibited EERs of
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< 0.01%. The worst four EERs were 0.19, 0.33, 0.50, and 0.53%. As with the identification task, worst case verification performance was associated with the template
for device A6, followed closely by device A8. Again, this is due to the similarity
between the statistical fingerprints of the two devices as shown in Fig. 3.3. Fig.
3.6 shows the behavior of device verification performance as the input signal quality
degraded, i.e. performance decreases significantly as the collected signal is corrupted
with additional simulated noise, eventually reaching near “random” verification accuracy at SNR = −40 dB. Again, if higher performance is required for a specific application, verification accuracy can be improved by extracting multiple fingerprints
from the device.
In this study, steps were taken to ensure that the device being authenticated
is as isolated from external effects as practical. In operational systems, it is likely
that a particular chip is permanently integrated into a larger system component or
board. For instance, in embedded systems or smart-cards, the micro-controller is
likely to be soldered or otherwise packaged internally to the authentication device.
Since the process controls for integration and packaging may not be as stringent as
those for fabrication of the IC itself, it is believed that fingerprinting of the integrated
device may actually prove to be more effective than fingerprinting of isolated ICs as
considered here.
While the raw data acquired for this study was obtained using a high speed
digital sampling oscilloscope, sample rate and bandwidth were intentionally limited
using the procedure described in Sec. 3.8.2 to simulate a less capable receiver setup
(e.g., a low-cost data acquisition card). Furthermore, preliminary experiments using a simulated tuned receiver setup show that a substantial amount of the overall
discriminatory information is carried in narrow sidebands around harmonics of the
device clock frequency. Thus, it is believed that more practical, low-cost receiver
architectures are likely to remain highly effective.
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A final observation is that the results suggest acceptable performance may be
achieved for some devices without the need for extensive optimization of the response sequence. The results herein were obtained by arbitrarily designating several
clock cycles of an overall operation sequence as the response region. No statistical
difference in performance was observed during limited trials when the designated response region was varied to include sub-regions containing very different microcode
instruction sequences. This suggests that the technique can be implemented in an
opportunistic manner, where the challenge-response sequence can be conveniently
selected from a portion of other authentication procedures or protocol communications. Additional improvements in performance might be obtained by more carefully
choosing or defining a response that emphasizes device sub-circuitry that exhibits
high inter-device variability. However, it is believed that for many applications the
opportunistic approach will provide sufficient performance without the need for further performance improvement through response optimization.
Although obtained under controlled conditions using a single sensor module,
the results thus far are very promising and the proposed technique merits additional
investigation. These results also suggest that RF-DNA fingerprinting is suitable
for other applications such as Trojan or counterfeit device detection and forensic
attribution for criminal or other investigations.
A considerable amount of work remains to fully understand the suitability
of RF-DNA fingerprinting for practical security implementations. Intuitively, the
nature of the intrinsic characteristics that induce inter-device variations suggests
a fingerprint based on those variations will be extremely difficult to impersonate.
However, further analysis and experimentation are needed to confirm this. Other
areas for additional study include:
• Permanence and robustness of RF-DNA features under varying environmental
conditions.
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• Sensitivity of fingerprint performance to variations due to different sensor modules or sensor positioning.
• Scalability to very large databases.
• Optimization of the device response sequence in the challenge-response phase
to maximize device discriminability.
• Suitability for low-cost implementations through bandwidth optimization and
investigation of alternative sensor module architectures.
• Effectiveness for programmable or custom logic ICs such as FPGAs or ASICs.
Finally, recent research [KTM09,WTR10] has demonstrated significant performance gains using spectral Fourier-based and wavelet-based RF-DNA fingerprints
for intentional emissions. Application of these approaches to recognition of unintentional IC emissions remains an area of future research.

3.10

Conclusion
RF “distinct native attributes” (RF-DNA) possessed by the unintentional emis-

sions of ICs are a rich source of discriminatory information for device recognition.
Empirical results demonstrate the suitability of RF-DNA fingerprinting for both
identification and verification device recognition tasks. For experimentally collected
emissions, the technique correctly identifies devices greater than 99.5% of the time,
with average verification EERs of less than 0.05% using a single extracted fingerprint. Correct identification success rates of better than 90% were maintained under
analysis conditions of SNR ≥ 15 dB. Thus, RF-DNA fingerprinting is promising for
anti-cloning and related security applications requiring unique IC device recognition.
Furthermore, the impressive performance indicates the technique may be adaptable
to less ideal conditions while still providing acceptable performance. Finally, these
results were obtained using a single extracted fingerprint, and a substantial improve-
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ment in performance is believed to be realizable through a straightforward extension
of the approach for multiple extracted fingerprints.

3.11

Supplementary Discussion
This section contains an expansion of the material submitted as part of this

article that could not be included due to mandatory space limitations.
3.11.1

Experimental Setup.

This section includes additional information

on the experimental setup used to acquire the data for all experiments conducted
during this research. The primary source of data used for this research (unintentional
EM signals) was collected using AFIT’s commercial Riscure Inspector side channel
analysis system. The experimental setup closely follows the setup described in Sec.
2.7 as shown in Fig. 2.5.
The system is configured to collect unintentional RF emissions from the device
under test using a near-field probe (1 GHz bandwidth) connected to a Lecroy 104-XiA oscilloscope. The probe acts as an antenna to receive the unintentional emissions
from the device under test, and does not directly contact the chip. The oscilloscope
has a 1 GHz bandwidth, a maximum sample rate of 10 GSa/sec, and four channels
with 12.5 MBits of sample memory each. Depending on the device technology and
clock rate of the device under test, hardware low-pass filters (either built-in to the
oscilloscope, or in-line filters inserted between the H-field probe and the oscilloscope
input) are used as necessary to prevent signal aliasing due to the analog-to-digital
sampling process.
The near-field probe is mounted on a computer-controlled motorized XYZ table
for consistent placement of the probe relative to the device under test. Initial probe
position for measurements is established by performing a two-dimensional scan of
the surface of the tested chip as it repeatedly executes the operation of interest.
The results of the scan are processed with a digital bandpass filter and analyzed
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to determine the location of maximal RF energy in the band corresponding to the
known internal clock frequency. The probe and relative device positions remained
fixed for all subsequent collections. Custom jigs are fabricated for each test board to
help stabilize the device being measured and to ensure consistent placement of the
probe for subsequent measurements.

Figure 3.8

Riscure Inspector Side Channel Analysis System [Ris09]

To improve collection efficiency and reduce post-processing for signal alignment, the training devices are controlled by a PC over an RS-232 serial interface.
Devices are programmed to assert a trigger signal on one of the general purpose
input/output (GPIO) pins at the start of the operation sequence. The oscilloscope
is configured through a PC interface to collect the RF signal for a fixed time interval
each time the trigger is asserted. This enables precise identification and alignment of
the individually collected signals without the need for extensive post-processing. As
described in Chap. 4, triggering based on known features that indicate the start of
the encryption operation using real-time EM emissions is also feasible, but requires
substantial post-processing of the acquired signals to achieve similar alignment.
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4. Leakage Mapping: A Systematic Methodology for Assessing the
Side Channel Information Leakage of Cryptographic Implementations
This chapter contains the text of an article that has been submitted for publication
to the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) Transactions on Information
and System Security [CBL11]. This article was co-authored by Dr. Rusty Baldwin
and Mr. Eric Laspe.

4.1

Abstract
We propose a generalized framework to quantify the side-channel information

leakage from arbitrary cryptographic implementations. The framework provides a
comprehensive methodology to assess the information leakage from all algorithmicallyspecified key-dependent intermediate computations for implementations of symmetric block ciphers. The leakage assessment quantitatively bounds the resistance of an
implementation to the general class of differential side channel analysis techniques.
The leakage mapping framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming
Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, with recommendations for extension of the technique to more accurate models. The approach is applied to two
typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard, and the
assessment results are empirically validated against a correlation-based differential
power analysis attack.

4.2

Introduction
Over the last several years, there has been an extensive effort in academia

and industry to address physical implementation attacks on cryptographic systems,
to include both side channel and fault attacks [KJJ99, MOP07, AARR02, ARRS05,
BCO04, SLP05, Sko06, SMY09, GBTP08]. However, relatively little work has been
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done to aid cryptographic system designers in practically addressing the identified
security risks.
From a security perspective, it is naı̈ve and dangerous to assess implementation security based on the results of limited testing. For instance, the failure of a
differential power analysis (DPA) attack based on the Hamming Weight of an S-Box
output should not be the basis for concluding the implementation is secure against
DPA or other side channel analysis techniques in general.
It is also dangerous to assess the overall strength (or weakness) of an implementation’s security based on analysis of a small subset of the overall implementation
(e.g., one S-box), particularly for complex FPGA or ASIC circuits where various
portions of the algorithm may be implemented in completely separate physical areas
of a die, with very different layouts and routing in each area.
From a cryptographic system designer or engineer’s perspective, designing a
system that is secure against the plethora of rapidly evolving physical implementation attacks is daunting. Nevertheless, to sufficiently characterize the leakage of
an implementation against the full spectrum of tools that may be employed by a
real adversary, it is essential that a systematic evaluation of an implementation be
conducted against the widest variety of attacks possible. In particular, the effectiveness of countermeasures cannot be adequately understood unless their effects are
comprehensively assessed against the full spectrum of available attack techniques.
The work by Standaert, et al. [SMY09] is the first concerted effort to provide a
practice-oriented framework for a fair comparative evaluation of side channel attacks
and implementation leakage. The work provides a solid foundation for the comparison of attack effectiveness as well as a standard method for quantitatively bounding
the leakage from a particular device.
However, to assess the worst-case leakage of an implementation, Standaert’s
methodology essentially relies on an evaluator’s skill in the subtle art of building an
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optimal template attack. Furthermore, the results are only applicable to the targeted
portion of the overall cryptographic algorithm, which may neglect to identify other
exploitable leakages. In light of techniques such as algebraic SCA [RSVC09, RS09],
assessing the overall security of a system based on the leakage from a limited portion
of an overall implementation is simply insufficient.
Herein, we expand on the objectives of [SMY09] by introducing a systematic
approach to comprehensively quantify the leakage characteristics of a given implementation. We provide a practical tool set for making sound decisions during the
system design process to achieve, with some certainty, a desired level of resistance
against differential side channel attacks.
The contributions of this work include a generalized framework for leakage
assessment of block ciphers, and a method to bound the resistance of an implementation against the general class of differential SCA techniques. The approach
is applied to two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the assessment results are empirically validated against a
correlation-based DPA attack.

4.3

Background
4.3.1

Side Channel Emissions of ICs.

All physical systems, viewed exter-

nally, produce both intended and unintended outputs. The unintended outputs are
quantifiable, physically observable phenomena produced as a side-effect of normal
operation. When an unintended observable outcome is correlated to some aspect
of the internal state or operation of the system, the resulting side channel is said
to leak information. Herein, the term information leakage generically refers to any
such phenomena that exhibits a statistical relationship to the underlying operations
being performed or data being manipulated.
Information leakage can result from a variety of side channel emission sources.
Known sources include variations in power consumption, radiated electromagnetic
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(EM) energy, computation time, and even acoustic or thermal emissions. The various
known sources of side-channel emissions are shown in the block diagram of a notional
two-party communication system in Fig. 1.1.
4.3.2

Information Leakage and Side Channel Analysis.

The objective of

side channel analysis is to infer details about internal data or operations based on the
observation of a side channel while that data is being processed. Various mathematical techniques have been introduced [KJJ99, SLP05, BCO04, GBTP08] that permit
an adversary to exploit relationships between the data manipulated internally to a
device and the externally observable side channels. Even if the underlying data has
a very small influence on the external observable, it is often possible to recover secret
key material from a cryptographic system using these techniques.
Side channel attacks have profound implications for the physical security of
sensitive electronic systems since cryptographic algorithms form the very foundation
of virtually all modern secure systems—with applications ranging from remote keyless entry systems to secure payment technologies to the protection of various forms
of intellectual property. Because cryptographic key secrecy plays such a central role
in security, preserving that secrecy and understanding the practical implications
of any vulnerabilities that may lead to the disclosure of key material is of critical
importance. Thus, although side channel techniques are generic in the sense that
they can be used to infer a wide variety of information about the internal activity
of an integrated circuit, the majority of the research in this area has been on key
recovery attacks (i.e., side channel attacks) of cryptographic systems.
We develop a framework of techniques that permit a cryptographic engineer
or security evaluator to systematically assess, investigate, and counter the numerous
sources of information leakage that can lead to unintentional disclosure of sensitive
key material.
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Hereafter, we focus on symmetric block ciphers, with particular attention to
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [Nat01]. Application of leakage mapping
to other symmetric block ciphers is straightforward, and the general approach introduced herein can be adapted to most other classes of cryptographic algorithms (e.g.,
stream ciphers, asymmetric algorithms, etc.) with minimal modifications.
4.3.3

Structure of Symmetric Block Ciphers.

Symmetric cryptographic

algorithms are typically made up of repetitive sequences called rounds, where each
round is composed of a sequence of primitive operations. A cryptographic operation
is denoted Ck (m) where k is a fixed key drawn from the key space K and m is the
input message (either plain-text or cipher-text depending on the cryptographic mode
of operation) drawn from the message space M.
To enable efficient implementation on a wide variety of hardware and software
platforms, cryptographic algorithm designers often constrain the underlying primitive operations to function on small sub-blocks of data no larger than the data bus
width of potential target platforms. In practice, this means that data sub-block sizes
for many algorithms are limited to eight or fewer bits to permit implementation on
low-cost micro-controllers or embedded processors. Throughout this work, the term
data is used generically to include all inputs to an operation, including the key.
A practical implication of the constrained input size for each intermediate
computation is that the intermediate result of each primitive operation step can be
exhaustively predicted with low computational effort. The dependence of an implementation’s behavior on these data sub-blocks is one of the key concepts exploited
by many SCA attacks.
For example, consider a typical 8-bit substitution box (S-Box) such as the one
used in the AES Rijndael algorithm. Each AES S-Box produces an output that
depends only on an 8-bit input and an 8-bit portion of the round key. A common
attack scenario involves a known input, i.e., a known plain-text for an encryption
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operation. The output can, then, be exhaustively predicted for each of the 28 = 256
possible round sub-keys. Thus, although both the AES state array and key are 128
bits resulting in 2128×2 ≈ 1.2 × 1077 possible combinations1 , the modular structure
of the algorithm enables prediction of all intermediate results after each S-Box stage
with only 16 × 28 = 4096 computations.
The bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) function commonly employed in cryptographic
algorithms further exemplifies this point. An XOR operation effectively yields a data
sub-block size of 1-bit since each bit of the output only depends on two input bits.
Thus, to compute all possible hypothetical states given knowledge of half the input to
an XOR stage (assuming the key bit is the only unknown) requires only 128×2 = 256
total computations.
4.3.4

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

The AES is a public and

thoroughly documented symmetric block cipher. The reader is referred to [DR01,
Nat01] for an in depth discussion of the design and mathematics of the algorithm
which are beyond the scope of this work. A brief overview of the algorithm and the
specific notation employed herein are described below. The notation and algorithm
description have been tailored to allow a more natural description in the context of
SCA attacks and the leakage mapping technique introduced in Sec. 4.4.
4.3.4.1

Notation.

Throughout this work, vector representations of

data are denoted by an over-arrow and matrix forms are denoted by bold type. Except where explicitly specified, each element of a vector or matrix represents one byte
(8 bits) of data. Various other representations of data (e.g., bit- or word-oriented)
are sometimes employed to more naturally match the actual machine representation
used for an arbitrary implementation. Such representations are distinguished by an
1

AES can also be implemented with a 192 or 256 bit key. Individual round keys are 128 bits for
all FIPS 197 approved variants of the Rijndael algorithm.
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underset

(n)

where n is the number of bits represented by each vector or matrix

element, i.e.,
~x A vector of bytes where ~xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255} is the ith element of the vector.
~x A vector of n−bit elements where ~xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1}.

(n)

(n)

x A matrix of bytes where xi,j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255} is the element at the ith row and
j th column of the matrix.
X An n-dimensional matrix, where n ≥ 3. The notation used to denote individual
elements of the matrix differ, but in general superscripts (e.g., Xi ) are reserved
to denote round indices, and subscripts (e.g., Xi,j ) denote individual elements
within a round.
4.3.4.2

AES State Representation.

All FIPS 197 approved variants

of the AES algorithm operate on 128-bit data blocks, represented algorithmically as
a (4×4) state array composed of 16 bytes of data [Nat01]. Using the above notation,
the bit-vector of the state is formed from the individual state bits is

~s = [b0 b1 b2 · · · b127 ][1×128] ,

(4.1)

(2)

where bi ∈ {0, 1} represents the ith bit of data. Each byte of the state array is formed
from 8 bits of the 128-bit data block or

s 0 = b7 b 6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b 1 b0
s1 = b15 b14 b13 b12 b11 b10 b9 b8
..
.
s15 = b127 b126 b125 b124 b123 b122 b121 b120 ,
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~s7 ~s11
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~s12
~s13 

~s14 
~s15
}

Vector Element Order

Illustration of mapping between AES state matrix (indexed by row and
column) and corresponding elements of the equivalent byte-vector.

where si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}. The (byte-oriented) AES state vector, ~s, is then formed
from the 16 bytes of AES state information

~s = [s0 s1 . . . s15 ][1×16] ,

(4.2)

where ~si denotes the ith byte, and i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}. The equivalent AES state
matrix 2 is formed from the bytes of the state vector in column order. The linear
indices of the state vector, ~s, can be translated to or from equivalent row and column
indices of the state matrix s, using the mapping in Fig. 4.1.
~ and is formed from
The AES master key (in byte-vector form) is denoted K,
the NB bytes of the key

~ = [k0 k1 . . . kN −1 ]
K
B
[1×NB ] ,

(4.3)

where ki is the ith byte for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NB − 1}, and NB is determined from the
key size as shown in Table 4.1. As with the AES state information, the equivalent
~.
bit-vector representation is denoted K
(2)

The master key is expanded into a full key schedule composed of (Nr + 1)
individual 128-bit (16-byte) round keys, where Nr = 10, 12, or 14 for implementations
2
Throughout this work, the term state matrix is used interchangeably with the state array
defined in [Nat01].
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Table 4.1

Number of intermediate result states computed during AES encryption
and key scheduling (inclusive of input and output states).
# Intermediate Steps
Key Size

Nr

NB

# Rnd Keys

Cipher

Key Sched.

128

10

16

11

41

70

192

12

24

13

49

70

256

14

32

15

57

79

using 128, 192, or 256-bit keys, respectively (see Tab. 4.1). The ith round-key (in
byte-vector form) is denoted ~k i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nr }.
Each of the (Nr + 1) individual 16-byte round keys, Ki , for round i (in bytematrix form) is formed from the individual round key bytes

~k i
 0
 i
~k1

i
K =
~k i
 2

~k i
3

~k i
4

~k i
8

~k i
5

~k i
9

~k i ~k i
10
6
~k i ~k i
11
7

~k i
12





~k i 
13 

~k i 
14 

~k i
15

,

(4.4)

4×4

for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nr }. The full key schedule is constructed as a three-dimensional
matrix denoted K[4×4×(Nr +1)] , where the individual matrix elements are
Kir,c The element (byte) of the full AES key schedule at row r, column c of the ith
round key, where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nr }.
4.3.4.3

AES Round Structure.

Each round of the AES is composed

of a sequence of four primitive operations that manipulate the byte-oriented state
matrix, s. The AES primitive operations are
• AddRoundKey (ARK): Combines the input data with the round key using a bitwise XOR operation.
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• SubBytes (SB): Independently processes each byte of the state using a nonlinear substitution (S-box).
• ShiftRows (SR): Cyclically shifts (byte-oriented rotation) the rows of s by
incremental offsets.
• MixColumns (MC): Independently mixes the data within each column (4 bytes)
of s.
A detailed description of each AES primitive operation can be found in the
AES specification [Nat01].
One full round of an AES encryption as defined herein is illustrated in Fig.
4.3. This definition is slightly different from that in [Nat01]. The two descriptions
are semantically equivalent, as depicted in Fig. 4.2, but the round definition herein
allows a more natural mathematical description of side channel attacks and clarifies the dependency between each individual round key and the locally dependent
intermediate results.
The first (NR − 1) rounds of an AES encryption are identical and composed
of a sequential application of the ARK, SB, SR, and MC primitive operations. The
final round omits MC, instead applying an additional ARK operation to produce the
cipher-text output, c.
The AES state after completing the j th intermediate computation step of round
i is denoted si,j , and the individual elements of the AES state matrix after each step
are indexed by their matrix indices, i.e.
si,j AES state matrix after completing j th intermediate computation step of round i,
si,j
r,c The element (byte) of the AES state matrix at row r and column c after
completing j th intermediate computation of round i.
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M

M

for i ← 1, (Nr-1)

Ki
SB
SR
MC
Ki

SB
SR

MC

for i ← 0, (Nr-2)

K0

KNr-1
SB

SB

SR

SR

KNr

Figure 4.2

KNr
C

C

(a)

(b)

Comparison of (a) FIPS 197 round definition to (b) the round definition used herein. The two definitions are semantically equivalent, but
the modified description in (b) allows a more natural mathematical
description of intermediate result dependencies on round keys.

Thus, s0,0 and sNr −1,4 represent the plain-text, m, and cipher-text, c, of an
AES encryption operation, respectively. Since the output of each round is the input
to the next, si,4 ≡ si+1,0 for any two adjacent rounds i and (i + 1).
4.3.5

Modeling Leakage.

The information leakage from a cryptographic

implementation can be modeled at various levels of abstraction depending on how
much is known about the implementation’s internal design architecture (to include
both hardware and software aspects).
Herein, a leakage model is defined to include a minimum of two components
• A leakage function FL (·) used to transform one or more intermediate results
into hypothetical leakage values, and
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• A parameter, ND , that defines the assumed data sub-block size used for model
predictions.
The leakage function, FL , can operate on a single static state value or on two
different states. The latter definition is used to create models based on the transistor
switching activity or other underlying physical phenomena influenced by the change
from one state to another.
The term leakage model, when considered in combination with the particular
mathematical technique used in a differential side-channel analysis (DSCA) attack,
is closely related to the concepts of side channel distinguisher and selection function
employed in other works (e.g., [SGV08]). Herein, the leakage model is considered
separately from the mathematical tools used to analyze the relationship between the
modeled data and actual leakage data.
4.3.5.1

Algorithmic Leakage Models.

In general, cryptographic sys-

tem designers have a great deal of flexibility in how they implement an algorithmic
specification. It is common, for example, for designs to combine primitive operations
or other steps to efficiently use the resources available on the target platform, e.g.
the T-Table implementation commonly used in 32-bit software implementations of
the AES [DR01].
Theoretically, given sufficient resources, a symmetric algorithm with a 128-bit
key and a 128-bit data block size could be implemented as a one-step lookup table
with 2128×2 ≈ 1.16 × 1077 entries. In practice, this is clearly infeasible, and designs
can be expected to substantially follow the algorithmic specification—at a minimum
producing the same outputs as the reference implementation after each round.
Because implementations of cryptographic algorithms generally follow the algorithmic specification to some degree, algorithmic leakage models can be constructed
even if no details of the underlying implementation architecture are known.
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Because generality of the systematic approach was an important objective of
this research, such models are the basis of our work as they can be applied to any
implementation with minimal modification. Supplementing these techniques with
additional implementation knowledge is straightforward, and would lead to a more
conservative leakage assessment relative to the worst-case scenario where an adversary is able to obtain substantial information about the underlying implementation.
4.3.5.2

Common Leakage Models.

A variety of leakage models have

been suggested [KJJ99,MOP07,BCO04] with varying degrees of complexity. In practice, even very simple algorithmic leakage models have been shown to be adequate
to carry out a wide variety of side channel attacks. Such simple models also provide a solid basis for a systematic leakage assessment of most implementations while
maintaining the generality of the technique. Two common leakage transformations
proposed in previous work, Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance of intermediate
results, are described below.
The Hamming Weight leakage transformation assumes a relationship between
the number of non-zero bits in an intermediate result of interest and the resulting data-dependent variance leaked through a side channel. The Hamming Weight
leakage transformation, HW(·), for an arbitrary bit-vector, ~x , with n-elements is
(2)

  X
n−1
HW ~x =
~xi ,
(2)

i=0

(4.5)

(2)

where

0 ≤ HW (·) ≤ n.
For data representations other than bit-vectors, it is assumed that each grouping of ND bits is computed by converting each individual element to an equivalent
bit-vector representation before computing the Hamming Weight. In the interest
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of conciseness, we omit the details of these conversions. Herein, the HW leakage
transformation operates on vectors or matrices as well as individual elements, i.e.

s0 = HW (s)
denotes the Hamming Weight leakage transformation of the state matrix s, where
each matrix element’s Hamming Weight is computed independently. The Hamming
Weight transformation results in an output matrix with the same dimensionality as
the input.
Hamming Distance is related to the Hamming Weight, but measures the number of bits that differ between two bit-vectors of the same length. The Hamming
Distance, denoted HD(·, ·), between two n-element bit-vectors, ~x and ~y , is
(2)

!
HD

~x , ~y

=

n−1
X

(2) (2)

i=0

(2)

!
~xi
(2)

⊕ ~yi

(4.6)

(2)

where ⊕ denotes the bit-wise exclusive-or operator, and

0 ≤ HD (·, ·) ≤ n.

(4.7)

In practice both the Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance models effectively account for a significant portion of the variance in side channel emissions during
certain operations. For example, the Hamming Weight model is normally highly accurate for operations involving a pre-charged data bus such as those commonly used
on micro-controllers.
Likewise, the Hamming Distance model has been found quite accurate for
operations that toggle the state of the bits stored in a hardware register or latch.
An appropriately constructed Hamming Distance model can effectively account for
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virtually all variance in the side channel emissions of even an iterative FPGA-based
hardware implementation of the AES [SÖP04, SMPQ06].
4.3.5.3

Improved Leakage Models.

In addition to the simple models

described above, more complex (and accurate) models can also be constructed. For
example, a straightforward improvement to the Hamming Distance model, known
as a switching distance model, distinguishes between 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 bit transitions [PSQ07] by assigning different weights to each transition. Application of the
switching distance model within the leakage mapping framework is straightforward.
If details of the hardware architecture (i.e., the net-list) are available, the
switching activity of the device can be simulated at the transistor level. Although
such models are highly accurate, their employment requires access to detailed design
information that is difficult to obtain for commercial hardware devices. Furthermore,
the time required to simulate the full circuit over a large number of random inputs
makes such models inappropriate for our use.
A more promising technique for integration into a systematic leakage assessment methodology is linear regression based models [SLP05]. Although not considered in this initial study, such models can be constructed relatively efficiently.
Furthermore, whereas the Hamming Weight and Distance models assume a fixed
leakage transformation across all sampled instants in time, a regression-based approach could adapt the model for each sample. Models constructed using regression
techniques might be considered leakage agnostic since they can adaptively capture
the statistical relationship between the variance of the observed signal at each sample
and the data of interest. It is believed that such an approach would be substantially
more robust at the expense of significantly increased computational effort.
4.3.6

Measures of Information Leakage.

Various approaches are used

to quantify information leakage. The most frequent include Kocher’s difference
of means [KJJ99], Pearson’s product-moment correlation [BCO04], and Shannon’s
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entropy and mutual information [GBTP08, SMY09, BGP+ 11]. Correlation is used
herein based on its computational efficiency and effectiveness in practical attacks as
demonstrated through numerous empirical studies [MOP07,SGV08]. Other measures
such as the entropy or mutual information-based approach could also be used given
sufficient computational resources, and may prove to be more suitable for implementations that exhibit leakages that do not conform to the Gaussian assumptions that
underly the correlation approach.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient measures the strength of a positive or negative linear relationship between two random variables. Although independent random variables will have a correlation of ρ = 0, the converse does not guarantee
independence since the measure is only sensitive to linear relationships.
The population correlation coefficient, ρXY , between two real-valued random
variables X and Y is
Cov (X, Y )
ρXY = p
Var(X) · Var(Y )

(4.8)

where −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 [RN88]. The sample correlation coefficient, rXY , for Nt observations of the random variables, X and Y, is
Nt
X
(Xi − X)(Yi − Y)

,
rXY = Corr(X, Y) = v i=1
u Nt
N
t
X
uX
t (Xi − X)2 ·
(Yi − Y)2
i=1

(4.9)

i=1

where X and Y are the observed sample means over the Nt traces. This formulation has the practical advantage of allowing the correlation coefficient to be updated
incrementally by adding new observations (rows) to each matrix. The sample correlation coefficient will approach its true value given a sufficiently large number of
sample observations.
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4.4

Leakage Mapping
Our leakage mapping procedure is a systematic approach which characterizes

the information leakage from an implementation throughout an entire cryptographic
operation, including intermediate results computed during 1) all rounds of the cipher,
and 2) related activities such as key-scheduling. This is done by carrying out a known
key SCA analysis procedure for all algorithmically specified intermediate results,
inclusive of input and output, under the assumption of various selected leakage
models.
As described above, Pearson’s correlation coefficient quantifies the magnitude
of the identified leakages. The overall procedure is composed of the following steps
1. Acquire a sufficiently large number of side channel leakage traces while randomizing key and input data,
2. Pre-compute all algorithmically specified intermediate results,
3. Model the data-dependent leakage variations based on the known intermediate
results,
4. Use a known-key correlation procedure to identify and quantify all potentially
exploitable leakages, and
5. Interpret the results to bound the number of traces required for key inference
based on maximum observed correlations, and prepare summary statistics and
visual representations of the data to aid in qualitative leakage assessment.
Each step of the leakage mapping procedure is described in detail below.
Step 1. Acquire profiling side channel data. The first step of the leakage mapping procedure is to collect a suitable number of side channel traces while the evaluated device performs cipher operations on known (random) input/key pairs. The
number of traces, Nt , required to sufficiently characterize side channel leakage is
highly implementation dependent.
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Ideally, the leakage from a device would be measured under replications of
all possible input/key combinations to adequately characterize the noise induced by
non-cipher related sources (e.g., ambient or environmental noise, unrelated circuit
activity, nearby off-die electronic components, etc). Since this is clearly impractical
(it would be quicker to brute force the key), a more reasonable approach is to choose
the number of profiling traces, Nt , based on the desired SCA-resistance of the implementation. For example, the design objective might be to achieve DPA-resistance
for up to Nt ≤ 1E6 traces.
The side-channel signal observed during each of the Nt encryption operations
is digitally sampled at a fixed rate, typically using a high-speed digital sampling
oscilloscope (DSO) or similar data acquisition device. For each measured trace, Ns
~ composed of the digital
samples of side channel data are acquired. The vector L
samples from a single observed cryptographic operation is referred to as a trace. The
vector containing the samples from the ith trace is then

~ i = [L0 L1 . . . LNs ]
L
1×Ns .

(4.10)

For analysis, a measurement matrix, L, composed of traces corresponding to
the Nt individual (m, k) pairs is formed as


~0
L





~ 0,0
L

···

~ 0,Ns −1
L




 

 ~   ~

~
 L1   L1,0
···
L1,Ns −1 




L= . = .

..
...
.
.
 .   .

.

 

~
~
~
LNt −1
LNt −1,0 · · · LNt −1,Ns −1

,

(4.11)

Nt ×Ns

where Li,j corresponds to the j th sample of trace i. Thus, each row of the measurement matrix corresponds to a trace taken for the ith (m, k) pair, and each column
corresponds to the sample taken at a particular instant in time relative to the start
of each encryption operation, across all observed traces.
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For each trace, the corresponding input and master key are also stored in
byte-matrices for later use, i.e.,






m
~ 0,0
m
~0
 

 

 m
~ 1,0
~1   m
=
M=
 ..   ..
 .   .
 

m
~ Nt −1,0
m
~ Nt −1

···

m
~ 0,16

···
..
.

m
~ 1,16
..
.



... m
~ Nt −1,16









.

(4.12)

,

(4.13)

[Nt ×16]

and,


~0
K





~k0,0

···

~k0,N −1
B





 

 ~   ~
~
 K1   k1,0
···
k1,NB −1 




K= . = .

..
...
.
.

 .   .
.


 
~
~
~
kNt −1,0 . . . kNt −1,NB −1
KNt −1

[Nt ×NB ]

The result of the acquisition phase is composed of three sets of data:
1. The (Nt × Ns ) measurement matrix, L, containing the digitally sampled side
channel data,
2. The (Nt × 16) input matrix, M, containing the plain-text associated with each
captured leakage trace, and
3. The (Nt × NB ) master key matrix, K , containing the master key associated
with each captured leakage trace.
Step 2. Intermediate result computation. To characterize the security of a
particular cryptographic implementation against the range of possible SCA attacks,
it is necessary quantify information leakage for the duration of the full cryptographic
operation. Most published SCA attacks target the outer rounds of the cipher since
the intermediate results of those rounds can be exhaustively predicted if the input or
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1: function AESComputeIntermediates(m,K)
2:
s0,0 ← m
3:
for i ← 0, Nr − 2 do

4:
si,1 ← AddRoundKey si,0 , Ki
5:
si,2 ← SubBytes si,1 
6:
si,3 ← ShiftRows si,2

7:
si+1,0 ← MixColumns si,3
8:
end for

9:
sNr −1,1 ← AddRoundKey sNr −1,0
, KNr −1

10:
sNr −1,2 ← SubBytes sNr −1,1 
11:
sNr −1,3 ← ShiftRows sNr −1,2

12:
sNr ,0 ← AddRoundKey sNr −1,3 , KNr

return s
13: end function

Figure 4.4

Pseudo code to calculate and store all algorithmically specified intermediate results computed during the full AES encryption operation for
a given input, m, and key schedule, K.

output is known. Standaert, et al. introduced the notion of predictability to describe
intermediate results that meet this requirement [SÖP04].
However, more recent techniques such as algebraic side channel analysis and
chosen or adaptive input techniques [RS09, RSVC09, LPdH10] have demonstrated
the ability to directly target multiple leaked intermediate results from the middle
rounds. Therefore, limiting an evaluation to better-known outer-round attacks neglects important exploitable leakages. This is particularly true for implementations
that implement protective countermeasures based on the assumption that only outer
rounds will be attacked, leaving the inner-rounds unprotected.
The AESComputeIntermediates algorithm in Fig. 4.4 executes an AES encryption algorithm as described in [Nat01] while preserving the state after each AES
primitive operation. The retained intermediate state information is combined to
construct a five-dimensional intermediate cipher state matrix, S[Nt ×4×4×4×(4·Nr )+1]
(Fig. 4.5). The individual elements of the full matrix for the tth trace are denoted
Si,j
t,r,c .
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Construction of the intermediate cipher state matrix, S, for a single
AES encryption operation. For an AES encryption operation there are
Ns = (4 · Nr ) + 1 separate states computed, inclusive of the plain-text
and cipher-text.

The same basic process is repeated to construct the full intermediate key schedule state matrix, T[Nt ×Nks ×4] , based on the intermediate results computed during a
straightforward implementation of the AES key expansion algorithm. Since a different (random) key is associated with each trace, one T matrix is computed and
saved for each acquired profiling trace. Individual matrix elements are denoted Ti,j
t
where t is the trace index, i is the loop counter as defined in the key expansion
algorithm in [Nat01], and j is an index corresponding to the individual intermediate
computational step within each loop iteration.
Step 3. Model data-dependent leakage variations. To discover all potentially
exploitable data-dependent variability in side channel emissions, several different
leakage models should be considered. Although some general observations have been
made in previous work about which models are best suited for specific architectures,
focusing too narrowly on a particular leakage model and corresponding attack is likely
to neglect other important sources of information leakage. Rather than choosing one
specific leakage model that may not be well-suited to the particular implementation
being considered, a more systematic approach is taken to avoid any inadvertent
oversights.
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The results herein were prepared by considering leakage models based on Hamming Weight and the Hamming Distance of the states separated by 1 to 4 computational steps, for all algorithmically specified intermediate computation results. The
Hamming Distance between the result of two states is denoted HDn (·, ·) where n is
the number of intermediate computation steps separating the initial and final state
values used in the computation. For example, the hypothetical leakage matrix, H,
modeled as the Hamming Distance between the AES plain-text and the output of
round 0 (input to round 1) is


H = HD4 S0,0 , S1,0 ,
since the input to each round is separated by four primitive computational steps.
The leakage assessments conducted to validate the approach introduced herein
considers each of the following leakage transformations
• HW: HW (S0,0 ), . . . , HW SNr ,0



• HD1 : HD1 (S0,0 , S0,1 ), . . . , HD1 SNr −1,3 , SNr ,0



• HD2 : HD2 (S0,0 , S0,2 ), . . . , HD2 SNr −1,2 , SNr ,0



• HD3 : HD3 (S0,0 , S0,3 ), . . . , HD3 SNr −1,1 , SNr ,0



• HD4 : HD4 (S0,0 , S1,0 ), . . . , HD4 SNr −1,0 , SNr ,0



Finally, for each considered leakage transformation, the data sub-block size
is varied over ND ∈ {1, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128} to account for differing natural machine
representations that might be present on an arbitrary hardware or software AES
implementation. Although it is impractical to directly exploit (predict) the larger
(ND ≥ 64) data sub-block sizes using exhaustive techniques such as standard DPA
attacks, the information gleaned from analysis of leakages based on models of the
the larger data block sizes aid in understanding what aspects of an implementation
are causing leakages.
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This semi-comprehensive approach allows the technique to be applied to various implementations of the AES that optimize the algorithm for a particular hardware or software architecture (e.g., use of T-Tables) without loss of generality.
The result of this step is the hypothetical leakage matrices containing the
predicted leakages under each assumed model, i.e.

H = FL

(ND )


S

(4.14)

(ND )

for HD models, where ND is the data sub-block size and FL is the leakage transformation function. The individual elements of a byte-oriented (ND = 8) hypothetical
leakage matrix are denoted Hi,j
t,r,c where i is the AES round, j is the computational
step within the round, t is the trace index, and (r, c) are the row and column of the
AES state matrix. Note that for Hamming Distance models, (i, j) corresponds to
the first argument in the HD(·, ·) leakage transformation.
Leakages related to the key scheduling procedure are modeled in a similar
manner. The details of the procedure are omitted here in the interest of space.
Step 4. Known-Key Correlation. The final step of the leakage mapping procedure is to quantify the leakage from an implementation under the assumptions of
each considered leakage model. The objectives of this step are two-fold:
1. To identify potentially exploitable leakages (data-dependent variations) of all
intermediate results, and
2. To quantify the magnitude of all identified leakages.
To identify and quantify leakages, we use a known key correlation procedure
based on the correlation power analysis (CPA) technique [BCO04, MOP07]. The
primary difference between a CPA attack and our technique is that herein the objective is not to infer a key (which is known a priori to the evaluator) but rather to
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identify leakages and quantify their magnitudes. Therefore, only the correct (known)
sub-keys need be considered.
Although the evaluator may have detailed knowledge of precisely when each
intermediate computation occurs, this technique does not rely on any such information. This keeps the approach as general as possible while reducing the risk of
an evaluator inadvertently overlooking leakages that occur outside of the expected
times.
The basic procedure involves computing pairwise correlation coefficients between each column of the hypothetical leakage matrix, H, and each column of measurement matrix, L. The AESKnownIVCorrelation algorithm in Fig. 4.6 illustrates
the procedure for a byte-oriented leakage model.
A variation of this known-key correlation procedure is exhaustively performed
for the intermediate results of the AES encryption and key scheduling algorithms
under each considered leakage model, adjusting the procedure as necessary to account for the varying data sub-block size. Correlation results are also computed
directly for the full key schedule matrix, K, to identify any leakages due to direct
key manipulation not captured in modeling of the specified algorithm.
The output of this step is a correlation matrix, R, for each considered leakage
model. Each element of R represents the correlation between a) the hypothetical
leakage modeled from a particular computational step or intermediate result of the
cipher and b) the observed side-channel signal sampled at some instant in time
(relative to the start of the cipher), computed across all traces.
The overall result is subjectively (through visual analysis of the graphical representation) and statistically analyzed to identify aspects of the implementation that
exhibit problematic leakages.
It is assumed that the start of each trace is temporally aligned, i.e., the first
sample of each trace corresponds to the same instant in time relative to the actual
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1: function AESKnownIVCorrelation(H,L)
2:
for r ← 0, 3 do
3:
for c ← 0, 3 do
4:
for i ← 0, Nr − 1 do
5:
for j ← 0, 3 do
6:
for s ← 0, Ns − 1do

i,j
7:
Ri,j
←
Corr
H
,
L
(),s
t,r,c
(),r,c

end for
end for
end for
end for
end for
return R
13: end function

8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

Figure 4.6

Pseudo code to perform a known-key correlation between a byteoriented hypothetical leakage matrix, H and the measurement matrix, L.

start of the encryption operation. For evaluations conducted by a system designer
this can easily be accomplished by designing the implementation to supply a trigger signal to the acquisition system at the appropriate time. For systems where
precise triggering is not possible, alternate approaches are to use a real-time signalmonitoring device such as the commercially available Riscure icWaves device [Ris09]
or temporal alignment through post-acquisition signal processing.
Step 5: Interpretation of results. For a given ρ, the number of traces needed
to determine whether the correlation is statistically significant (different from zero)
can be determined using [MOP07]

N =3+8

Z(1−α)
log 1+ρ
1−ρ

!2
.

(4.15)

where Z is the critical value for 1 − α statistical confidence, which can be computed
using statistical software or looked up in most statistical textbooks. Mangard, et al.
suggest using α = 0.0001 (99.99% confidence) which gives Z = 3.719 to estimate the
number of traces required to mount a successful DPA attack [MOP07].
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This same relationship can estimate the maximum tolerable leakage (in terms
of correlation coefficient) to achieve DSCA resistance for a specified number of traces.
Solving (4.15) for ρ yields
Z

exp ( √(1−α)
)−1
N −3
ρmax =

8

Z
)+1
exp ( √(1−α)
N −3

.

(4.16)

8

If the comprehensive leakage assessment reveals any correlations that exceed
the maximum threshold, ρmax , then there is a high likelihood that the implementation fails to meet the desired security objective. Table 4.2 illustrates the relationship
between the maximum tolerable ρ for a given objective number of traces, Nt , as a
function of the required statistical significance, α. For example, to achieve DSCA
resistance for up to Nt = 100, 000 traces using α = 0.0001, the leakage should meet
the condition of ρ ≤ 0.0166 for all considered leakage models.
Our results during extensive pilot studies suggest that α = 0.0001 provides
a good guideline for estimating the number of traces necessary for a completely
successful differential CPA attack, i.e., one that successfully eliminates all guessing
entropy. However, in many scenarios, a CPA attack can be considered successful if
the key candidates are sufficiently reduced to make brute forcing the remaining search
space computationally feasible. Thus, we suggest using a more conservative α = 0.1
when using (4.16) as a test of DSCA resistance. Returning to the previous example,
under this more conservative guideline an implementation should not exhibit any
correlations that exceed 0.0057 to claim DSCA resistance for up to Nt = 100, 000
traces.
Note that any claim of SCA resistance under this test is valid only under
the evaluated combinations of leakage model parameters. More accurate leakage
models may enable an adversary to successfully extract key material with less traces
than indicated by this test. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that this
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Table 4.2

Maximum tolerable correlation (ρmax ) to achieve Nt -trace DSCAresistance as a function of α, predicted using (4.16).
Conf. Level (α)
Nt

0.1

0.01

0.001

0.0001

1, 000

0.0573

0.1038

0.1375

0.1650

10,000

0.0181

0.0329

0.0437

0.0526

100,000

0.0057

0.0104

0.0138

0.0166

1,000,000

0.0018

0.0033

0.0044

0.0053

1,000,000,000

0.0006

0.0010 0.0014

0.0017

10,000,000,000

0.0002

0.0003

0.0005

0.0004

procedure does not directly evaluate resistance to advanced profiling techniques such
as template attacks.

4.5

Experimental Methodology
To evaluate the effectiveness of our techniques, the full leakage mapping ap-

proach was carried out against several different hardware and software AES implementations. We present results from two representative implementations (Imp. A
and Imp. B ) are presented; the characteristics of the two studied implementations
are summarized in Table 4.3.
4.5.1

Implementation A.

Imp. A was implemented on a low-cost 16-bit

PIC micro-controller unit (MCU) representative of the type used extensively in commercial security applications (e.g., smart-cards, garage door openers, remote key-less
entry systems, etc.), and fabricated using an unspecified 180-nm process technology.
For device control and measurement, the PIC was mounted on an evaluation board
and controlled through a serial interface. The development board was powered from
a standard lab DC power supply to reduce effects of uncontrolled supply voltage
fluctuations.
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The radiated EM data from Imp. A was collected using a specially designed
RF near-field probe with a wide-band preamplifier connected to a Lecroy 104-XIA high speed digital sampling oscilloscope. The EM data was collected from an
unmodified PIC MCU. The chip was not specially prepared or decapsulated, and all
EM measurements were taken by placing the probe directly over the area of the chip
that exhibited maximal energy in a narrow band around the known clock rate.
All data was collected at a sample rate of fS1 = 5 GSa/sec with a WLP = 1 GHz
low pass anti-aliasing filter inserted between the probe and the oscilloscope. The acquired data was down-sampled to an analysis sample rate of fS2 = 200 MSa/sec
using proper decimation (i.e., every 25th sample is retained and all others are discarded). The higher sample rate was chosen to permit post-acquisition simulation
of various receiver configurations using data collected under identical environmental
conditions.
For leakage mapping, a total of 100, 000 traces were acquired using random
key and plain-texts drawn from the uniformly distributed key and message spaces.
The signals were analyzed in their raw-acquired form without any averaging or other
noise reduction post-collection processing steps. For attack validation, additional
measurements were taken from the same device under fixed key conditions for Nk =
100 random keys, and Nt = 1000 traces per key.
4.5.2

Implementation B.

The data for Imp. B is the publicly available

power consumption data from the second DPA Contest [Par10]. The DPA Contest
data set was chosen to demonstrate the feasibility of exhaustive leakage mapping for
a device fabricated using the more modern 65 nm process technology and to allow
reproduction of the results presented herein.
The Imp. B data set was collected from a Virtex 5 FPGA, which is a modern reprogrammable logic device fabricated using a 65 nm process technology [Xil11]. The
Virtex 5 was mounted on the commercially available SASEBO-GII board [fISR11]
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Table 4.3

Summary of characteristics for evaluated implementations.
Implementation ID
Imp. A

Imp. B

Algorithm

AES

AES

Key Size

128

128

Mode

Encryption

Encryption

Type

Software

Hardware

Microchip PIC24 MCU

Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA

29.5 MHz

24.0 MHz

EM (Near-field RF)

Power

200 MSa/sec

5 GSa/sec

100, 000

1, 000, 000

Device
Clock Rate
Side Channel
Sample Rate
# Profiling Traces

which is specially designed to facilitate control and side channel measurements of
cryptographic designs.
For leakage mapping, the DPA Contest template data set was used. The template data set includes 1, 000, 000 traces collected using random keys and plaintexts. For attack validation, we used the DPA Contest public data set, composed of
Nt = 20, 000 traces for each of Nk = 32 random keys. According to the available documentation, each trace in these data sets was averaged 10 times during acquisition
to reduce the effect of external noise sources.
Additional details on the experimental setup and acquisition procedures for
Imp. B are available on the DPA Contest [Par10] and SASEBO [fISR11] websites.
4.5.3

Data Alignment.

For experimental efficiency, both sets of data were

acquired with the aid of a trigger signal asserted by the target device at the start of
each encryption operation of interest. This allows for near perfect alignment without requiring extensive post-collection processing of the acquired data. No further
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alignment was performed on the Imp. A data set prior to processing. The DPA
Contest data sets used for Imp. B are also nearly perfectly aligned.
In practice, a trigger is not required, and we successfully demonstrated acquisition setups with real-time triggering using only the monitored side channel emissions
of both device types. Thus, the lack of an available trigger signal does not prohibit
employment of our techniques, but does increase the required data processing time.
The data from each target implementation was collected using random plain-text /
key combinations for the number of profiling traces indicated in Table 4.3.
4.5.4

Resource Requirements.

All results were obtained on a standard

scientific workstation equipped with dual quad-core Xeon processors, a two terabyte
hard-drive, and 72 GB of RAM. A comparable workstation can be obtained or built
for approx $5,000 U.S. in 2011. All code was written in Matlab and optimized for
computation speed (vice memory efficiency).
Execution of the full leakage mapping procedure for either implementation,
across all considered parameter combinations, takes approximately 12 hours on this
workstation. Although the memory requirements are high, the same results should be
obtainable using a workstation with significantly less available memory by optimizing
the computations to work primarily from disk.

4.6

Results
This section contains a representative sample of the results obtained by apply-

ing the full leakage mapping procedure to the two AES implementations described
in Sec. 4.5.
The technique introduced in Sec. 4.4 was applied to selected data sets to assess
the overall leakage from each implementation. The resulting data is evaluated to
identify the maximal exhibited leakages, and the resulting leakage maps were studied
to determine how much detail about the implementations a naı̈ve adversary would
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Table 4.4

Summary of correlation results for all considered byte-oriented leakage
models.
Implementation A

Implementation B

Leakage Model

Min

Max

Mean

Min

Max

Mean

HW

0.77

0.91

0.84

0.00

0.08

0.01

1

0.63

0.87

0.73

0.01

0.11

0.04

HD2

0.01

0.63

0.17

0.00

0.07

0.01

HD

3

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.04

0.07

0.05

HD

4

0.01

0.07

0.03

0.04

0.07

0.05

HD

be able to obtain from the application of typical differential attack techniques under
common leakage models.
Some selected results of these analyses are presented below. Note that although
the results obtained through analysis of non-byte oriented leakage models are highly
informative, the results presented herein are restricted to the more common byteoriented model in the interest of space.
4.6.1

Intermediate Cipher Leakages.

The information leakage from each

implementation was evaluated using the procedure in Sec. 4.4 for both cipher and
key expansion intermediate computations under all considered leakage models. Table
4.4 summarizes the minimum, maximum, and mean correlation results observed for
the considered byte-oriented (ND = 8) leakage models.
As expected, the observed leakage from Imp. A (software) is much stronger
than the leakage observed from Imp. B (FPGA). This can be attributed primarily
to the architecture of the FPGA implementation, which processes all 16 bytes of
the AES state in parallel. The uncorrelated parallel activity has the effect of acting
as a noise generator and reducing the effective signal-to-noise ratio for the targeted
intermediate result(s).

113

In contrast, the software implementation is constrained by the limited size of
the data path, and all circuit activity (with the exception of other on-chip housekeeping or peripheral activity) within a particular clock cycle is thus dedicated to a
single AES primitive operation.3
4.6.2

Leakage Maps.

Although a tabular summary of the leakage assess-

ment can capture the overall results, a visual presentation of the results permits a
much more natural and efficient interpretation given the large number of considered
parameter variations.
The visual presentation also aids the evaluator in drawing intuitive conclusions about what the most problematic leakages are, when and under what model
parameters they occur, as well as quickly highlighting the presence of any unexpected leakages. Because the visual representation can be thought of as a mapping
of the observed leakages in terms of time and intermediate results, we refer to them
as leakage maps.
4.6.2.1

Temporal Leakage Maps.

A temporal leakage map is con-

structed as a two-dimensional plot where the x-axis represents the sample time, and
the y-axis corresponds to the intermediate step being modeled. Each correlation coefficient is represented as a single pixel, where the pixel intensity represents the relative
strength of the identified correlation at a particular instant in time, normalized to
the maximum observed correlation for the currently considered leakage model. One
temporal leakage map is prepared for each data sub-block under each combination
of model parameters, i.e., (NM = 128/ND ) separate leakage maps are prepared for
each leakage model, where ND is the number of bits in each data sub-block.
3

Because the PIC24 has a 16-bit data path, some operations are actually optimized to manipulate
two bytes of state information or intermediate results at a time.
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Because the leakage characteristics of sequential software and parallel hardware
implementations are very different, the results of the assessments for Imp. A and B
are each presented slightly differently.
For Imp. A the leakage due to each modeled intermediate step is sparse compared to the dimensionality of the correlation result matrices. As a result, it is difficult to visually discern the leakages if each correlation coefficient is simply mapped
to a pixel intensity. Therefore, the correlation results for Imp. A are prepared using
contour plots, which highlights the sparse leakages. A typical example of a temporal
leakage map for Imp. A is shown in Fig. 4.7. This figure shows the magnitude of the
correlation observed between the modeled leakages of all AES intermediate results
under a byte-oriented Hamming Weight leakage model.
Several interesting observations can be made about the leakage from Imp. A
based on a visual inspection of Fig. 4.7. First, the Nr = 10 encryption rounds
and four primitive operations within each round are immediately obvious. Second,
the EM side channel significantly leaks the Hamming Weight of all algorithmically
specified intermediate results computed throughout the entire encryption operation.
Thus, it can be inferred that this particular implementation closely follows the AES
specification. Note that the similarity between the correlation of steps 2 − 3 during
each round is expected under a Hamming Weight model since the SR operation does
not actually change any intermediate results.
For Imp. B, the observed leakages are no longer sparse in comparison to the
dimensionality of the results matrices, and a direct mapping from the correlation
matrix to the temporal leakage map is possible. A typical example of a temporal
leakage map for Imp. B is shown in Fig. 4.8.
The example shown is the result of the leakage assessment for a byte-oriented
HD4 leakage model. Although direct exploitation of the HD4 model has until recently been considered impractical for the standard DPA-class of attacks, analysis
of the results from the HD4 leakage model reveals a great deal of information about
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Figure 4.7

Temporal leakage map for Imp. A. under the byte-oriented HW model.
The intensity represents the maximum observed magnitude of the leakage observed at each sampled instant across all 16 bytes of the AES
state matrix.

what an adversary could discern about the underlying implementation architecture
through the application of similar techniques. Furthermore, recent results indicate
advances in computing technology are now making direct attacks on 32-bit key hypothesis feasible [MKP11], which makes consideration of such leakage models even
more relevant.
The round structure of Imp. B is, again, immediately obvious from a cursory
inspection of Fig. 4.8. However, in contrast to the leakage from Imp. A, Imp.
B does not show high correlations for all computed intermediate results under the
HD4 model. Rather, the higher relative correlations are isolated to the Hamming
Distance between intermediate results following the ARK steps (i.e., HD(Si,1 , Si+1,1 ))
in adjacent rounds. This strongly implies the use of registers at that point in the
algorithm.
Examination of the source code of Imp. B confirms this, and provides experimental confirmation that the HD4 leakage transformation is a suitable abstrac-
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Temporal Leakage Map for Imp. B under a byte-oriented HD4 leakage
model. The x-axis represents sample time, and each band along the
y-axis represents one of the 37 initial states used in the Hamming Distance computation. Close examination reveals the variations between
individual bytes are also visible within each band. The intensity represents the magnitude of the observed correlation at each instant in time,
normalized to the maximum observed under this leakage model.
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Typical correlation plot for Imp. B under a byte-oriented HD4 leakage
model, illustrating the damped oscillatory nature of the correlation well
beyond the originating clock cycle. The x-axis represents sample time,
and the y-axis represents the observed correlation coefficient.

tion of the physical leakages produced by register updates for this implementation.
These basic observations suggest that while the leakage of information under the
HD4 model may not lead directly to successful key recovery attacks, the information
leaked could be used by an adversary to craft more powerful techniques that take
advantage of the particular implementation architecture.
Another interesting observation is that the leakages of Imp. B appear as a
damped oscillatory response that continues well beyond the clock cycle in which the
modeled computation is carried out. Fig. 4.9 shows a typical plot of the correlation
between a modeled leakage and the power consumption of the circuit observed over
the the duration of the encryption operation. It was confirmed through numerous
pilot experiments that the leakages in the later clock cycles do lead to successful DPA
attacks, and can be combined through various techniques to improve the effectiveness
of standard DPA approaches.
4.6.2.2

Summary Leakage Maps.

Whereas a temporal leakage map

provides a visual summary of an implementation’s leakage over time, a more useful
tool for summarizing the leakage of each individual data sub-block is the summary
leakage map. The summary leakage map is a concise graphical representation of
the maximum leakages identified for each data sub-block, computational step, and
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leakage model. The graph is constructed by determining the maximum observed
(magnitude) correlation for each combination of parameters. The resulting tabular
data is then graphically represented by mapping each correlation coefficient to a
color intensity, normalized to the maximum observed correlation across all of the
considered leakage models.
Summary leakage maps for Imp. A are depicted in Fig. 4.10. The summary
maps for the HD2 , HD3 , and HD4 models are omitted since, as expected, the software implementation exhibits no statistically significant leakage under those models.
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State Byte (Linear Index)

Inspection of Fig. 4.10 immediately reveals the extent of the problematic
leakages associated with this implementation. As already noted, Imp. A significantly
leaks the Hamming Weight of every intermediate value computed.
Additionally, there is also strong leakage associated with HD1 (Si,0 , Si+1,0 ),
which corresponds to the ARK primitive operation in each round. Although this
could be due to a register update, the observed leakage is more likely the result of
the relationship between the HD1 model and the AES round keys. Note that the
Hamming Distance across the ARK operation is determined by the number of bits toggled during the XOR operation with the associated portion of the round sub-key, which
in turn is determined by the number of ‘1’ bits in the key. Thus HD1 (Si,0 , Si+1,0 ) is
equivalent to HW(Ki ).
Given this, it appears likely that this implementation leaks the Hamming
Weight of the round keys. In fact, our results indicate that the key leakage exhibited is sufficient to permit key extraction from this particular implementation
without knowledge of the plain-text or cipher-text.
One final note related to Imp. A is that although it is not evident from the HD1
summary leakage map, significant (exploitable) leakage is also caused by intermediate
steps other than ARK. However, the relative strength of the ARK has the effect of
masking the presence of these smaller leakages due to the normalization of the color
intensity to the maximum observed correlation. Note that any masked leakages can
be readily identified by a direct examination of the tabular results.
In general, it is assumed that system designers will address the strongest leakages first since they are presumably the easiest to exploit. It is recommended that
the full leakage mapping procedure be repeated after implementing any SCA countermeasures, since any changes could incidentally introduce new sources of leakage.
Once the stronger leakages have been eliminated or managed, any remaining leakages
are more easily identified in the graphical leakage maps. In general, it is assumed that
system designers will address the strongest leakages first since they are presumably
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the easiest to exploit. It is recommended that the full leakage mapping procedure
be repeated after implementing any SCA countermeasures, since any changes could
incidentally introduce new sources of leakage. Once the stronger leakages have been
eliminated or managed, any remaining leakages are more easily identified in the
graphical leakage maps.
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Comparing the summary leakage map from Imp. A (Fig. 4.10) to that of
Imp. B (Fig. 4.8) shows how different the leakage characteristics of the two implementations are. Whereas the PIC micro-controller shows strong leakage of the
Hamming Weight across all intermediate computations, the FPGA implementation
only exhibits strong leakage under the HD1 , HD3 , and HD4 models. Such leakages
are characteristic of hardware implementations. Here, it is noteworthy that the HD3
leakage model only exhibits strong (relative) leakage for HD3 (s9,1 , s10,0 ). This is attributed to the replacement of the MC step in the final round with an additional ARK,
as illustrated in Fig. 4.2. This bears additional scrutiny because the register update
at this location meets the criteria of predictability using standard DPA techniques.
It is believed that the presence of strong HD1 leakage can be attributed to
direct leakage of the round keys, K, generated during real-time key scheduling—
similar to the direct key leakage exhibited by Imp A. Again, examination of the
source code supports this hypothesis since the generated round key is stored in a
temporary register for each round. Additional experimentation would be necessary
to confirm whether key expansion is the root cause of this leakage, and whether or
not the leakage is vulnerable to direct key extraction.
4.6.3

Attack Validation.

Using (4.16), the correlation results from each

implementation are used to estimate the number of traces a standard correlation
SCA attack would require to correctly extract the full master key. These predictions
were compared to the number of traces actually required using standard correlationbased DSCA attacks. For Imp. A, the targeted intermediate for the DEMA attack
was the output of the initial (Round 0) SB operation under a Hamming Weight
model, i.e. HW(S0,2 ). For Imp. B, the target was the Hamming Distance across the
last three states, i.e., HD3 (S9,1 , S10,0 ). Both attacks were carried out using a single
sample taken at the instant found to exhibit the largest magnitude leakage under
the corresponding leakage model.
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Table 4.5

Comparison of number of traces required for successful attack as predicted by (4.15) vs. actual results of a correlation-based DPA attack on
Imp. B using a HD3 (s9,1 , s10,0 ) leakage model.
Predicted (α)

Actual

0.1

0.001

0.0001

Indiv. Byte

Full Key

758

3,054

6,362

300

9,400

2,200

Mean 1,469

5,927

12,352

6, 8614

17, 2724

3,883

10,051

20,950

> 20, 000 > 20, 000

4,237

Min.
Max.

2,490

GE < 32 bits

Table 4.5 shows the results of the attack validation for Imp. B.4 The attack
was attempted against each of the 32 available trace-sets in the DPA Contest public
database, where each trace-set corresponds to a different secret key. Traces used for
the attack were drawn from each available trace set in a randomly determined order.
The minimum number of traces required to extract an individual key byte was 300.
Out of the 32 × 16 = 512 byte extractions attempted, the attack failed to extract 11
of the key bytes after the available trace set (Nt = 20, 000) was exhausted. Thus,
the standard attack fails to achieve a first-order success rate of 1 [SMY09] given the
limited number of traces.
Unfortunately for cryptographic engineers, the failure of an attack to extract
the correct key with 100% certainty does not imply that the key will not be found.
A more practical measure of attack success in scenarios where one or more single
plain-text-cipher-texts pair is available is the remaining Guessing Entropy [SMY09]
which provides a measure of the remaining cost of a brute-force attack given the
current ranking of the true key in the list of key hypotheses.
Fig. 4.12 shows the maximum, average, and mean guessing entropy for the
attacks against all 32 keys as a function of the number of traces used in the CPA
4

The mean values shown are estimates since all available Nt = 20, 000 traces were exhausted
before all key bytes were successfully extracted.
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Figure 4.12

Guessing entropy of Imp. B as a function of the number of traces
used in a correlation-based DPA attack on HD3 (s9,1 , s10,0 ).

attack. Clearly, although the attack occasionally fails on the basis of extracting the
full key, the information leakage is sufficient to enable a practical brute force attack
given a much smaller number of traces. If it is assumed, very conservatively, that
it becomes practical to brute force the key when the Guessing Entropy is reduced
to ≤ 32 bits, an average of approximately 4000 traces are required for an attack to
succeed against this implementation.
Once again, it is extremely important to note that the abstract algorithmic
model used in this particular attack is very likely to be sub-optimal, and more
accurate models will probably succeed with fewer traces. Thus, when using (4.16) to
predict DSCA-resistance based on the leakage model assessment, it is recommended
to use a conservative α = 0.1 or 0.2.
4.6.4

Suitability for Protected Implementations.

Initial results indicate

our approach is an effective tool for assessing the leakage from both protected and
unprotected implementations. Several pilot studies, not presented herein, successfully used leakage mapping to assess the leakage from a software-based smart-card
implementation using common countermeasures. We note that use of the leakage
mapping methodology to effectively assess masked implementations would require
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supplementing the simple Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models
with more complex multi-variate leakage models, however the procedure required to
do this is straightforward.
In general, the introduction of countermeasures significantly reduces the correlation at a particular instant in time by introducing various forms of noise or reducing
the signal strength. Our systematic approach enables an evaluator to quickly and
efficiently repeat the assessment process to identify how much more resistant an implementation is after adding a countermeasure. Perhaps more importantly, it also
allows a designer to ensure that the implementation of one countermeasure does not
introduce new unexpected sources of information leakage. The preliminary results
indicate that the leakage mapping assessment methodology is well suited to assess
whether a particular countermeasure is justified given the added cost in time, space,
and energy.

4.7

Conclusion
We have developed a systematic, efficient process through which cryptographic

engineers can assess the resistance of a particular implementation against differential
SCA techniques. While our technique does not guarantee an implementation will be
secure against all future side channel attacks, it does provide an efficient mechanism
through which system designers and testers may gain substantial insight into the level
of security of a particular implementation. Additionally, as illustrated throughout
this paper, examination of the leakage maps permits insights that are not at all
obvious if testing is carried out in a less thorough manner.
Our techniques can be adapted to incorporate more advanced statistical tools
(e.g. mutual information or linear regression models)—in particular those capable
of capturing non-linear leakages. However, the inclusion of any such techniques
must be weighed in terms of the added benefit obtained compared to the additional computational effort required. Additionally, our studies to date have been
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focused exclusively on signals in the time domain. Various other work has suggested
that spectral-domain techniques may be even more effective, particularly against
implementations which implement basic countermeasures such as random process
interrupts.
For devices where the template attack scenario [CRR02, ARRS05] is deemed
a legitimate threat, designers must also consider the multivariate leakage from the
device in terms of profiled attacks. The methodology introduced by Standaert, et
al. [SMY09] provides a solid foundation on which to evaluate whether a sound leakage
model can be formed to attack the device using profiled attacks. However, an efficient
methodology for formulating the leakage models to be tested in this context remains
an open problem.

4.8

Supplementary Discussion
This section contains additional relevant material that could not be included

in the submitted paper due to mandatory space limitations. It is assumed that most
readers of this article will be familiar with the procedure of DSCA attacks in general,
and correlation-based DSCA attack in particular. However, for completeness, the
procedure employed in this research is described below.
4.8.1

Correlation-Based DSCA.

The procedure used to carry out the

correlation-based DSCA attacks is based on the correlation DPA described in [MOP07].
The general approach is shown in Fig. 4.13. Each step of the procedure is described
below:
Step 1. Choose a target intermediate computation and corresponding
leakage model . The chosen intermediate computation must depend on some
small portion of the key and some observable or controllable input or output data t, and can be one or more bits. The results herein are based on
byte-oriented leakage models. For Imp. A, the targeted intermediate was the
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Figure 4.13

Block diagram of a generalized DSCA attack procedure for one byte
of the key, assuming a HW leakage model. Note that steps 3-4 require minor modifications for use with leakage models that consider
transitions between two states, e.g., HD3 (·, ·).

output of the SB operation for Round 0 under a Hamming Weight model, i.e.
HW(s0,2 ). For Imp. B, the target was the Hamming Distance across the last
three states, i.e., HD3 (s9,1 , s10,0 ). Note that the first attack assumes an observable or controllable plaintext, while the second attack assumes an observable
ciphertext.
Step 2. Record side channel data. Record Ns samples of side channel data (e.g.,
strength of the EM field near the circuit) during each of Nt cryptographic operations performed using an unknown fixed key. Construct the leakage matrix,
L, and known-message matrix, M as described in Step 1 of Sec. 4.4. Note
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that in the attack scenario, the adversary has no knowledge of the secret key,
which is the objective of the attack.
Step 3. Considering one byte of the AES state at a time, compute the
hypothetical intermediate state matrices for the states considered
under the targeted leakage model for all possible (hypothetical) subkeys, k̂i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}. The hypothetical results are computed
by considering each possible subkey as the true subkey, and computing the
intermediate computation results for each known byte of the observed message
matrix, M. For the byte-oriented attack, there are 28 = 256 possible subkeys
associated with each byte of the intermediate result. The result of this step is
the (256 × Nt × 4 × 4) hypothetical intermediate result matrix, V.
Step 4. Map each hypothetical intermediate result to a predicted side
channel leakage value under the selected leakage model. In this step,
each element of the matrix V, from Step 3 is mapped to an estimated side
channel leakage using the leakage model, i.e., HW(V) for Imp. A. The result
of this step is the hypothetical leakage matrix, H[256×Nt ×4×4] .
Step 5. Compute the correlation between predicted hypothetical values
and observed side channel data. In the final step, the hypothetical side
channel leakages H computed in Step 4 are compared to the actual data L
captured in Step 2 using (4.9), i.e., R = Corr (H, L). Each column of the
H[(),(),r,c] sub-matrix corresponds to one of the 256 hypothesized subkeys for
key byte K0r,c (for Imp. A) or K10
r,c (for Imp. B ). The columns of L represent
the side channel leakage from the device at a particular point in time. At any
particular point in time, it is not known in advance whether information leakage is present in the side channel signal due to the targeted intermediate value.
Thus, the adversary must search over all sampled instants to find times when
information about the intermediate value is leaked. The most probable correct
key is the one that exhibits the maximum correlation coefficient between the
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modelled leakages under all hypothetical keys and the observed side channel
measurements at any of the considered instants in time. Alternatively, subkey
candidates can be ranked in descending order of their maximum observed correlation. An adversary with access to a single known plaintext-ciphertext pair
can then attempt to bruteforce the true key by trying the keys in order of likelihood. Note that an evaluator with knowledge of the true key can determine
the remaining guessing entropy by computing the product of the rank of each
of the 16 correct subkeys at the end of the attack procedure.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter concludes the main document and provides an overall summary of the
research activities and key findings, followed by several recommendations for future
research.

5.1

Research Summary
The information leakage of electronic devices, especially those used in cryp-

tographic or other vital applications, represents a serious practical threat to secure
systems. While physical implementation attacks have evolved rapidly over the last
decade, relatively little work has been done to allow system designers to effectively
counter the identified threats. This work addresses the technology gap between the
identified problems and potential solutions, and makes significant contributions to
the study of information leakage in two primary areas of investigation:
1. RF-DNA fingerprinting of integrated circuits for device authentication, and
2. Leakage mapping to assess the information leakage from arbitrary cryptographic implementations.
The results and major contributions related to each area of investigation are
described below.
5.1.1

RF-DNA Fingerprinting of Integrated Circuits.

Unintentional elec-

tromagnetic (EM) emissions were investigated as a source of information to recognize
or verify the identity of a unique integrated circuit (IC). The technique investigated, known as radio frequency distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting,
was adapted from previous work (cf. [SITMM08, KTM09, RTM10, RPT11, HBK06,
WMTM10, WTR10]) on intentional EM emissions. The technique was successfully
adapted herein to recognize individual microchips based on fabrication process-

132

induced variations in each chip’s unintentional RF emissions in a manner analogous
to biometric human identification.
The problem of IC authentication has numerous practical applications, including 1) providing enhanced security for secure access mechanisms (e.g., anti-cloning),
2) detection of unauthorized modifications to circuit designs (e.g., hardware Trojan
detection), and 3) forensic attribution of electronic evidence in criminal or other
cases. It is believed that this work is the first to propose and demonstrate the
feasibility of using the unintentional emissions for IC recognition.
Whereas all previously known IC recognition techniques require either hardware or software modifications to the device being recognized, the RF-DNA fingerprinting technique permits passive authentication based on analysis of the unintentional emissions produced during pre-existing processes and protocols. Because it
is passive, it is suitable for security applications involving commodity commercial
ICs without requiring any modifications to the device being authenticated. Thus,
the proposed approach is very promising for security applications such as those requiring detection of cloned, copied, or counterfeited devices. Furthermore, because
the technique does not require any modifications to the ICs, the approach is more
cost-effective and scalable than other known techniques for applications involving
commodity commercial ICs.
In addition to being the first application of RF-DNA fingerprinting techniques
to the unintentional emissions of ICs, this research extends the previous work related
to the intentional emissions of wireless networking equipment, in two new ways.
Previous RF-DNA work has predominantly considered device identification tasks.
However, the primary use case envisioned for IC fingerprinting is to counter cloning
and related threats, which requires identity verification. A systematic approach was
developed and introduced to evaluate the effectiveness of RF-DNA fingerprinting in
the context of both identification and verifications tasks. Additionally, the RF-DNA
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fingerprinting technique was extended from a fixed 3-class approach to one capable of
identifying or verifying the fingerprints of devices for an arbitrary N −class problem.
An extensive empirical study was conducted and the performance of RF-DNA
fingerprinting was evaluated under a wide range of simulated noise conditions. Empirical results indicate the technique scales well for both identification and verification tasks involving 40 near-identical devices. For experimentally collected emissions,
the technique correctly identifies devices greater than 99.5% of the time, with average verification equal error rates (EERs) of less than 0.05% achieved using a single
extracted fingerprint. Correct identification success rates of better than 90% were
maintained under analysis conditions of SNR ≥ 15 dB.
The impressive performance indicates that RF-DNA fingerpinting is adaptable
to less ideal conditions while still providing acceptable results. Finally, these results
were obtained using a single extracted fingerprint. A substantial improvement in
performance is believed to be realizable through a straightforward extension of the
approach for multiple extracted fingerprints.
5.1.2

Leakage Mapping.

The second major contribution of this work is

the development and demonstration of a leakage mapping methodology for assessing
the information leakage from arbitrary block cipher implementations. Prior to this
work, [SMY09] provided the only proposed methodology to enable system evaluators
to quantitatively bound the leakage from an evaluated implementation. However,
this earlier work relies on the evaluator’s ability to build an optimal template attack,
and the end result is limited in focus to a small portion of the overall cryptographic
algorithm.
The framework proposed here provides a comprehensive approach to assess
the information leakage from all algorithmically specified key-dependent intermediate computations for implementations of symmetric block ciphers. The resulting
leakage assessment quantitatively bounds the resistance of an implementation to
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the general class of differential side-channel analysis (SCA) techniques, and provides
system designers and evaluators with a tool that can be used to objectively assess
whether countermeasures implemented are justified given the added cost in time,
space, and energy compared to the obtained reduction in exploitable information
leakage. Furthermore, the systematic approach enables evaluators to quickly and
efficiently repeat the assessment process for different variations of implementations,
which helps to ensure the additions of countermeasures does not inadvertently introduce new unexpected sources of information leakage.
While using this technique does not guarantee an implementation will be secure
against all future side-channel attacks, it does provide an efficient mechanism through
which system designers and testers may gain substantial insight into the level of
security of a particular implementation. Examination of the leakage maps permits
insights that are not at all obvious when testing is carried out in a less thorough
manner.
The framework was demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and
Hamming Distance leakage models, with recommendations for extension of the technique to more accurate models. The approach was applied to two typical unprotected
implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the assessment
results were empirically validated against correlation-based differential power and
electromagnetic analysis (DPA/DEMA) attacks.

5.2

Recommendations for Future Research
A number of recommendations for future research were made in each article

in the main body of this work. Those recommendations are revisited here with
additional discussion.
5.2.1

RF-DNA Fingerprinting of ICs.

Although the results of the empir-

ical studies conducted thus far are very promising, a considerable amount of work
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remains to fully understand the suitability of RF-DNA fingerprinting for practical
security implementations. Intuitively, the nature of the intrinsic characteristics that
induce inter-device variations suggests a fingerprint based on those variations will be
extremely difficult to impersonate. However, further analysis and experimentation
are needed to confirm this. Particular areas for additional study include:
5.2.1.1

Permanence and robustness of RF-DNA features under varying

environmental conditions.

It is likely that normal operation of an IC over its

lifespan will affect the physical device structure and resulting RF-DNA fingerprints.
More studies are necessary to assess the sensitivity of RF-DNA fingerprinting to such
physical changes over long periods of time. If structural changes are found to cause
the fingerprint to change significantly in a way that adversely affects fingerprint performance, one solution might be to design the authentication system to update the
training database and reference fingerprints each time a device is successfully authenticated. In practical implementations, uncontrolled environmental fluctuations (e.g.,
temperature or supply voltage) are also expected to effect the fingerprints. Previous
work has shown that environmentally-induced fingerprint variations for intentional
emitters can be compensated for effectively by conducting the enrollment training
procedure over the range of expected operating temperatures and voltages [TSU04].
Additional studies should be conducted to assess the suitability of this approach for
application to the unintentional emissions of ICs.
5.2.1.2

Sensitivity of fingerprint performance to variations due to dif-

ferent sensor modules or sensor positioning.

Another anticipated source of per-

formance degradation is variations in the physical sensor characteristics, receiver
components, and sensor positioning relative to the IC. The experiments conducted
in this work used a single sensor and receiver module and controlled the sensor positioning over each IC. In practice, each device reader introduces its own unique effects
on the fingerprint characteristics. Thus, the fingerprinting procedure must select fea-
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tures that are insensitive to receiver and sensor induced variations. The sensitivity
of RF-DNA fingerprints to such variations should be studied further to determine if
performance is still acceptable for different sensor and receiver modules under more
realistic operating conditions. A logical test case is smart-card based authentication tokens, where the amount of variation in the positioning of the smart-card and
an embedded EM sensor in the reader could be controlled in practical applications.
Variations due to card positioning in a contact smart-card reader could be simulated
very realistically using a motorized XY stage to control probe positioning.
5.2.1.3

Scalability to larger databases.

The RF-DNA fingerprinting

technique performed very well for the 40 near-identical devices tested in this work
for both verification and identification tasks. It is believed that the MDA approach
employed is scalable to much large databases of devices, at least for the verification
task. One limitation of the MDA technique employed herein is that it requires
an initial number of features that exceeds the number of total potential classes.
For identification, the straightforward MDA implementation will encounter practical
limits as the number of classes exceeds the number of available (or computationally
feasible) features. However, for identity verification applications of IC fingerprinting,
many smaller databases can be used to ensure a single verification set does not
violate the MDA requirements. Since in an authentication scenario the claimed
device identity is known prior to attempting the classification, only the sub-database
containing the claimed identity need be considered. Investigation of this solution
could be tested using simulation to reduce the manual workload and cost associated
with fingerprinting a large number of devices.
5.2.1.4

Challenge-response sequence optimization.

The results herein

were obtained by arbitrarily designating several clock cycles of an overall operation
sequence as the response region. Although no statistical difference in performance
was observed during limited trials when the designated response region was varied to
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include different sub-regions, additional performance improvements may be obtained
by more carefully choosing or defining the response. Future research into this area
might focus on a rigorous investigation into the performance of fingerprints based
on microcode instruction sequences that exercise different device subcircuitry.
5.2.1.5
GAs or ASICs.

Effectiveness for programmable or custom logic ICs such as FPThis work evaluated the effectiveness of the RF-DNA finger-

printing technique for low-cost commercial microcontrollers typical of those used
in a wide-variety of modern security applications. However, the ICs tested were
fabricated using a 180nm lithography process. An interesting extension of this work
would be to conduct additional experiments to confirm the technique’s suitability for
other classes of devices such as FPGAs or custom ASICs, as well as those fabricated
using more modern fabrication processes with much smaller features sizes.
5.2.1.6

Performance improvement through use of multiple fingerprints.

Although it is anticipated that achievable SNRs for most applications of this technique will be very high in practice since the emissions are captured using a near-field
probe, it is believed that identification and verification accuracies could be substantially improved over the results herein by considering multiple extracted fingerprints
for the classification decision. It would be worthwhile to examine how much further
performance could be increased, particularly for degraded SNR conditions, by either
averaging multiple signals or by extending the Bayesian classification technique by
iteratively classifying additional fingerprints until a desired confidence in the decision
is reached.
5.2.1.7

Investigation of alternate side-channels.

It is believed that

the same techniques employed in Chapter 3 would be similarly effective if the RF
emissions were replaced by other side-channel emissions such as variations in power
consumption. If the power side-channel is found to have similar performance, it may
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be more suitable in some situations such as those where precise probe positioning is
difficult to achieve reliably. The experiments in Chapter 3 could easily be replicated
for alternative side-channels by simply replacing the measured RF signal with the
variations in power consumption. Power consumption variations can be obtained
using a typical power-based side-channel analysis setup where the voltage drop is
measured across a resistor placed in-line with the circuit’s supply and/or ground line
as illustrated in Sec. 2.7.
5.2.2

Leakage Mapping.

Future work related to leakage mapping should

focus on continuing to enhance the procedure to provide a more robust overall leakage assessment for arbitrary cryptographic implementations. A number of possible
improvements to the procedure were suggested in Chapter 4, and are expanded on
here.
5.2.2.1

Advanced Statistical Techniques.

In particular, the techniques

should be adapted to incorporate more advanced statistical tools such as mutual information or linear regression models rather than depending on the fixed Hamming
Weight or Hamming Distance Models. The non-parametric mutual information approach is interesting because of the potential to capture non-linear information leakages, but the computational complexity is high. Thus, any efforts to employ such an
approach would need to focus on identifying efficient techniques for computing the
required non-parametric statistical distributions to make the systematic application
of MIA feasible. This problem may be suitable for the application of parallel processing techniques using scientific high performance computing clusters or graphical
processing unit (GPU) acceleration.
Linear regression based techniques (e.g., [SLP05]) are also highly promising
because they can automatically adapt the leakage model to each considered sample or instant in time. Thus, models constructed using regression techniques might
be considered to be leakage agnostic since they can adaptively capture the statisti-
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cal relationship between the observed signal variance at each sample and the data
of interest. It is believed that such an approach would be substantially more robust at the expense of significantly increased computational effort. An assessment
conducted using leakage mapping augmented with regression-based models would
be much more representative of the types of DSCA attacks a persistent, adaptive
adversary might employ. Although the computational requirements would increase
significantly, limited initial experiments suggest that a regression-based approach is
feasible for the leakage mapping framework.
5.2.2.2

Suitability for Assessing Protected Implementations.

Al-

though some pilot studies were conducted to evaluate the suitability of leakage
mapping against protected cryptographic implementations, the results so far are
very limited due to the limited availability of protected implementations for study.
To truly assess the suitability of the leakage mapping approach as a tool for making
appropriate design decisions in the development of a protected implementation, it
should be used directly in that enviornment. That is, it should be employed in an
iterative fashion as a cryptographic implementation is designed and various countermeasures are applied to determine how well it guides the decision making process.
At each step, it is also recommended that the leakage mapping results be validated
against well-known attack techniques as in Chapter 4.
5.2.2.3

Frequency Domain Leakage Mapping.

For this research, the

leakage mapping approach was applied exclusively to signals in the time domain.
However, various other work has suggested that spectral-domain techniques may be
even more effective, particularly against some implementations that implement basic
countermeasures such as random process interrupts [RO04b]. In general, the only
change that would be necessary to apply leakage mapping to signals in the frequency
or time-frequency domains would be input signal pre-processing and interpretation of
the resulting correlation matrices. Spectrogram or similar pre-processing techniques
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would be particularly interesting since the leakage assessment produced from timefrequency domain signals would identify both problematic instants in time as well
as the frequency bands containing the majority of the leaked information.
5.2.3

Related Future Research Recommendations.

In the course of this

work, a large number of experiments were conducted that led to a variety of interesting observations that have not yet been fully investigated. One observation
in particular—discovered during development of the leakage mapping procedure—
merits further investigation.
It was emphasized in Section 4.4 that a significant advantage of the systematic
leakage mapping approach is that it can help to prevent the inadvertent oversight of
important leakages. Because leakage is assessed across all intermediate computations
during the entire cryptographic algorithm, any unexpected leakages are highlighted
when the full assessment results are reviewed.
The software-based AES implementation (Imp. A) studied in Chapter 4 exhibits such unexpected leakages. For this software implementation, direct key correlation would typically be expected twice in each round. This is because each round
key is manipulated during the ARK operation and during on-the-fly key scheduling.
Strangely, several bytes of the master key exhibit leakage during rounds other than
the first round during which the master key also serves as the round key. Based on
knowledge of the AES algorithm, this leakage is unexpected since the master key is
not typically manipulated, directly or indirectly, at those times. Examination of the
available source code for this implementation confirmed that the master key was not
manipulated at the times when the unexpected leakage occurred.
The source of the key leakages was identified by estimating the clock cycle
that corresponds to each unexpected leakage (using the MPLAB PIC simulator)
and determining which instructions are being executed at those times. This analysis
indicated that the source of the observed leakage is ARK operations that mix each
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round’s input with the associated round key. Further investigation revealed that
the temporary round key is stored in a block of memory addresses that immediately
preceeds the memory addresses where the master key is stored. This suggests that the
content of the master key memory addresses is being leaked without ever explicitly
accessing the addresses that contain the leaked information. The physical cause of
this leakage is currently unknown, and additional experimentation is necessary to
determine the root cause. Notably, even without identifying the cause, these leakages
could easily be avoided by adding a buffer around the sensitive data in memory to
prevent any accesses to adjacent memory locations.
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Appendix A. Side Channel Analysis Countermeasures
A.1

Constant Time
Kocher, in his original paper on timing attacks, suggested a number of possible

approaches system developers can take to reduce the vulnerability of their systems
to similar attacks [Koc96]. The most obvious approach to counteract timing attacks
is to make all operations take constant time.
Realizing this approach has proven to be difficult in practice, and some operations that were long thought to resist timing attacks (e.g., table lookups) have later
proven to be vulnerable, as described in 2.5.1. When candidates algorithms were
evaluated for selection as the new AES algorithm, vulnerability to SCA attacks was
one of the criteria considered but table lookup based implementations were considered to be resistant to timing attacks. It has since been shown that, at least on
general purpose microprocessor implementations, cache architectures make that an
invalid assumption as described in Section 2.5.1 [Ber05].
Additionally, as Kocher originally noted, ensuring the intended output is produced in constant time is insufficient to prevent timing attacks since other measurable
phenomenon can reveal the time taken by intermediate operations [Koc96]. Finally,
constant time countermeasures have the undesirable effect of making all operations
take the longest time, effectively de-optimizing the performance to the lowest common denominator [Roh06, MOP07].

A.2

Constant Power Countermeasures
One way to reduce the information signal produced through the power con-

sumption side channel is for all operations to require constant power. If operations
take precisely the same amount of power without regard for the data being processed,
then power analysis attacks are no longer possible and the adversary must seek an
alternate (hopefully less informative) source of information leakage. This approach,
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unlike some of the others, must be implemented at the hardware level, and is therefore not applicable to software-based implementations that run on general purpose
devices such as microprocessors. The term commonly used for constant-power logic
design styles is secure logic.
Several secure logic variations have been proposed, which fall into two primary categories: transistor-level [TAV02,BGLT06], and gate-level logic styles [TV04,
PM05]. Transistor-level logic styles typically perform better in the sense that they
are more effective at reducing power consumption fluctuations. However, they typically can’t be implemented using existing commercial design flows and standard cell
libraries. Therefore, the cost and time required to develop systems based on these
logic styles is much higher than for a standard CMOS design. In contrast, gate-level
secure logic assembles compound constant-power logic cells from existing standard
CMOS logic cells (e.g., AND and OR gates). These logic styles can generally be implemented using existing design flows, commercial tools, and standard cell libraries
but are less effective at reducing variations in power consumption. In general, all of
the proposed secure logic styles sacrifice power, size, and / or performance to reduce
the side-channel information leakage of the circuit’s power consumption.
Both the transistor and gate-level logic styles are based on the idea of dual
or multi-rail logic. Figure A.1 illustrates a transistor-level pre-charged dual-rail
domino style that achieves near constant power consumption profiles for all inputs
and outputs.
The logic cell requires an input pair of both the true signal and its complement
for each input. Likewise, it produces an output signal pair consisting of both true
and complementary output values of the logic function, where Y h represents the
output and Y l is its complement. While the the clock φ is low (or logical ‘0’), both
output signals are being pre-charged to low voltage. When the clock φ goes high,
the circuit evaluates and one (and only one) of the two output signals is asserted.
During proper operation, both output signals should never be ‘1’ simultaneously.
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Figure A.1

Dual Rail Domino Logic Style with Completion Detection for Asynchronous Design. [WH05]

Table A.1 summarizes the states for a dual-rail domino logic cell. An example of an
XOR gate implemented in dual-rail domino logic is shown in Figure A.2.
Table A.1

Dual-rail domino signal encoding [WH05]
sig h
0
0
1
1

sig l
0
1
0
1

Meaning
precharged
‘0’
‘1’
invalid

The idea behind the dual-rail design as a countermeasure is since the logic cell
always calculates both the true and complementary outputs, either one half or the
other of the complementary paths will be exercised during any particular operation.
Thus, the power the logic cell draws should be basically independent of the inputs
and output.
Note that the dual-rail logic style means that the logic can signal completion
by tying both un-inverted outputs to a NAND gate as shown in Figure A.1. In
this manner, domino dual-rail can be used for asynchronous logic, which has been
proposed as a further countermeasure to DSCA attacks.
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Figure A.2

Dual Rail Domino XOR/XNOR gate (without completion detection
explicitly shown). [WH05]

A limitation of this approach is that routing can create capacitive imbalances
in the cell, which can bias the power consumption. Several specific variations on the
dual-rail logic concept have been proposed in the literature.
• Sense amplifier based logic (SABL) [TAV02]. A transistor-level custom synchronous logic style with a single switching event each clock cycle, during which
it “...discharges and charges the sum of all the internal node capacitances together with one of the balanced output capacitance” [TV04]. SABL requires
the design of an all-new custom cell library.
• Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) [TV04]. A gate-level semi-custom
logic style that combines logic gates from a standard cell library into compound
secure gates with constant power characteristics similar to SABL. WDDL can
be implemented for both ASIC and FPGA-based designs. In general, WDDL is
less effective than SABL at hiding power consumption variations due to internal
computations and unbalanced routing of complementary wires can render the
countermeasure less effective at reducing data-dependent power fluctuations.
The technique can be integrated into an existing design flow using commercial
EDA tools and commercially available complementary CMOS standard cell
libraries with some modifications (semi-custom design flow) [TV06].
• Masked dual-rail pre-charge logic (MDPL) [PM05]. Another gate-level semicustom logic style formed from the combination of standard cells that attempts
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to overcome routing constraints. MDPL combines power equalization with
intermediate value masking (see Section A.1).
• Three-phase dual rail power (DRP) logic (TDPL) [BGLT06]. A transistorlevel enhancement to SABL intended to provide constant-power consumption
without restrictive routing restraints. TDPL also requires the design of a
custom cell library.
Another area of active research is the efficient integration of full- or semicustom logic styles into existing design workflows. Baddam and Zwoliniski proposed
a technique to effectively route circuits following the divided WDDL logic style using
backend duplication [BZ08]. Their technique is interesting because it can reportedly
be applied to FPGAs as well as custom ASIC designs. The authors presented experimental results from a 130nm technology FPGA demonstrating the technique’s
effectiveness.
Although hardware-based secure logic styles are promising in theory, achieving
equalized power has proven to be very difficult to do in practice. Suzuki and Saeki
showed that slight variations in gate input arrival times result in the complementary
paths switching at different times, which results in exploitable power consumption
leakage [SS06]. Mangard, Popp and Gammel showed that all of the fully complementary CMOS-based logic styles exhibit glitching behavior that exhibits similar
characteristics [MPG05]. Schaumont and Tiri have recently shown that the combination of masking and dual-rail logic (e.g. MDPL), which was thought to be one
of the most promising hardware countermeasures to prevent DPA, is fundamentally
insecure [ST07]. Small differences in the routing of complementary wire pairs leads
to imbalanced capacitances. Though these implementations are not directly vulnerable to traditional DSCA-type attacks, the routing imbalances induce a bias in
the probability density function of the power consumption which can be filtered to
remove the mask, resulting in a much lower DPA resistance than originally thought.
The authors were able to extract the key from their AES implementation, originally
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believed to be highly resistant to standard DPA attacks, with approximately 2,000
observations.

A.3

Temporal Desyncronization
Noise addition is an intuitive way to cover up information leakage of a circuit.

The concept is that if noise can be increased enough, the attacker will be unable to
identify and extract the underlying information signal. One way of increasing the
noise in a side channel is to desynchronize the time when sensitive data manipulations
take place from one operation to another. This can be accomplished by, for instance,
randomizing the clock period, the order of operations, or the number of cycles taken
for a microprocessor instruction [Koc96, Roh06, MOP07].
The theory behind these randomization techniques is that DSCA attacks are
sensitive to the temporal alignment of the side channel traces. Variations in the
start time of individual traces, or variations in the time when subsequent sensitive
operations or data manipulations occur relative to that start will introduce noise
into the corresponding side-channel signal. The effect on DSCA techniques is that
the peaks in the correlation coefficients (or whatever statistical tool is used) which
normally indicate a correct key are spread across a number of points in time. In
digital signal processing this is known as incoherent averaging [CCD00]. If the start
of traces are not temporally aligned, the adversary must either collect more samples
or use sophisticated signal processing techniques to align them (see Section 2.7)
[MOP07].
An alternate technique to achieve temporal descynchronization is to implement
circuits using asynchronous or self-timed logic styles. Removing the clock as a source
of information makes the task of side-channel analysis much more difficult and has
the added benefit of countering clock-based fault attacks [FMP03]. In addition to
the properties of constant power consumption that can be achieved through careful logic design, the dual-rail logic styles introduced above also lend themselves to
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asynchronous design since each cell inherently signals the completion of an operation [FMP03].

A.4

Masking countermeasures
Masking countermeasures are a class of techniques that protect sensitive infor-

mation from side channel attacks by making the physically observable phenomena
independent of sensitive data. Masking of asymmetric ciphers is commonly referred
to as blinding in the cryptographic literature [Koc96, MOP07].
Kocher first proposed applying blinding as a countermeasure to timing attacks [Koc96], but the technique is also effective at reducing vulnerability of systems
other side channel attacks [CJRR99, Roh06, MOP07]. Kocher’s blinding technique
for protecting the private key is described in detail in Appendix D.
The generalized application of masking to side channel attacks was proposed
by Chari, et al. as a derivative of the already known secret sharing technique from
the cryptographic literature [CJRR99]. Masking, in general, is accomplished by
randomizing sensitive intermediate values processed by the device. The idea is to
randomly split sensitive intermediate values into a number of shares, each of which
is independent of the original sensitive data. Each sensitive unmasked intermediate
value, v, is split into d shares where the relation

m1 ? m2 ? · · · ? md = v

(A.1)

holds for some group operation ?. The shares m1 . . . md−1 are the random masks,
and md is the masked intermediate value. The shares m1 . . . md−1 are assumed to
be mutually independent random variables uniformly distributed over v. Typical
choices for the masking operation, ?, are the logical XOR (boolean masking) and
modular addition or multiplication (arithmetic masking) [MOP07, PRB09].
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Masking does not make physically observable phenomena independent of the
device operations, but rather randomizes the data on which the device is operating. Thus, the device still leaks information about the intermediate values being
processed, but those intermediate values are independent of the secret or private
key. An adversary with no knowledge that the masking countermeasure has been
implemented will be unable to attack the device using standard SCA techniques.
Even with knowledge that masking is used the difficulty of mounting an attack is
significantly increased.
Most of the masking schemes proposed use a single random mask to split
the sensitive intermediate value into just two shares, although higher-order masking schemes have also been proposed to provide further security against HO-DSCA
techniques [CJRR99,MOP07,PRB09]. The complexity of both implementing higherorder masking schemes and attacking grows quickly with the order, so most research
has focused on 2nd order masking and 2O-DSCA attacks [PRB09].
Masking countermeasures are sometimes combined with constant-power logic
styles, but that combination has been found to be fundamentally insecure as described in A.2.
A.4.1

Masking of complex ciphers.

A key characteristic of masking coun-

termeasures is they require changes to the underlying algorithm to handle the masked
intermediate values properly. For RSA, the changes are straightforward due to the
properties of modular arithmetic, but masking schemes can be substantially less
straightforward for more complicated ciphers. For example, masking S-box lookups
introduces significant overhead (performance and memory) since the masked equivalent of the entire table would have to be calculated for each new mask [MOP07].
More efficient implementations are possible if the S-box functions are computed
dynamically using finite field arithmetic since the entire table doesn’t have to be
recomputed for each new mask value [OMPR05].
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A.4.2

Implementation levels for masking.

In addition to masking inter-

mediate values at the algorithmic level (in either hardware or software), it is also
possible to mask operations at higher system levels. Mangard et al. describe several techniques for masking hardware multipliers, combinational logic, and data
buses [MOP07]. Various proposals have been made for masked logic styles to be
implemented at the custom hardware design level for both ASIC and FPGA implementations.
A.4.3

Practical considerations.

The security benefits of masking counter-

measures can be easily lost if the technique is implemented carelessly. Mangard, et
al. warns of several possible pitfalls when implementing masking schemes in practice. Consecutively storing a masked value and its corresponding mask in the same
register or inadvertently consecutively transferring them across a data bus may leak
the Hamming distance between the two and reveal the unmasked intermediate value.
Likewise, intermediate values that are concealed by the same mask and processed
consecutively can leak the Hamming distance between the two unmasked intermediate values. Simultaneously processing a masked value intermediate value and the
mask used to protect it can unintentionally occur in parallel hardware implementations, effectively leaking the un-masked intermediate value. Finally, implementation
tools (compilers, hardware synthesis tools, etc.) may inadvertently optimize away
countermeasures if care is not taken [MOP07].
To be effective random masks should be changed frequently enough to prevent
the masks themselves from introducing exploitable side-channel leakage. However,
every mask change reduces performance of the system, and thus the frequency of
changes must be balanced to achieve acceptable performance and security [MOP07].
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A.5

Power Supply Shielding
A countermeasure to power analysis techniques is to isolate the internal time-

varying requirements of a circuit from easily probed terminals. Shamir was the
first to propose physically isolating a circuit’s power supply from a circuit by using
large shielding capacitors [Sha00]. Others have noted that capacitors used in power
distribution networks of complex integrated circuits such as FPGAs filter some of
the higher-frequency activity of the internal switching activity [MOP07]. Shamir’s
approach used two capacitors in tandem so that one could supply the circuit while
the other recharged.
Ratanpal, Williams and Blalock pointed out that Shamir’s technique can be
bypassed by probing the power supplied by the capacitors instead of the global power
supply (assuming the capacitors are off-chip or accessible), and reconstructing a full
power consumption trace by combining the power traces from the two capacitors
and applying standard DPA attack techniques against the combined trace [RWB04].
The authors proposed a more effective active signal suppression circuit. A key disadvantage of all power supply shielding techniques is that the are only effective against
power analysis and do not protect against attacks on the EM or other side channels.

A.6

EM Shielding
There are few specific countermeasures that specifically address the problem

of EM leakage. Quisquater et al. suggest several possible ways to reduce the vulnerability of systems to EM analysis, including reducing the magnitude of the radiated
electromagnetic field through shielding (such as thick metal packaging), imprisoning
the circuitry inside a Faraday cage to prevent EM radiation from escaping, reducing the power consumption of the device (and thus the resulting EM radiation),
asynchronous logic, or using one of the various dual-rail power logic styles proposed
elsewhere as a countermeasure to power analysis attacks [QS00, QS01]. Introducing
temporal or spatial jitter with techniques such as the ones described in Sections
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A.3 and A.8 may also improve resistance to EM-based DSCA attacks. The Faraday cage approach is likely to be effective, but may not be realistic for practical
implementations of many systems.

A.7

Leakage-Resistant Arithmetic
Bajard, et al.

proposed a leakage-resistant arithmetic (LRA) style based

residue number system (RNS) as a countermeasure to timing, SSCA and DSCA
attacks [BILT04]. In the RNS representation, large integers are represented by a
series of smaller integers. The system is defined by a set of relatively prime moduli,
{m1 , m2 , . . . , mN }. Any arbitrary integer, X, is represented as a set of N smaller
integers {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN } such that xi = X mod mi . The LRA system randomizes
data, order of computations, and the function of individual logic cells by randomly
selecting the initial set of moduli used and/or randomly changing the base moduli
before and during an arithmetic operation.
The countermeasure is most suitable for public-key ciphers that operate over
large finite fields such as RSA or ECC. The authors developed a reference implementation of a reconfigurable logic design to implement LRA for the RSA encryption
algorithm. The resulting implementation takes approximately 5-7 times more gates
than a standard modular exponentiation implementation, but the inherently parallel nature of the arithmetic operations offers potential performance improvements
at larger key sizes (≥ 2048 bits). Although the approach presents some intuitive
degree of protection against SCA attacks, no experimental results were presented to
validate the claim of improved SCA resistance.

A.8

Dynamic Reconfiguration
One interesting new area of countermeasures research is the idea of dynami-

cally reconfiguring FPGAs or other devices in real-time, as introduced by Mentens
et al. [MGV08]. The countermeasure creates temporal and spatial jitter by ran-
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domly inserting delay registers into the computation path and changing the location
where the logic that processes sensitive operations is instantiated. The temporal
jitter descynchronizes the timing of sensitive operations as previously discussed in
Section A.3. Spatial jitter increase resistance to EM attacks, which typically attempt to localize the area of maximal EM leakage. Fixed configuration spatial jitter
was also previously introduced by Bajard, et al. and Ciet et al., but requires multiple dedicated instantiations of the elementary computational cells, which increases
overhead [BILT04, CNPQ03]. Dynamic reconfiguration may achieve similar spatial
protection with improved area and resource utilization efficiency.
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Appendix B. Kocher’s Timing Attack on RSA
B.1

Overview
The seminal paper on cryptanalytic SCA attacks, published by Kocher in 1996,

targets the timing variations of several asymmetric ciphers including the popular
RSA algorithm. This section describes Kocher’s attack on RSA.

B.2

Overview of RSA
RSA use is widespread because of its strong computational security and ease of

implementation [Sch96]. Asymmetric ciphers such as RSA are typically much slower
than block ciphers such as DES or AES, but the key lengths are typically much
larger—1024 bits or higher for RSA vs. 256 bits maximum for AES. Because they
are relatively slow, asymmetric ciphers are not generally used for sustained transfers
of large amounts of data, but are commonly used for applications such establishing a
secure session between two parties over a computer network (e.g., the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) protocol used for secure Internet browser sessions) or for encrypting or
signing emails.
In RSA and other asymmetric ciphers, the ciphering process is based on the
mathematical properties of modular exponentiation:

R = dk

mod m

(B.1)

where d is the data being operated on, m is a publicly known modulus, and k is the
cryptographic key.
In RSA and other asymmetric ciphers, cryptographic keys are generated in
pairs—a public key kpub which is used to encrypt data and a corresponding private
key kpri which can decrypt the data that was encrypted using kpub . A public key is
published as the set (kpub , m) and is shared freely with anyone from whom the key’s
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owner would like to be able to receive secure messages. Asymmetric ciphers used in
this manner are typically referred to as public-key encryption schemes [Sch96].
The mathematical details of how RSA keys are generated how/why the ciphering process works are irrelevant to Kocher’s timing attack and therefore are not
discussed here, but are described in detail by a number of references [Sch96]. It is
noteworthy that many of the RSA implementations in use today are based largely
on the ‘C’ source code from the original RSA laboratories reference implementation [Lab94].
B.2.1

Implementation of RSA.

In practice, the modular exponentiation

operations used in RSA and other similar ciphers are generally implemented using
one of several well-known techniques. One common algorithm, which is used as an
example in Kocher’s paper, is the binary square and multiply method (also known
as addition chaining) shown in Algorithm 4 [Koc96, Sch96].
Algorithm 4 Square and Multiply Modular Exponentiation—Adapted from [Koc96]
1: s0 ← 1
2: for i = 0 to w − 1 do
3:
if ki = 1 then
4:
Ri ← (si × y) mod n
5:
else
6:
Ri ← si
7:
end if
8:
si+1 ← Ri2 mod n
9: end forreturn (Rw−1 )

B.2.2

Information Leakage Modular Exponentiation.

There are at least

two sources of potential information leakage in this algorithm [Koc96]. The first,
which is the focus of Kocher’s timing attack, is the conditional execution of the the
modular multiplication on Line 4. The multiplication is executed only if ki = 1. This
data dependency results in variations in computation time—the effect of which is to
leak information about the value of the key. Kocher’s attack is based on analysis of
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this first source of information leakage. A second source of information leakage is
due to variations within the modular multiplication step itself.

B.3

Key Assumptions of Kocher’s Attack
With all side channel attacks, it is important to be aware of the underlying

assumptions that can limit the attack’s practicality. Kocher’s timing attack makes a
number of assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities, which are described here:
1. The attacker (Eve) has the ability to monitor the decryption operations of her
target (Bob), and to accurately record the computation time for each decryption.
2. Eve is able to eavesdrop on and capture the encrypted messages that are sent
to Bob. (Alternatively, in some scenarios an active adversary could actually
be the source of the encrypted messages.)
3. Eve is able to do the above for a large number of decryption operations where
Bob is using the same private key.
4. Eve must have knowledge of the amount of time required by Bob to perform
the modular multiplication that occurs when a key bit is ‘1’. One way for
Eve to accomplish this is to create a simulator using the same source code
as the targeted implementation, running on a similar hardware platform. She
can then precisely simulate the amount of time each partial calculation should
have taken on her target platform.1
1

Realistically, this is not an impractical constraint from the perspective of an attacker. A
scenario where Eve may have this capability is if she is attacking one of the many widely used RSA
implementations that are based on the original RSAREF reference implementation (which is freely
available) or use open-source implementations of other cryptographic libraries.
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5. Measurement error, loop overhead, and other computation time contributions
not directly attributable to the mathematical operations of modular exponentiation are negligible.2
6. Modular multiplication computation times are approximately normally distributed. Kocher illustrates that this is the case for his targeted implementation
(RSAREF toolkit running on 120MHz Pentium computer, MSDOS operating
system) [Koc96].
7. Modular multiplication computations times are independently distributed. In
fact, it has been shown that there is some correlation between multiplication
times in a straightforward square and multiply implementation, but the approximations used for this attack are still useful in practice [Roh06].

B.4

The Attack
The actual attack is an iterative process whereby Eve attempts to guess the

bits ki of the full w-bit private key in the order they are used by the modular
exponentiation algorithm. The basic steps of Kocher’s timing attack are:
1. Eve observes Bob’s decryption of n cipher-texts.
2

If these factors are not negligible, it does not render Kocher’s attack ineffective, but does
increase the noise. The result is that the attacker must gather more samples in order to average
out the underlying noise.
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2. For each decryption operation j = 1, 2, ..., n, Eve records the total computation
time, Tj . The total computation time for each individual observation can be
decomposed as:



Tj =

w−1
X
i=0

ti,j




+ ej = 




T1
T2
..
.
Tn

t0,1 + t1,1 + · · · + tw−1,1 + e1



 
 
  t0,2 + t1,2 + · · · + tw−1,2 + e2
=
 
..
 
.
 
t0,n + t1,n + · · · + tw−1,n + en













(B.2)

where ti,j is the time attributable to pass i through the square and multiply loop
for observation j and e represents the remaining timing and error components
including loop overhead and measurement error. Each ti,j depends on the
value of the key bit ki and the value of the cipher-text dj . Initially, all ti,j are
unknown.
3. Beginning with the LSB (k0 ), Eve iteratively considers each bit ki of the key.
For subsequent iterations, it is assumed that all previous key bits (ki−1 ..k0 ) are
known. Eve makes two hypotheses about ki , namely
H0 : ki = 0,

H1 : ki = 1

Given her knowledge of the implementation, Eve simulates the partial compuPi−1
tation for the first i key bits and determines the time q=0
tq,j attributable to
that portion of the modular exponentiation for each observation. The remaining time, which is attributable to the unknown key bits for which Eve cannot
yet simulate the computation is:

H0|H1
Tj

=e+

w−1
X
p=0
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tp,j −

i−1
X
q=0

tq,j .

(B.3)

The result of this step is two new lists of adjusted timings TH0
and TH1
for
j
j
all observations (j = 1, 2, ..., n).
4. Eve then calculates the variance for TH0
and TH1
from the previous step.
j
j
Whichever hypothesis (H0 : ki = 0 or H1 : ki = 1) resulted in the largest
reduction in the variance over all adjusted computation times is chosen as the
next key bit.
5. Eve repeats steps 3-4 for each bit of the key until the entire key is known.
Under the assumptions of independence and normal distribution of multiplication times, Kocher derived the probability that a wrong hypothesis will result
in a greater reduction in variance of the adjusted computation times. When this
does occur, the variance calculated in subsequent steps will actually begin to grow,
indicating that an incorrect key bit was selected and that some backtracking is required to correct the error [Koc96,Roh06]. Kocher refers to this as an error-detection
property of the timing attack.
In the general case, the probability at each step of selecting the correct hypothesis for the current key bit (given all previous key bits were chosen correctly) is
given:




= P Ki = 0| V ar TjH0 < V ar TjH1



= P Ki = 1| V ar TjH1 < V ar TjH0
s
!
n(i − c)
=Φ
2 (w − i)
where c is the index of the first incorrectly guessed key bit.
Thus, Eve can make trades between the number of observations and the postprocessing time (including backtracking for wrong guesses) to optimize the efficiency
of her attack.
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Appendix C. Kocher’s SPA Attack on DES
Kocher’s original SPA attack illustrates a typical application of SSCA. The principle
of the analysis is that the power consumption of a micro-controller looks different
for different operations. For instance, the side channel leakage may look significantly
different when a conditional branch is taken compared to when the branch is not
taken. Figure C.1 shows the current drawn by a micro-controller-based DES implementation for two sets of operations over a period of seven clock cycles [KJJ99].
Close examination of the traces reveals that they have very similar (nearly identical)
current profiles until they reach clock cycles 6-7. Clock cycles 6-7 correspond to the
micro-controller’s execution of a conditional branch instruction. In one of the traces
the branch is taken, and in the other trace the branch is not taken.

Figure C.1

Variations in Current Drawn Due to Different Conditional Branch Decisions (Adapted from [KJJ99])

In this example, the device being analyzed is a micro-controller running DES
code, and the differences in current drawn by the device occur at times when the
micro-controller is making a conditional branch decisions based on a portion (one
bit in this case) of the cryptographic key. By applying publicly available knowledge
of the DES algorithm and domain knowledge of how the algorithm would be imple161

mented in practice, it is possible to deduce the value of the cryptographic key from
these differences.
In Kocher’s example, the target is a (software, microprocessor-based) smartcard implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Listing C.1

Assembler Code for DES Conditional Branch [?]

;==============================
M SHIFT C

MACRO

;==============================

CLR

C

MOV

A, PB 4 C

RLC

A

MOV

PB 4 C , A

MOV

A, PB 3 C

RLC

A

MOV

PB 3 C , A

MOV

A, PB 2 C

RLC

A

MOV

PB 2 C , A

MOV

A, PB 1 C

RLC

A

MOV

PB 1 C , A

JC

M SHIFTC1

CLR

PB 4 C . 4

JMP

M SHIFTC2

M SHIFTC1 :
SETB

PB 4 C . 4 , #1

M SHIFTC2 :
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ENDM
The attack begins by analyzing the DES algorithm to identify some intermediate value that, if known, would reveal a portion of the key. For DES, examining the
publicly available specification reveals that the generation of the sub-key used in each
round of ciphering requires the rotation of two 28-bit key registers. Applying domain
knowledge of how a rotation is likely to be implemented for a micro-controller-based
implementation, it is expected that most implementations will optimize the 28-bit rotation operation and only copy the most-significant bit (MSB) to the least-significant
bit (LSB) if it is a ‘1’. Otherwise, the code will probably perform a less costly shift
operation—which would automatically fill the LSB with a ‘0’ value. Thus, it is
anticipated that straightforward implementations of DES will make a conditional
branch decision based on the MSB of the key register before each rotation.
For the micro-controller-based smart-card device targeted, the power trace
data looks significantly different for operations where a conditional branch is taken
vs. operations where it is not taken (Figure C.1). Therefore, it is possible to tell
whether the MSB of the key register is a ‘1’ or a ‘0’ by examining the power trace
for the moment when the conditional decision is made.
Furthermore, according to the Federal Information Processing Standard 463 [Nat99], a total of 28 left rotations of each 28-bit key register are used in the DES
algorithm. Therefore, every bit in the 56-bit DES key is subject to the above analysis
over the course of a full 16 round ciphering process, permitting extraction of the full
secret key by analyzing whether or not the jumps were taken.
A key point of SPA is that an attacker requires substantial knowledge of the
algorithm being implemented in order to effectively use the technique. Since the
detailed specifications of many encryption algorithms are publicly available, and in
most cases the manufacturers of encryption devices advertise the type of encryption
being used, this information is frequently easy to obtain. Kocher’s second type
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of attack, DPA, and improvements made later are not as dependent on detailed
knowledge of the implementation.
The series of operations for both traces include an instruction that rotates the
contents of a register left by one bit. If the most significant bit in the register (before
the rotation) is a ‘1’ then a special carry register is set to ‘1’. If the MSB is a ‘0’
then the carry register is set to ‘0’.
A branch decision is then made based on the value of the carry register. If
the carry register is set, the branch is taken. Likewise, if the carry register is not
set, the branch is not taken. The two traces depict the current drawn by the device
for each case (branch taken vs. branch not taken). Close examination of the traces
reveals that both have almost identical current profiles until they reach clock cycles
6-7, which corresponds to the location of the conditional branch operation. Thus,
by visually examining the power consumption side channel data, it is possible to
determine whether or not a conditional branch was taken or not—and in doing so,
to infer the value of the manipulated register’s MSB.
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Appendix D. RSA Message Blinding
To protect the private key kpri during RSA decryption one option (known as message
blinding) is to choose a random pair of numbers (mi , mf ) such that

k

mf −1 = mi pri

mod n

(D.1)

where n is used to represent the public modulus to prevent confusion with the mask
value m. To do this, mf can initially be chosen as a random number that is relatively
prime to n. Then,

mi = (mf −1 )kpub

mod n.

(D.2)

The input message (the cipher-text, C) is then masked prior to computing the RSA
modular exponentiation by first multiplying it by mi mod n or

Cm = C × mi

mod n.

(D.3)

Decryption is performed as normal to recover the plain-text

Pm = (Cm )kpri

mod n.

(D.4)

However, since the decryption was performed on the masked cipher-text, the resulting
plain-text is also masked. To recover the original plain-text, the masked plain-text
is multiplied by mf

P = Pm × m f .
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(D.5)

Appendix E. AES Object Source Code
This appendix contains the source code for a Matlab AES implementation that will
pre-compute and preserve all FIPS 197 specified algorithmically specified intermediate results. This source code supports all FIPS 197 approved variants of AES,
including all key sizes (128, 192, and 256-bit) and modes (encryption and decryption). The supported parameters are documented in AESObject.m.
Listing E.1

AESObject.m

1

% =========================================================================

2

% ========

3

% =========================================================================

4

%

5

%

6

%

7

%

8

%

AES Object

=========

Created : Jun 2010
By :

Maj Will Cobb

Last Modified : 28 Jul 2011
By :

Cobb

9
10

%

Implements FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard ( AES ) .

11

%

FIPS 197 specified key sizes and operation modes .

12

%

13

%

This class will compute the output and all algorithmicly specified ( per

14

%

FIPS 197 specification ) intermediate values of the AES encryption /

15

%

decryption given a specific input ( plain or ciphertext depending on

16

%

mode ) and key .

17

%

18

%

19

%

20

%

19 Jul 10 -- made drastic improvements to speed by

21

%

going to a lookup - table based approach for AES polynomial

22

%

multip licatio n .

23

%

24

%

25

%

26

%

28 Jul 11 -- Moved lookup tables to separate . mat file to improve

27

%

code readability .

28

%

29

%

30

%

31

%

Supports all

Modified :

14 Sep 10 -- Updated comments , prettied up hex output display

18 Aug 11 -- Added get . Hex KeySche dule & get . Bi nKeySch edule .

Examples using Test Vectors from FIPS 197 Appendix C :
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32

%

33

%

myAES = AESObject ;

34

%

myAES . HexInput = ’00112233445566778899 aabbccddeeff ’;

35

%

myAES . HexKey = ’000102030405060708090 a0b0c0d0e0f ’;

36

%

myAES . Encrypt ;

37

%

myAES . HexOutput

38

%

39

%

40

%

41

%

42

%

43

%

myAES . HexInput = myAES . HexOutput ;

44

%

myAES . Decrypt ;

45

%

myAES . HexOutput

46

%

47

%

48

%

49

%

50

%

51

%

% Get Key Schedule :

52

%

myAES . w

53

%

54

%

55

%

56

%

57

%

58

%

190 ,155 ,197 ,0;104 ,48 ,179 ,254;182 ,255 ,116 ,78;210 ,194 ,201 ,191;

59

%

108 ,89 ,12 ,191;4 ,105 ,191 ,65;71 ,247 ,247 ,188;149 ,53 ,62 ,3;249 ,108 ,50 ,188;

60

%

253 ,5 ,141 ,253;60 ,170 ,163 ,232;169 ,159 ,157 ,235;80 ,243 ,175 ,87;

61

%

173 ,246 ,34 ,170;94 ,57 ,15 ,125;247 ,166 ,146 ,150;167 ,85 ,61 ,193;

62

%

10 ,163 ,31 ,107;20 ,249 ,112 ,26;227 ,95 ,226 ,140;68 ,10 ,223 ,77;78 ,169 ,192 ,38;

63

%

71 ,67 ,135 ,53;164 ,28 ,101 ,185;224 ,22 ,186 ,244;174 ,191 ,122 ,210;

64

%

84 ,153 ,50 ,209;240 ,133 ,87 ,104;16 ,147 ,237 ,156;190 ,44 ,151 ,78;%

65

%

19 ,17 ,29 ,127;227 ,148 ,74 ,23;243 ,7 ,167 ,139;77 ,43 ,48 ,197;]

66

%

67

%

% Get hex repre sentatio n of key schedule (1 round key / row )

68

%

myAES . Hex KeySched ule

69

%

70

%

71

%

72

%

0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 A0B0C0D0E0F

73

%

D6AA74FDD2AF72FADAA678F1D6AB76FE

74

%

B692CF0B643DBDF1BE9BC5006830B3FE

ans =

69 C 4 E 0 D 8 6 A 7 B 0 4 3 0 D 8 C D B 7 8 0 7 0 B 4 C 5 5 A

ans =

0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 AABBCCDDEEFF

ans =

[0 ,1 ,2 ,3;4 ,5 ,6 ,7;8 ,9 ,10 ,11;12 ,13 ,14 ,15;214 ,170 ,116 ,253;210 ,175 ,114 ,250;
218 ,166 ,120 ,241;214 ,171 ,118 ,254;182 ,146 ,207 ,11;100 ,61 ,189 ,241;

ans =
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75

%

B6FF744ED2C2C9BF6C590CBF0469BF41

76

%

47 F 7 F 7 B C 9 5 3 5 3 E 0 3 F 9 6 C 3 2 B C F D 0 5 8 D F D

77

%

3 CAAA3E8A99F9DEB50F3AF57ADF622AA

78

%

5 E390F7DF7A69296A7553DC10AA31F6B

79

%

14 F 9 7 0 1 A E 3 5 F E 2 8 C 4 4 0 A D F 4 D 4 E A 9 C 0 2 6

80

%

47438735 A 4 1 C 6 5 B 9 E 0 1 6 B A F 4 A E B F 7 A D 2

81

%

549932 D 1 F 0 8 5 5 7 6 8 1 0 9 3 E D 9 C B E 2 C 9 7 4 E

82

%

13111 D 7 F E 3 9 4 4 A 1 7 F 3 0 7 A 7 8 B 4 D 2 B 3 0 C 5

83

%

84

%

% Get intermediate values :

85

%

A E S _ I n t e r m e d i a t e s = myAES . IV

86

%

87

%

88

%

89

%

temp : [70 x4 double ]

90

%

S : [41 x4x4 double ]

91

%

92

%

% Note that temp is the intermediates calculated in key

93

%

% schedule generation

94

%

% S is the 4 x4 AES state array at each intermediate point in

95

%

% the calculation .

96

%

% for the intermediate value in order of computation .

97

%

% this dimension will determine on AES key size (128 ,192 ,256)

ans =

The first dimension is the designator

98
99

classdef AESObject < hgsetget

100
101

properties ( Constant )

102
103

cENCRYPT_MODE = 1;

104

cDECRYPT_MODE = 0;

105
106

Nb = 4;

107
108

binLookup = de2bi (0:255 , ’ left - msb ’) ;

109
110

end ;

111
112

properties

113
114

K ey Ob je c tH an dl e ;

115

IV = {};

116
117

%

*** Default input / keys are FIPS 197 test vectors ***
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Size of

118

HexInput =

{ ’ 32 ’ ’ 88 ’ ’ 31 ’ ’ e0 ’; ...

119

’ 43 ’ ’5 a ’ ’ 31 ’ ’ 37 ’; ...

120

’ f6 ’ ’ 30 ’ ’ 98 ’ ’ 07 ’; ...

121

’ a8 ’ ’8 d ’ ’ a2 ’ ’ 34 ’ };

122
123

HexKey =

{ ’2 b ’ ’7 e ’ ’ 15 ’ ’ 16 ’ ’ 28 ’ ’ ae ’ ’ d2 ’ ’ a6 ’

124

...

’ ab ’ ’ f7 ’ ’ 15 ’ ’ 88 ’ ’ 09 ’ ’ cf ’ ’4 f ’ ’3 c ’ };

125

%

126

%

’c8 ’ ’10 ’ ’f3 ’ ’2b ’ ’80 ’ ’90 ’ ’79 ’ ’e5 ’ ...

127

%

’62 ’ ’f8 ’ ’ea ’ ’d2 ’ ’52 ’ ’2c ’ ’6b ’ ’7b ’};

128

%

HexKey = { ’60 ’ ’3d ’ ’eb ’ ’10 ’ ’15 ’ ’ca ’ ’71 ’ ’be ’

129

%

’2b ’ ’73 ’ ’ae ’ ’f0 ’ ’85 ’ ’7d ’ ’77 ’ ’81 ’

...

130

%

’1f ’ ’35 ’ ’2c ’ ’07 ’ ’3b ’ ’61 ’ ’08 ’ ’d7 ’

...

131

%

’2d ’ ’98 ’ ’10 ’ ’a3 ’ ’09 ’ ’14 ’ ’df ’ ’f4 ’};

HexKey = { ’8e ’ ’73 ’ ’b0 ’ ’f7 ’ ’da ’ ’0e ’ ’64 ’ ’52 ’ ...

132
133

BinOutput = logical ( zeros (1 , 64) ) ;

134

DecOutput = uint8 ( zeros (1 , 8) ) ;

135
136

% S is current AES State matrix

137

S = zeros ( 4 , 4) ;

138
139

% These lookup tables are loaded from a pre - computed . mat file

140

RotWord = [];

141

P = [];

142

ShiftRows = [];

143

InvShiftRows = [];

144

SBox = [];

145

InvSBox = [];

146

RCon = [];

147

PM = [];

148
149

end ;

150
151

properties ( Dependent = true )

152

Nk ; % Valid values are 4 , 6 , 8 for AES -128 , 192 , 256

153

Nr ; % Valid values are 10 , 12 , 14 for AES -128 , 192 , 256

154

HexOutput ;

155

IntInput ;

156

IntOutput ;

157

IntKey ;

158

HexK eySchedu le ;

159

BinK eySchedu le ;

160

Mode ;
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...

161
162

w;
end ;

163
164

properties ( Access = private )

165

priMode = 1;

166

p r i K e y S c h e d u l e V a l i d = 0;

167

priKeySize = 128;

168

priK eySchedu le ;

169

end ;

170
171
172

methods

173
174

function UpdateOutput ( a )

175

if ( a . Mode == a . cENCRYPT_MODE )

176

a . Encrypt ;

177

elseif ( a . Mode == a . cDECRYPT_MODE )

178

a . Decrypt ;

179

else

180

error ( ’ Invalid AES Mode Specified .

Must be 1 ( encrypt ) or 0 (←-

decrypt ) ’) ;
181
182

end ;
end ;

183
184

function Nk = get . Nk ( a )

185
186

Nk = a . priKeySize / 32;
end ;

187
188

function Nr = get . Nr ( a )

189
190

Nr = ( a . priKeySize / 32) + 6;
end ;

191
192

function HexOutput = get . HexOutput ( a )

193
194

HexOutput = reshape (( dec2hex ( a .S , 2) ) ’, 1 , []) ;
end

195
196

function IntKey = get . IntKey ( a )

197
198

IntKey = hex2dec ( a . HexKey ) ’;
end

199
200

function IntInput = get . IntInput ( a )

201

IntInput = hex2dec ( a . HexInput ) ;

202

end
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203
204

function IntOutput = get . IntOutput ( a )

205
206

IntOutput = reshape ( a .S , 1 , []) ;
end

207
208

function HexK eySchedu le = get . HexK eySched ule ( a )

209
210

HexK eySchedu le = [];

211

for i = 1: a . Nr +1

212

HexK eySchedu le = [ HexKeySc hedule ; reshape ( dec2hex ( reshape ( a . w (4*( i←-1) +1:4*( i -1) +4 ,:) ’, 1 , []) , 2) ’, 1 , 32) ];

213

end

214
215

end

216
217

function BinK eySchedu le = get . BinK eySched ule ( a )

218
219

BinK eySchedu le = [];

220

for iRnd = 1: a . Nr +1

221

rnd_key = reshape ( a . w (4*( iRnd -1) +1:4*( iRnd -1) +4 ,:) ’, 1 , []) ;

222

tmp = [];

223

for iByte = 1:16

224

if iByte > 1

225

tmp = [ tmp ’ ’ ];

226

end

227

tmp = [ tmp dec2bin ( rnd_key ( iByte ) , 8) ];

228

end

229

BinK eySchedu le = [ BinKeySc hedule ; tmp ];

230

end

231
232

end

233
234

% AESObject constructor .

235

function a = AESObject ( hexinput , hexkey , mode )

236
237

load A E S O b j e c t _ l o o k u p _ t a b l e s ;

238
239

a . InvSBox = InvSBox ; clear InvSBox ;

240

a . PM = PM ; clear PM ;

241

a . RCon = RCon ; clear RCon ;

242

a . SBox = SBox ; clear SBox ;

243

a . ShiftRows = ShiftRows ; clear ShiftRows ;

244

a . InvShiftRows = InvShiftRows ; clear InvShiftRows ;
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245

a . P = P ; clear P ;

246

a . RotWord = RotWord ; clear RotWord ;

247
248

if nargin

249

a . HexInput = hexinput ;

250

a . HexKey = hexkey ;

251

end

252
253

if nargin > 2

254

a . Mode = mode ;

255

else

256

a . Mode = a . cENCRYPT_MODE ;

257

% Default is ’ encrypt ’ mode

end

258
259

end ;

260
261

function set . HexInput (a , hexinput )

262
263

if iscellstr ( hexinput )

264

if ( length ( hexinput ) ~= 16 )

265

error ( ’ Invalid hexadecimal input represe ntation .

Must be 16 ←-

bytes ’) ;
266

end ;

267

a . HexInput = hexinput ;

268

else

269

if ( length ( hexinput ) ~= 32 )

270

error ( ’ Invalid hexadecimal input represe ntation .

Must be 16 ←-

bytes ’) ;
271

end ;

272

for idx = 1:( length ( hexinput ) /2)

273

a . HexInput ( idx ) = cellstr ( hexinput (2* idx -1:2* idx ) ) ;

274

end

275

end ;

276
277

end ;

278
279

function set . HexKey (a , hexkey )

280
281
282

if iscellstr ( hexkey )
if isempty ( find ([16 24 32] == length ( hexkey ) , 1) )

283

error ( ’ Invalid hexadecimal key rep resenta tion .
24 , or 32 bytes long . ’) ;

284

end ;
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Must be 16 , ←-

285

a . HexKey = hexkey ;

286

else

287

if isempty ( find ([32 48 64] == length ( hexkey ) , 1) )

288

error ( ’ Invalid hexadecimal key rep resenta tion .

Must be 16 , ←-

24 , or 32 bytes long . ’) ;
289

end ;

290

for idx = 1:( length ( hexkey ) /2)

291

a . HexKey ( idx ) = cellstr ( hexkey (2* idx -1:2* idx ) ) ;

292

end

293

end ;

294
295

a . priKeySize = length ( a . HexKey ) * 8;

296

a . p r i K e y S c h e d u l e V a l i d = 0;

297
298

end ;

299
300

function mode = get . Mode ( a )

301
302

mode = a . priMode ;

303
304

end ;

305
306

function set . Mode (a , mode )

307
308

if ( a . Mode == a . cENCRYPT_MODE )

309

a . priMode = mode ;

310

elseif ( a . Mode == a . cDECRYPT_MODE )

311

a . priMode = mode ;

312

else

313

error ( ’ Invalid AES Mode Specified .

314

Must be 0 or 1 ’) ;

end ;

315
316

a . UpdateOutput ;

317
318

end ;

319
320

% % Implement the AES Key Expansion algorithm per FIPS 197.

321

%

322

function keyschedule = get . w ( a ) %

Verified working for FIPS 197 test keys ( all sizes )

323
324

if a . p r i K e y S c h e d u l e V a l i d

325
326

keyschedule = a . priKe ySchedul e ;
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327
328

else

329
% 44 , 52 , or 60 rows for ←-

330

keyschedule = zeros (4*( a . Nr +1) ,4) ;

331

keyschedule (1: a . Nk ,:) = ( reshape ( a . IntKey , 4 , a . Nk ) ) ’;

128/192/256 bit

332
333

% Pre - allocate memory to store intermediate values from key ←-

334

if ( a . priKeySize == 128) || ( a . priKeySize == 192)

scheduling

335
336

a . IV . temp = zeros (70 ,4) ;
else

337
338

a . IV . temp = zeros (79 ,4) ;
end

339
340

i = a . Nk ;

341

hist_idx = 1;

342
343

while i < ( a . Nb * ( a . Nr + 1) )

344

temp = keyschedule (i ,:) ; % Remember ... base 1 not base 0

345

a . IV . temp ( hist_idx , :) = temp ;

346

hist_idx = hist_idx + 1;

347
348

if ( mod (i , a . Nk ) == 0)

349

temp = temp ( a . RotWord ) ;

350

a . IV . temp ( hist_idx , :) = temp ;

351

hist_idx = hist_idx + 1;

352
353

temp = a . SBox ( temp + 1) ;

354

a . IV . temp ( hist_idx , :) = temp ;

355

hist_idx = hist_idx + 1;

356
357

temp = bitxor ( temp , a . RCon (( i / a . Nk ) , : ) ) ;

358

a . IV . temp ( hist_idx , :) = temp ;

359

hist_idx = hist_idx + 1;

360
361

elseif ( a . Nk > 6 && ( mod (i , a . Nk ) == 4) )

362
363

temp = a . SBox ( temp + 1) ;

364

a . IV . temp ( hist_idx , :) = temp ;

365

hist_idx = hist_idx + 1;

366
367

end % if
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368
369

keyschedule ( i +1 ,:) = bitxor ( keyschedule (( i +1) - a . Nk ,:) , temp )←;

370
371

i = i + 1;

372
373

end ; % while

374
375

a . p riKeySch edule = keyschedule ;

376

a . p r i K e y S c h e d u l e V a l i d = 1;

377
378

end ; % if

379

end

380
381
382

end ;
end

Listing E.2
1

function out = Encrypt ( a )

2
3

Nr = a . Nr ;

4

Nb = a . Nb ;

5

w = a.w;

6
7

IV_S = zeros (5+4*( Nr -1) ,4 ,4) ;

8

MCIVs = zeros ( Nr -1 ,4 ,4 ,4 ,2) ;

9
10

S = reshape ( a . IntInput , 4 , 4) ;

11

a.S = S;

12

IV_S (1 ,: ,:) = S ;

13
14

S = bitxor (S , w (1:4 ,:) ’) ; % AddRoundKey

15

IV_S (2 ,: ,:) = S ;

16
17

for round = 1:( Nr -1)

18

S = a . SBox ( S + 1) ;

% SubBytes

19

IV_S (3+4*( round -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

20

S = S ( a . ShiftRows ) ;

% ShiftRows

21

IV_S (4+4*( round -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

22

a.S = S;

23

a . MixColumns ;

% MixColumns

24

%

MCIVs ( round ,: ,: ,: ,1) = a . MC_IV_1 ;

25

%

MCIVs ( round ,: ,: ,: ,2) = a . MC_IV_2 ;
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26

S = a.S;

27

IV_S (5+4*( round -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

28

S = bitxor (S , w ((1+4* round ) :(4+4* round ) ,:) ’) ;

29

IV_S (6+4*( round -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

30

% AddRoundKey

end

31
32

S = a . SBox ( S + 1) ;

33

IV_S (3+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

34

S = S ( a . ShiftRows ) ; % ShiftRows

35

IV_S (4+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

36

S = bitxor (S , w ( Nb * Nr +1: Nb * Nr +4 , :) ’) ; % AddRoundKey

37

IV_S (5+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

% SubBytes

38
39

a.S = S;

40

out = a . HexOutput ;

41

a . IV . S = IV_S ;

42

a . IV . MC = MCIVs ;

43
44

end

Listing E.3
1

Decrypt.m

function out = Decrypt ( a )

2
3

% Don ’ t recalc these each time ...!

4

Nr = a . Nr ;

5

Nb = a . Nb ;

6

w = a.w;

7
8

IV_S = zeros (5+4*( Nr -1) ,4 ,4) ;

9
10

% Set initial state to input

11

S = reshape ( a . IntInput , 4 , 4) ;

12

IV_S (1 ,: ,:) = S ;

13
14

S = bitxor (S , w ( Nb * Nr +1: Nb * Nr +4 , :) ’) ; % AddRoundKey

15

IV_S (2 ,: ,:) = S ;

16
17
18
19

for round = ( Nr - 1) : -1:1
S = S ( a . InvShiftRows ) ;

% InvShiftRows

20

IV_S (3+4*( Nr - round - 1) ,: ,:) = S ;

21

S = a . InvSBox ( S + 1) ;

22

IV_S (4+4*( Nr - round - 1) ,: ,:) = S ;

% InvSubBytes
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23

S = bitxor (S , w ((1+4* round ) :(4+4* round ) ,:) ’) ;

24

IV_S (5+4*( Nr - round - 1) ,: ,:) = S ;

25

a.S = S;

26

a . InvMixColumns ;

27

S = a.S;

28

IV_S (6+4*( Nr - round - 1) ,: ,:) = S ;

29

% AddRoundKey

% InvMixColumns

end

30
31

S = S ( a . InvShiftRows ) ;

32

IV_S (3+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

33

S = a . InvSBox ( S + 1) ;

% InvShiftRows

% InvSubBytes

34

IV_S (4+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

35

S = bitxor (S , w (1:4 ,:) ’) ;

36

IV_S (5+4*( Nr -1) ,: ,:) = S ;

% AddRoundKey

37
38

a.S = S;

39

out = a . HexOutput ;

40

a . IV . S = IV_S ;

41
42

end

Listing E.4
1

MixColumns.m

%

2
3

function MixColumns ( a )

4
5

%

Commented out for efficiency .

6

%

of polymul instead .

7

%

8

%

9

%

10

%

[~ , r ] = deconv ( conv (x , y ) , a . P ) ;

11

%

tmp = mod (r , 2) ;

12

%

13

%

% Binary to decimal conversion ... much faster than bi2de !

14

%

out = [128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1] * tmp ( end -7: end ) ’;

15

%

16

%

This version is SLOW !

function out = polymul (x , y )

end

17
18

S = a.S;

19
20

Using table lookup

for col = 1:4

21
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22

s0 = S (1 , col ) ;

23

s1 = S (2 , col ) ;

24

s2 = S (3 , col ) ;

25

s3 = S (4 , col ) ;

26
27

S (1 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (2+1 , s0 +1) , a . PM (3+1 , s1 +1) ) , bitxor ( s2 , s3←-

28

S (2 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( s0 , a . PM (2+1 , s1 +1) ) , bitxor ( a . PM (3+1 , s2 +1) , s3←-

29

S (3 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( s0 , s1 ) , bitxor ( a . PM (2+1 , s2 +1) , a . PM (3+1 , s3 +1)←-

));

));

));
30

S (4 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (3+1 , s0 +1) , s1 ) , bitxor ( s2 , a . PM (2+1 , s3 +1)←));

31
32

%

33

%

This version is SLOW !
a . S (1 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul ([1 0] , s0b ) , polymul ([1 1] , s1b ) ) , ←bitxor ( s2 , s3 ) ) ;

34

a . S (2 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( s0 , polymul ([1 0] , s1b ) ) , bitxor ( polymul ([1 ←-

%

1] , s2b ) , s3 ) ) ;
35

%

a . S (3 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( s0 , s1 ) , bitxor ( polymul ([1 0] , s2b ) , polymul←([1 1] , s3b ) ) ) ;

36

%

a . S (4 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul ([1 1] , s0b ) , s1 ) , bitxor ( s2 , polymul←([1 0] , s3b ) ) ) ;

37
38

end

39
40

a.S = S;

41
42

end

Listing E.5
1

InvMixColumns.m

function InvMixColumns ( a )

2
3

% Commented out for efficiency .

4

% of polymul instead

5

%

6

%

7

%

8

%

gfx = de2bi (x , ’ left - msb ’) ;

9

%

gfy = de2bi (y , ’ left - msb ’) ;

10

%

11

%

[~ , r ] = deconv ( conv ( gfx , gfy ) , a . P ) ;

12

%

tmp = mod (r , 2) ;

This version is SLOW !

function out = polymul (x , y )
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13

%

14

%

15

%

16

%

out = bi2de ( tmp , ’ left - msb ’) ;

end

17
18

S = a.S;

19
20

for col = 1:4

21
22

s0 = S (1 , col ) ;

23

s1 = S (2 , col ) ;

24

s2 = S (3 , col ) ;

25

s3 = S (4 , col ) ;

26
27

S (1 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (14+1 , s0 +1) , a . PM (11+1 , s1 +1) ) , ...

28

bitxor ( a . PM (13+1 , s2 +1) , a . PM (9+1 , s3 +1) ) ) ;

29

S (2 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (9+1 , s0 +1) , a . PM (14+1 , s1 +1) ) ,

30

...

bitxor ( a . PM (11+1 , s2 +1) , a . PM (13+1 , s3 +1) ) ) ;

31

S (3 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (13+1 , s0 +1) , a . PM (9+1 , s1 +1) ) ,

32

...

bitxor ( a . PM (14+1 , s2 +1) , a . PM (11+1 , s3 +1) ) ) ;

33

S (4 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( a . PM (11+1 , s0 +1) , a . PM (13+1 , s1 +1) ) , ...

34

bitxor ( a . PM (9+1 , s2 +1) , a . PM (14+1 , s3 +1) ) ) ;

35
36

%

37

%

38

%

39

%

40

%

41

%

42

%

43

%

44

%

45

%

This version is SLOW !

a . S (1 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul (14 , s0 ) , polymul (11 , s1 ) ) , ...
bitxor ( polymul (13 , s2 ) , polymul (9 , s3 ) ) ) ;
a . S (2 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul (9 , s0 ) , polymul (14 , s1 ) ) ,
bitxor ( polymul (11 , s2 ) , polymul (13 , s3 ) ) ) ;
a . S (3 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul (13 , s0 ) , polymul (9 , s1 ) ) ,
bitxor ( polymul (14 , s2 ) , polymul (11 , s3 ) ) ) ;

bitxor ( polymul (9 , s2 ) , polymul (14 , s3 ) ) ) ;

end

48
49

a.S = S;

50
51

...

a . S (4 , col ) = bitxor ( bitxor ( polymul (11 , s0 ) , polymul (13 , s1 ) ) , ...

46
47

...

end
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Appendix F. MemMapTRS Source Code
This appendix contains the source code for to wrap the Riscure Inspector ‘.trs’
format with a Matlab memory-mapped interface. This allows the very large data
files to be manipulated from disk in a manner similar to native Matlab matrices.
This code is used extensively by the RF DNA Fingerprinting and Leakage Mapping
procedures. See the Matlab help files for general information on memory-mapping.
Listing F.1

MemMapTRS.m

1

% % Class to access to Riscure ’ s . trs format via Matlab memmapfile

2

%

3

%

4

%

5

%

memmap = MemMapTRS ( TracePath , TRSFileName )

6

%

new_memmap = MemMapTRS ( TracePath , TRSFileName , TraceDataMat , ...

7

%

8

%

Syntax :

PTCTDataMat , XDelta )

9

%

First two arguments ( directory & filename ) are mandatory .

10

%

are only needed if creating a new . trs file from an existing matrix

11

%

and data .

12

%

an ( N_t X N_s ) matrix containing the trace data .

13

%

of traces ( rows ) ; N_s is the number of samples per trace ( columns ) .

14

%

XDelta is the time per sample or 1/ SampleRate , used for scaling

15

%

X - Axis .

16

%

17

%

This class allows direct access to the Riscure ’. trs ’ trace set file

18

%

format using Matlab ’ s memmapfile capability .

19

%

manipulation of - very - large data sets .

20

%

21

%

Current weakness is the inability to fully treat it like a matrix .

22

%

It ’ s not currently possible to index across specific columns and

23

%

multiple rows of the traceset .

24

%

25

%

26

%

27

%

Author :

28

%

Created :

29

%

Last Modified :

30

%

31

%

! * TODO * !

Others

To create a new . trs , use the second syntax along with
N_t is the number

Allows efficient

-- Look into using Riscure ’ s Java API to improve this aspect

Maj Will Cobb
28 Feb 2010
28 Jul 2010 - added writeable flag to allow file
31 Aug 2010 - added capability to create a . trs file from
a matrix and associated PT / CT / KY data
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32

%

33

%

9 Sep 2010

- updated comments to better document
functionality .

34
35

classdef MemMapTRS < handle

36
37

properties ( Constant )

% Constants used in . trs header structure

38

NT = hex2dec ( ’ 41 ’) ;

% Number of traces

39

NS = hex2dec ( ’ 42 ’) ;

% Number of samples per trace

40

SC = hex2dec ( ’ 43 ’) ;

% Sample coding :

’000 ABBBB ’ where A indicates ←-

integer (0) or floating point (1) ; B is length in bytes ( must be in ←{1 ,2 ,4})
41

DS = hex2dec ( ’ 44 ’) ;

% Length of cryptographic / supplementary data

42

TS = hex2dec ( ’ 45 ’) ;

% Title space reserved for each trace

43

GT = hex2dec ( ’ 46 ’) ;

% Global trace title

44

DC = hex2dec ( ’ 47 ’) ;

% Description

45

XO = hex2dec ( ’ 48 ’) ;

% Offset in X - axis for trace repr esentat ion

46

XL = hex2dec ( ’ 49 ’) ;

% Label of X - axis

47

YL = hex2dec ( ’4 A ’) ;

% Label of Y - axis

48

XS = hex2dec ( ’4 B ’) ;

% Scale value for X - axis

49

YS = hex2dec ( ’4 C ’) ;

% Scale value for Y - axis

50

TO = hex2dec ( ’4 D ’) ;

% Trace offset for displaying trace numbers

51

LS = hex2dec ( ’4 E ’) ;

% Logarithmic scale

TB = hex2dec ( ’5 F ’) ;

% Trace block marker ; ’5 f 00 ’ marks end of header

52
53

end ; % properties ( Constant )

54
55

properties ( Access = public )

56

NumTraces = 0;

57

NumSamples = 0;

58

SampleCoding = 0;

59

INTE GER_CODI NG = 1;

60

FLOAT_CODING = 0;

61

SampleLength = 1;

62

DataLength = 0;

63

TitleLength = 0;

64

GlobalTitle = ’ ’;

65

Description = ’ ’;

66

XOffset = 0;

67

XLabel = ’ ’;

68

YLabel = ’ ’;

69

XDelta = 0;

70

YDelta = 0;

71

TraceOffset = 0;

72

LogScaleFlag = 0;

% Default is int8 coding

% Default is int8 coding
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73

coding_type = 0;

74

data_format = {};

75
76

memmap ;

77
78

end ; % public properties

79
80
81
82

properties ( Access = private )
idx = 0;
end ; % private properies

83
84

methods

85
86

%←% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % ←-

87

% %%

Constructor -- pass in directory ( TracePath ) and name of

88

% %%

TRS file to be memory mapped

89

%←% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % ←-

90

function m = MemMapTRS ( TracePath , TRSName , TraceDataMat , PTCTDataMat , ←XDelta )

91
92

filepath = fullfile ( TracePath , TRSName ) ;

93
94

if ~ exist ( filepath , ’ file ’)

95

if nargin < 3

96

error ( ’ Specified file :\ n \ n % s \ n \ n does not exist ! ’ , filepath ) ;

97

end

98
99

m = CreateTRSFile (m , filepath , TraceDataMat , PTCTDataMat , XDelta ) ;
end ;

100
101

m = ParseHeader (m , filepath ) ;

102

m = MakeFormat ( m ) ;

103
104

% Call memmap constructor

105

m . memmap = memmapfile ( filepath ,

...

106

’ offset ’ , m . idx ,

107

’ format ’ , m . data_format ,

...

108

’ repeat ’ , m . NumTraces ,

...

109

’ Writable ’ , true ) ;

...

is 0 based !!
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% This offset ←-

110
111

end ; % MemMapTRS method

112
113

function m = ParseHeader (m , filepath )

114
115

% % Open the file and parse the header

116

try

117

fid = fopen ( filepath , ’r ’) ;

118
119

data _loc_fou nd = 0;

120

m . idx = 0;

121
122

while ( d ata_loc_ found == 0)

123
124

tmp = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

125
126

if ( tmp == m . NT )

127

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

128

m . NumTraces = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

129

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

130

elseif ( tmp == m . NS )

131

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

132

m . NumSamples = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

133

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

134

elseif ( tmp == m . SC )

135

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

136

m . SampleCoding = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

137

if ( bitget ( m . SampleCoding , 5) == 0)

138

m . I NTEGER_ CODING = 1;

139

m . FLOAT_CODING = 0;

140

else

141

m . I NTEGER_ CODING = 0;

142

m . FLOAT_CODING = 1;

143

end ;

144

m . SampleLength = bitand ( m . SampleCoding , 7) ;

145

%

146

%

147

%

148

%

149

%

150

%

151

%

152

%

switch bitand ( SampleCoding , 7)
case 1
SampleLength = 1;
case 2
SampleLength = 2;
case 4
SampleLength = 4;
otherwise
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153

%

display ( ’ ERROR :

INVALID SAMPLE CODING DETECTED ←-

’) ;
154

%

155

%

break ;
end ;

156

% m . idx = m . idx + 2;

157

m . idx = m . idx + 3;

% I think 2 was WRONG ...?? should be 1←-

byte for code , 1 byte for length , 1 byte for sample ←coding
158

elseif ( tmp == m . DS )

159

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

160

m . DataLength = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int16 ’) ;

161

m . idx = m . idx + 4;

162

elseif ( tmp == m . TS )

163

% IMPORTANT :

164

% LONGER THAN 127 CHARACTERS ( YET ) !!!!!

THIS WON ’ T CORRECTLY HANDLE TITLE

165

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

166

m . TitleLength = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

167
168

m . idx = m . idx + 3;
elseif ( tmp == m . GT )

169

length = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

170

m . GlobalTitle = char ( fread ( fid , length , ’ int8 ’) ) ;

171

m . idx = m . idx + length + 2;

172

elseif ( tmp == m . DC )

173

length = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ uint8 ’) ;

174

m . Description = char ( fread ( fid , length , ’ int8 ’) ) ;

175

m . idx = m . idx + length + 2;

176

elseif ( tmp == m . XO )

177

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

178

m . XOffset = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int32 ’) ;

179

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

180

elseif ( tmp == m . XL )

181

length = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

182

m . XLabel = char ( fread ( fid , length , ’ int8 ’) ) ;

183
184

m . idx = m . idx + length + 2;
elseif ( tmp == m . YL )

185

length = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

186

m . YLabel = char ( fread ( fid , length , ’ int8 ’) ) ;

187
188

m . idx = m . idx + length + 2;
elseif ( tmp == m . XS )

189

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

190

m . XDelta = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ float32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

191

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

192

elseif ( tmp == m . YS )
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193

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

194

m . YDelta = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ float32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

195

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

196

elseif ( tmp == m . TO )

197

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

198

m . TraceOffset = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int32 ’) ;

199

m . idx = m . idx + 6;

200

elseif ( tmp == m . LS )

201

trash = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

202

m . LogScaleFlag = fread ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

203

m . idx = m . idx + 3;

204

elseif ( tmp == m . TB )

205

data _loc_fou nd = 1;

206

m . idx = m . idx + 2;

%

*** Not sure why this is 7 , but ←-

trial & error found this works ...
207

else

208

m . idx = m . idx + 1;

209

end ;

210
211

end ;

212
213

catch SomeException

214
215

SomeException % Display any error information

216

error ( ’ Error parsing . trs file header for file :

% s ’ , filepath ) ;

217
218

end ;

219
220

% Done parsing header ... close the file and prepare to map to memory

221

fclose ( fid ) ;

222
223

end ; % ParseHeader method

224
225

function m = CreateTRSFile (m , filepath , trace_data , PTCT_data , XDelta )

226
227

m . NumTraces = size ( trace_data , 1) ;

228

m . NumSamples = size ( trace_data , 2) ;

229

m . SampleCoding = bin2dec ( ’ 00010100 ’) ; % Floating point ( bit 5 = ’1 ’) , ←4 bytes / sample ( bits 3..0 = ’4 ’)

230

m . DataLength = 48;

231

m . TitleLength = 0;

232

m . GlobalTitle = ’ Global Title Goes Here ’;

233

m . Description = ’ Description Goes Here ’;
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234

m . XOffset = 0;

235

m . XLabel = ’ Seconds ’;

236

m . XDelta = XDelta ;

237

m . YLabel = ’ Volts ’;

238

m . YDelta = 1;

239

m . TraceOffset = 0; % What is this ?

240

m . LogScaleFlag = 0;

241

m . FLOAT_CODING = 1;

242

m . SampleLength = 4;

243
244

try

245
246

% % Open the file and write the header

247

fid = fopen ( filepath , ’w ’) ;

248
249

fwrite ( fid , m . NT , ’ int8 ’) ;

250

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

251

fwrite ( fid , m . NumTraces , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

252
253

fwrite ( fid , m . NS , ’ int8 ’) ;

254

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

255

fwrite ( fid , m . NumSamples , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

256
257

fwrite ( fid , m . SC , ’ int8 ’) ;

258

fwrite ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

259

fwrite ( fid , m . SampleCoding , ’ uint8 ’) ;

260
261

fwrite ( fid , m . DS , ’ int8 ’) ;

262

fwrite ( fid , 2 , ’ int8 ’) ;

263

fwrite ( fid , m . DataLength , ’ int16 ’) ;

264
265

fwrite ( fid , m . TS , ’ int8 ’) ;

266

fwrite ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

267

fwrite ( fid , m . TitleLength , ’ int8 ’) ;

268
269

fwrite ( fid , m . GT , ’ int8 ’) ;

270

fwrite ( fid , length ( m . GlobalTitle ) , ’ int8 ’) ;

271

fwrite ( fid , uint8 ( m . GlobalTitle ) , ’ uint8 ’) ;

272
273

fwrite ( fid , m . DC , ’ int8 ’) ;

274

fwrite ( fid , length ( m . Description ) , ’ int8 ’) ;

275

fwrite ( fid , uint8 ( m . Description ) , ’ uint8 ’) ;

276
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277

fwrite ( fid , m . XO , ’ int8 ’) ;

278

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

279

fwrite ( fid , 0 , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

280
281

fwrite ( fid , m . XL , ’ int8 ’) ;

282

fwrite ( fid , length ( m . XLabel ) , ’ int8 ’) ;

283

fwrite ( fid , uint8 ( m . XLabel ) , ’ uint8 ’) ;

284
285

fwrite ( fid , m . YL , ’ int8 ’) ;

286

fwrite ( fid , length ( m . YLabel ) , ’ int8 ’) ;

287

fwrite ( fid , uint8 ( m . YLabel ) , ’ uint8 ’) ;

288
289

fwrite ( fid , m . XS , ’ int8 ’) ;

290

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

291

fwrite ( fid , m . XDelta , ’ float32 ’) ;

292
293

fwrite ( fid , m . YS , ’ int8 ’) ;

294

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

295

fwrite ( fid , m . YDelta , ’ float32 ’) ;

296
297

fwrite ( fid , m . TO , ’ int8 ’) ;

298

fwrite ( fid , 4 , ’ int8 ’) ;

299

fwrite ( fid , m . TraceOffset , ’ int32 ’ , ’l ’) ;

300
301

fwrite ( fid , m . LS , ’ int8 ’) ;

302

fwrite ( fid , 1 , ’ int8 ’) ;

303

fwrite ( fid , m . LogScaleFlag , ’ uint8 ’) ;

304
305

fwrite ( fid , m . TB , ’ int8 ’) ;

306

fwrite ( fid , 0 , ’ int8 ’) ;

307
308

% Write each row with PTCTData ....

309

for trace_idx = 1: size ( trace_data , 1) ;

310

fwrite ( fid , PTCT_data ( trace_idx ,:) , ’ uint8 ’) ;

311

fwrite ( fid , trace_data ( trace_idx ,:) , ’ single ’) ;

312

end

313
314

% Done writing file ... close

315

fclose ( fid ) ;

316
317

catch SomeException

318
319

SomeException % Display any error information
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320

error ( ’ Error creating file header for specified file :

% s ’ , ←-

filepath ) ;
321
322

end ;

323
324

end ; % CreateHeader method

325
326
327

% After reading the appropriate parameters from the file header ,

328

% construct the format that will be used to map the file to memory

329

function m = MakeFormat ( m )

330
331

if ( m . FLOAT_CODING == 1)

332
333

m . coding_type = ’ single ’;
elseif m . SampleLength == 1

334
335

m . coding_type = ’ int8 ’;
elseif m . SampleLength == 2

336
337

m . coding_type = ’ int16 ’;
elseif m . SampleLength == 4

338
339

m . coding_type = ’ int32 ’;
else

340
341

error ( ’ ERROR :

INVALID CODING TYPE DETECTED ’) ;

end ;

342
343

% Four possible combinations for actual trace data block ... must have ←actual

344

% tracedata , but Title and Data are optional .

345

if (( m . DataLength > 0) && ( m . TitleLength > 0) )

346
347

m . data_format = { ’ uint8 ’

348
349

[1 m . TitleLength ]

’ Title ’;

’ uint8 ’

350
351

...

...
[1 m . DataLength ]

’ PTCTData ’;

sprintf ( m . coding_type )

352

...

[1 m . NumSamples ]

...
...

’ tracedata ’ };

353
354

elseif ( m . DataLength > 0)

355
356

m . data_format = { ’ uint8 ’

357
358

...
[1 m . DataLength ]

’ PTCTData ’;

sprintf ( m . coding_type )

359

[1 m . NumSamples ]

360
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...
...

’ tracedata ’ };

361

elseif ( m . TitleLength > 0)

362
363

m . data_format = { ’ uint8 ’

364

...
[1 m . TitleLength ]

365

’ Title ’;

sprintf ( m . coding_type )

366

[1 m . NumSamples ]

...
...

’ tracedata ’ };

367
368

else

% No title or data areas allocated ...

369
370

m . data_format = { sprintf ( m . coding_type )

371

[1 m . NumSamples ]

372
373

end ;

374
375

end ; % MakeFormat method

376
377
378

end ; % Methods
end
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...
’ tracedata ’ };
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Christophe Clavier, Jean-Sébastien Coron, and Nora Dabbous. Differential power analysis in the presence of hardware countermeasures. In
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DHBČ09.
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